Kritik Toolbox Supplement – bfhhr general



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at: hyperreality

We do, in fact, know the difference between simulation and reality --- the media plays a healthy role in the public sphere


March, 95 James Marsh, Professor of Philosophy, Fordham University, 95, Critique, Action, and Liberation, pp. 292-293

Such an account, however, is as one-sided or perhaps even more one-sided than that of naive modernism. We note a residual idealism that does not take into account socioeconomic realities already pointed out such as the corporate nature of media, their role in achieving and legitimating profit, and their function of manufacturing consent. In such a postmodernist account is a reduction of everything to image or symbol that misses the relationship of these to realities such as corporations seeking profit, impoverished workers in these corporations, or peasants in Third-World countries trying to conduct elections. Postmodernism does not adequately distinguish here between a reduction of reality to image and a mediation of reality by image. A media idealism exists rooted in the influence of structuralism and poststructuralism and doing insufficient justice to concrete human experience, judgment, and free interaction in the world.4 It is also paradoxical or contradictory to say it really is true that nothing is really true, that everything is illusory or imaginary. Postmodemism makes judgments that implicitly deny the reduction of reality to image. For example, Poster and Baudrillard do want to say that we really are in a new age that is informational and postindustrial. Again, to say that everything is imploded into media images is akin logically to the Cartesian claim that everything is or might be a dream. What happens is that dream or image is absolutized or generalized to the point that its original meaning lying in its contrast to natural, human, and social reality is lost. We can discuss Disneyland as reprehensible because we know the difference between Disneyland and the larger, enveloping reality of Southern California and the United States.5 We can note also that postmodernism misses the reality of the accumulation-legitimation tension in late capitalism in general and in communicative media in particular. This tension takes different forms in different times. In the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, social, economic, and political reality occasionally manifested itself in the media in such a way that the electorate responded critically to corporate and political policies. Coverage of the Vietnam war, for example, did help turn people against the war. In the 1980s, by contrast, the emphasis shifted more toward accumulation in the decade dominated by the “great communicator.” Even here, however, the majority remained opposed to Reagan’s policies while voting for Reagan. Human and social reality, while being influenced by and represented by the media, transcended them and remained resistant to them.6 To the extent that postmodernists are critical of the role media play, we can ask the question about the normative adequacy of such a critique. Why, in the absence of normative conceptions of rationality and freedom, should media dominance be taken as bad rather than good? Also, the most relevant contrasting, normatively structured alternative to the media is that of the “public sphere,” in which the imperatives of free, democratic, nonmanipulable communicative action are institutionalized. Such a public sphere has been present in western democracies since the nineteenth century but has suffered erosion in the twentieth century as capitalism has more and more taken over the media and commercialized them. Even now the public sphere remains normatively binding and really operative through institutionalizing the ideals of free, full, public expression and discussion; ideal, legal requirements taking such forms as public service programs, public broadcasting, and provision for alternative media; and social movements acting and discoursing in and outside of universities in print, in demonstrations and forms of resistance, and on media such as movies, television, and radio.7

Even if simulation exists, reality is still putting up a good fight – plus the aff fails***


Luke, Chair, Political Science Dept – Virginia Tech, ‘91(Timothy W, “Power and politics in hyperreality: The critical project of Jean Baudrillard,” Social Science Journal, Vol. 28 Issue 3, p347)

Baudrillard's critical project clearly outlines a fascinating and innovative appraisal of the often confusing and contradictory tendencies in contemporary society that are usually labelled as "postmodernity." Nonetheless, there are considerable weaknesses as well as great strengths in Baudrillard's system of analysis. The tenacity of "reality" or "modernity" in several spheres of everyday life, for example, often still overshadows "hyperreality." Thus, it seems that Baudrillard's major flaw is mistaking a handful of incipient developments or budding trends for a full-blown or completely fixed new social order. The total break with all past forms of social relations cannot be verified either from within or from outside of Baudrillard's frameworks. While he denies finding much systematicity in hyperreal capitalism and sees the end of "production" and "power" in the rise of seduction, Baudrillard still clings to the image of a powerful exploitative system in his call to the masses to recognize "that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic."( n21) This twist in his thinking raises important questions. Why does a social order that no longer really exists need his theoretical intervention to be transformed by mass resistance if it is not real, powerful or productive? Likewise, if the history of power and production has ended, then why does Baudrillard envision today's best radical opposition to capital and the state assuming the form of hyperconformity by pushing "the system" into a hyperlogical practice of itself to induce the crisis that might abolish it?

