Jackson Vanik will pass – bipartisan support of congress and interest groups gives momentum
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turns terrorismU.S. Russian cooperation, specifically South and central Asia key to preventing terrorismHahn, 9 - Gordon M 5/21 senior researcher, Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program, and visiting assistant professor, Graduate School of International Policy Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, California; senior researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group, California; and analyst/consultant. “U.s. Russian relations and the war against jihadism" http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/hahn.pdf p. 4-5 ZM Changes in the structure of the jihadist movement since the September 11 attacks strengthen the rationale for broader and deeper U.S.-Russian cooperation. The leading role of al Qaeda in the global jihad has weakened, and a more decentralized network of still-allied but more isolated and self-sufficient jihadist nodes such as the “Caucasus Emirate” has emerged. In part, this restructuring is a result of better intelligence, police, and immigration performance in the West and Russia. However “leaderless” the jihad may be, the combination of continuing mutual assistance between its local nodes requires real coordination between the United States and Russia if not joint efforts in order to disrupt communications and attack more localized nodes. Strategically, Washington and Moscow are on the same page, which shows that the global jihadist threat is real and must be eliminated. But tactically, they diverge according to the extent that they each perceive one particular jihadist movement or another as a threat. With this in mind, in which regions can U.S.-Russian cooperation against jihadism be initiated and enhanced, and where is it a hopeless venture, at least at present? Jihadists outside of Eurasia writ large—including Eurasia proper, plus Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and the Persian Gulf region in general—represent little or no threat to Russia, but do threaten U.S. interests and/or those of its allies. Thus, in places such as Southeast Asia and northern Africa, there is little or no common interest or threat, though jihadist takeovers ultimately would affect both countries’ interests in the long run. In the Middle East, including Iraq, interests and perceptions diverge significantly, though again, a jihadist takeover in Iraq would have serious implications for both countries. Regarding the more immediate threats to their respective homelands, threats to one are, by all appearances, of less concern to the other, but mistakenly so. A catastrophic terrorist attack in the United States would affect the entire world, something that the U.S. financial crisis and its spread around the globe underscored. Similarly, Russia’s own jihadist threat in the North Caucasus means that Russia, Pakistan, and India constitute the only countries that possess both a significant jihadist movement and large stockpiles of nuclear and other materials and weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the North Caucasus mujahedin have metastasized into a threat to the United States, albeit one with limited capacity at present. In regions bordering Russia, such as Central Asia and the South Caucasus, especially Azerbaijan, deepening U.S. and Western involvement creates a modus vivendi for cooperation with Moscow in the war against jihadism. In sum, South and Central Asia and the Caucasus are the two regions where sufficient common interests and threats offer realistic prospects for increased U.S.-Russian security cooperation against jihadism. turns prolifStrong U.S.-Russia cooperation key to check proliferationBerman 08 Howard Berman (Member of the House of Representatives, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs) “Russia, Iran, and Nuclear Weapons”, Committee on Foreign Affairs, http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/press_display.asp?id=519 We’re here this morning to begin to assess the proposed agreement between the United States and Russian governments to expand civil nuclear cooperation. One key factor we’ll take into account during this process is the extent to which Russia is cooperating with the United States, the European Union and others to discourage Iran’s development of a nuclear weapons capability.One of the greatest potential threats to the security of the United States and its allies is an Iranian Bomb. We’ve all heard the crude threats that President Ahmadinejad makes against Israel, which he repeated as recently as last week. But Israel’s not the only state feeling the heat from Tehran’s radioactive rhetoric. Other states in the Middle East are now, suddenly, interested in developing their own nuclear energy programs, emulating Iran. I don’t believe this is a pure coincidence. As we know all too well, allegedly peaceful nuclear power programs can be used as a cover for the clandestine development of nuclear weapons.Not only would a nuclear-armed Tehran have the ability to intimidate other states in ways that could cripple U.S. national interests in the region and beyond – it would also effectively end the global nonproliferation regime. Unfortunately, we currently face a situation in which Iran is enriching uranium faster than sanctions are being applied to stop it. To date, the multilateral sanctions imposed on Iran by the United Nations are woefully inadequate. They have failed to change Tehran’s calculation that the benefits of a nuclear weapons capability outweigh the costs. In other words, our current policy at this particular point -- and I hope it changes, but at this particular point -- is not working. Russia’s role in persuading and pressuring Iran to cease its dangerous nuclear activities is absolutely crucial. Yet in the past, Moscow has often been the main stumbling block to tougher sanctions. While Russia recently has been more supportive, its commitment to effective international action remains in question. Just two weeks ago, Russian Prime Minister Putin publicly declared that there is no evidence that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability; he said this the very same week that the International Atomic Energy Agency seemed to be moving toward the opposite conclusion. It is in this context that the Bush Administration has signed a new agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with Moscow, something that has long been promised and upon which Russia places a high value. The Foreign Affairs Committee formally received the proposed nuclear cooperation agreement on May 13th. For the record, we are now on Day 19 of the statutory Congressional review period of 90 continuous days of session. The agreement will enter into force if, during this 90-day period, Congress does not enact a joint resolution of disapproval or approves a resolution of approval with conditions over the President’s veto. This Committee has statutory responsibility to review the proposed agreement and report to the House on whether it should be approved or disapproved. This hearing is an initial step in that process. There has already been a significant amount of commentary on the benefits and drawbacks of this agreement. Its proponents argue that it may encourage Russia to be more forthcoming on tougher sanctions on Iran; critics counter that Russia will do so only if we hold the agreement back as a point of leverage. Proponents claim this agreement will allow the U.S. and Russia to work together to create a nuclear fuel bank and multilateral fuel assurances to reduce incentives for countries, like Iran, to develop their own uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants, that can make fuel for reactors or bombs. Critics respond that these things can be done now without this agreement. Advocates claim that this agreement will allow greater cooperation with Russia to develop proliferation-resistant reprocessing methods to extract useful uranium and plutonium from spent reactor fuel with minimal risk of diversion to military ends. Opponents charge that any reprocessing is dangerous, and efforts to expand reprocessing globally will inevitably encourage other states to start their own reprocessing efforts. To the extent that the Russia cooperation agreement assists this effort, opponents charge, it actually works against nonproliferation efforts to reduce the amount of plutonium available for nuclear weapons. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 0.68 Mb. Share with your friends:
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