new development and legacy systems

3.5 new development and legacy systems

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  First, reconfirm or update as necessary, the security category and impact level for the information system based on the types of information that are currently being processed, stored, or transmitted by the system.
  
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  Second, review the existing security plan that describes the security controls that are currently employed considering any updates to the security category and information system impact level as well as any changes to the organization, mission/business processes, the system, or the operational environment. Reassess the risk and revise the security plan as necessary, including documenting any additional security controls that would be needed by the system to ensure that the risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, remains at an acceptable level.
  
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  Third, implement the security controls described in the updated security plan, document in the plan of action and milestones any controls not implemented, and continue with the remaining steps in the Risk Management Framework in the same manner as a new development system.
  

Applying Gap Analyses to External Service Providers

The gap analysis perspective is also applied when interacting with external service providers. As described in Section 2.5, organizations are becoming increasingly reliant on external providers for information system services. Using the steps in the gap analysis described above, organizations can effectively use the acquisition process and appropriate contractual vehicles to require external providers to carry out the security categorization and security control selection steps in the RMF. The resulting information can help determine what security controls the external provider either has in place or intends to implement for the information system services that are to be provided. If a security control deficit exists, the responsibility for adequately mitigating unacceptable risks arising from the use of external information system services remains with authorizing officials. In such situations, organizations can reduce the organizational risk to an acceptable level by:

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  Using the existing contractual vehicle to require the external provider to meet the additional security control requirements established by the organization;
  
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  Negotiating with the provider for additional security controls if the existing contractual vehicle does not provide for such added requirements;
  
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  Approving the use of compensating controls by the provider; or
  
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  Employing alternative risk mitigation actions⁸⁹ within the organizational information system when a contract either does not exist or the contract does not provide the necessary leverage for organizations to obtain the needed security controls.
  

Implementation Tip

Many organizations operate and maintain complex information systems, often referred to as a system-of-systems. Enterprise architecture plays a key part in the security control selection process for these types of information systems. Organizations can address the complex system problem by dividing the system into two or more subsystems and applying the FIPS 199 security categorization and FIPS 200 impact level determination to each subsystem. Applying separate impact levels to each subsystem does not change the overall impact level of the information system; rather, it allows constituent subsystems to receive a separate allocation of security controls instead of deploying higher-impact controls across every subsystem. It is not valid to treat the subsystems as entirely independent entities, however, since the subsystems are interdependent and interconnected.

Organizations develop security architectures to allocate security controls among subsystems including monitoring and controlling communications at key internal boundaries within the system and provide system-wide controls that meet or exceed the highest information system impact level of the constituent subsystems inheriting security capabilities from those controls. Organizations also consider that replicated subsystems within complex systems may exhibit common vulnerabilities that can be exploited by common threat sources—thereby negating the redundancy that might be relied upon as a risk mitigation measure. The impact due to a security incident against one constituent subsystem might cascade and impact many subsystems at the same time.



appendix a

Directory: publications
publications -> Acm word Template for sig site
publications ->  Preparation of Papers for ieee transactions on medical imaging
publications -> Adjih, C., Georgiadis, L., Jacquet, P., & Szpankowski, W. (2006). Multicast tree structure and the power law
publications -> Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (eth) Zurich Computer Engineering and Networks Laboratory
publications -> Quantitative skills
publications -> Multi-core cpu and gpu implementation of Discrete Periodic Radon Transform and Its Inverse
publications -> List of Publications Department of Mechanical Engineering ucek, jntu kakinada
publications -> 1. 2 Authority 1 3 Planning Area 1
publications -> Sa michelson, 2011: Impact of Sea-Spray on the Atmospheric Surface Layer. Bound. Layer Meteor., 140 ( 3 ), 361-381, doi: 10. 1007/s10546-011-9617-1, issn: Jun-14, ids: 807TW, sep 2011 Bao, jw, cw fairall, sa michelson

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