On the other hand, Baudrillard's strategy of "hyperconformity," as a means of radical resistance, does not seriously challenge the consumerist modes of domination intrinsic to transnational corporate capitalism. Moreover, its ties to consumer subjectivity do not even begin to address other possible strategies of resistance following lines drawn by gender, race, ethnicity, language or ecology. Unlike Lyotard, he does not advance any new conceptions of postmodern justice or articulate alternative principles to represent meaningful narratives about values in hyperreality. Thus, Baudrillard also can be tarred with the brush of neoconservatism, like many other postmodernist critics of society.( n22) Baudrillard tends to misplace the concreteness of the relations that he is investigating, lumping everything into the category of "seduction" which, in turn, totally subsumes such complex factors as power, production, sex, and economy into one universal force. He claims somewhat contradictorily that "seduction . . . does not partake of the real order." Yet, at the same time, "seduction envelops the whole real process of power, as well as the whole real order of production, with this never-ending reversibility and disaccumulation--without which neither power nor production would even exist."( n23) While Baudrillard makes these claims, he never really demonstrates definitely how this all works with carefully considered evidence.

we’re capable of seeing beyond the simulation because we’re not just mindless drones


King 98 http://eric.exeter.ac.uk/exeter/bitstream/10036/71394/1/King%2520Baudrillard%2520Telos.pdf King, A (1998). "Baudrillard's Nihilism and the End of Theory". Telos (New York, N.Y.) (0090-6514), 1998 (112), p. 89. Anthony King is a Professor in Sociology. His main areas of research are football, social theory and latterly, the military. He has published widely in international journals and his two most recent books are, The European Ritual and The Structure of Social Theory (see research page for details and downloadable papers). Although diverse, his research is concerned with analysing contemporary social change in Europe through anthropological studies situated within the context of wider institutional transformation.

The Fictitiousness of Hyperreality In severing the dialectical process of interpretation at its first and most assertive point and in raising his most cursory impressions of television culture to a definitive analysis of that culture, Baudrillard seriously misrepresents the transformations which have occurred over the last three decades. Baudrillard’s notion of hyperreality cannot be defended as an account of recent cultural transformations, although he is undoubtedly correct to point to the importance of television as a central element in contemporary culture. It is a startling development that in the last thirty years, practically everyone in the West is able to see footage of events from almost anywhere, and this footage is invariably misleading, even though it is apparently so compelling and “realistic.” However, Baudrillard is wrong to leap to the conclusion that reality is obliterated by the television screen. Television does not create an entirely false reality either in its representation of the world or with its reception by viewers. Television coverage is informed by the understandings and interpretations of the society to which it broadcasts and by those who work in it. Thus, any footage is an interpretation of the world according to a particular culture and, consequently, it is necessarily limited. Programmers try to render this interpretation of the world as compelling as possible to attract viewers and to sustain their claims, but those images are always and necessarily “social”; they are the historical products of a particular culture. Then the images are not free-floating, mere simulacra but, on the contrary, concrete moves in a cultural practice. They refer not so much to the reality of the situations they portray but rather to the society to which they communicate these images, and they only make sense to viewers insofar as viewers are thoroughly embedded in that culture. Similarly, television viewers do not regard these images as empty, referenceless and fragmentary. On the contrary, just as the creation of these images is embedded in the intepretive practice of making sense of the world, so the viewers try to interpret these images to make sense of their world. Whether the program be a soap opera or news footage, viewers interpret the images according to their cultural understandings31 — although those understandings are under constant revision in order to make sense of new information. Rather than becoming the primary and prior cultural factor in contemporary society, television is embedded in and dependent upon pre-existing and historically produced understandings. Furthermore, the footage does not exist above and beyond the lives of viewers but, as the briefest autobiographical consideration will reveal, television is employed as a resource, wherein new interpretations derived from its footage are used in the renegotiation of social relations.




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