Political turbulence, uncertainty, following Jammeh’s rejection of election results
December proved a highly eventful month in The Gambia, as a result of President Yahya Jammeh’s rejection of the results of the December 1 elections following an initial public concession. The move elicited widespread international condemnation, and mediation efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), led by Nigerian President Mahamadu Buhari, are currently ongoing. Domestically, Jammeh’s belated reversal was not seen to spark public protests or unrest, most likely due to the announcement being accompanied by a heavy deployment of troops throughout the capital Banjul, yet it nevertheless engendered calls from numerous political actors for him to step down, including 12 of the country’s own ambassadors.
Looking ahead, it is likely that Jammeh will remain resistant to the prospect to of handing power to president elect Adama Barrow. Efforts by the opposition camp to reassure Jammeh that he will not face legal action should he relinquish power, in contrast to earlier statements made by senior opposition member Fatoumata Jallow-Tambajang have thus far proven fruitless. Meanwhile, the ECOWAS dialogue has shown similarly little progress, despite the notable pressure exerted through the explicit mention of military intervention as a possible course of action should peaceful negotiations fail. Barrow enjoys significant support both at home and abroad, yet Jammeh and his Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) remain entrenched within the Gambia’s institutional infrastructure, and in control of the country’s security apparatus. Army chief General Ousman Badjie, who initially offered his support to Barrow, has since reversed his position and reaffirmed his loyalty to Jammeh. As such, he possesses the tools to quell any dissent within the country. Jammeh has also repeatedly exhibited distain for the international community, and thus is unlikely to be receptive to negotiation efforts. In this context, we assess that a period of nonviolent instability is liable to accompany the current political stalemate. Focal points for actual unrest include the Supreme Court’s slated ruling on Jammeh’s election appeal on January 10, as well as the inauguration date on January 19, when Jammeh is ostensibly slated to transfer power to Barrow. The ultimate outcome of the crisis, however, remains unclear, not least due to Jammeh’s unpredictability and eccentricity. Despite Jammeh’s resistance to international mediation, an exile agreement with immunity is somewhat plausible in the event other legal options are exhausted. However, there simultaneously exists a significant possibility that the incumbent president will attempt to call ECOWAS’ bluff with regards to military intervention, particularly in light of the extensive political will such an action would require.
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| KENYA |
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Medium Risk
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NOTABLE DATES
| Current Situation
  DECEMBER
5
23
19
Health workers strike in Nairobi’s CBD
Pokot and Marakwet clashes in Kerio Valley leave several homes torched, at least four killed
Two killed in al-Shabaab attack on telecommunication mast in Tarbaj, Wajir County
Assessments & Forecast
Rise of al-Shabaab attacks in Eastern Kenya
In spite of a relative effort from the Kenyan Security forces evidenced by several arrests of suspected jihadist or security operations, this past month al-Shabaab further demonstrated its ability to move freely and carry out deadly attacks in the Eastern regions of the country thus casting lights on Nairobi’s counterinsurgency inaction. Indeed, al-Shabaab’s strategy of isolating Kenyan counties bordering with Somalia and undermining their economy by targeting their telecommunications infrastructures, health workers or educators has proven successful and transpired in a relative uptick in their attacks in Kenya. Additionally this rise of militancy activity serves as a reminder of Kenya-Somalia border’s porosity, which is even heighten in December with the ongoing rainy season, which is said to provide additional cover for militants attempting cross-border operations. In this context, similar al-Shabaab attacks in the aforementioned outlying areas are very likely to be witnessed over the coming month.
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Violent demonstrations meeting harsh police reprisal
In Kenya, the month of December has been marked by a relatively high number of protests devolving into significant unrest and facing violent repression measures from the security forces evidenced with a number of arrests, or use of teargas to disperse the crowds. The harsh police reprisal against anti-government demonstrators such as the #TakeBackKenya movement where locals protested the government corruption or the health workers strike in early December serve to underscore President Uhuru Kenyatta’s government low tolerance for any form of political dissent. Notwithstanding, such disproportionate use of forces from the police is typical in Kenya thus rendering only relatively notable this month’s trend. Consequently, we assess that further violent security force are liable to occur going into January if any demonstration should take place.
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Continuing intercommunal clashes
Despite a notable effort of the Kenyan government in recognizing the problem and deploying over 200 police reservists in the Kerio Valley in November, deadly intercommunal clashes recurred in December as we assessed in previous reports. However, the clashes were largely localized to the Kerio Valley, between the Pokot and Marakwet communities. The persistent intercommunal violence is mostly related to disputes over resources and territories among pastoralists in the region, further cemented by ethnic rivalry and general lawlessness in the area. In this context, and given that the dynamics fueling the tensions between communities remain unchanged in spite of the recent government’s security measures, we assess that further similar clashes are liable to recur in January as well.
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