Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (ltte)
Rotberg, Robert I. Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation. Brookings Institution Press, 1999
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Rotberg, Robert I. Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation. Brookings Institution Press, 1999.Samaranayake, Gamini. “Political Terrorism of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka.” Journal of South Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (April 2007): 171-183. Stein, Yael and Alex Barnea Burnley. “Sri Lanka-Tamil and Sinhalese Conflict Timeline 1971-2010.” Genocide Prevention Now (2010): 1-72. Stokke, Kristian. “Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions and Forms of Governance in LTTE-Controlled Areas in Sri Lanka.” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 6 (2006): 1021-1040. “Taming the Tigers from here in the U.S.” FBI. January 2008. Tilly, Charles. “Terrorism as Strategy and Relational Process.” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 46, 1 (2005): 11-32. Uyangoda, Jayadeva. “Sri Lanka in 2009: From Civil War to Political Uncertainties.” Asian Survey 50, no. 1 (January/February 2010): 104-111. Vaughn, Bruce. “Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations.” Congressional Research Service (2011): 1-9. Wayland, Sarah. “Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora.” Review of International Studies 30, no. 3 (July 2004): 405-426. Weisman, Steven R. "ASSASSINATION IN INDIA; Rajiv Gandhi: A Son Who Won, Lost and Tried a Comeback." The New York Times. May 22, 1991. Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. London: Bodley Head, 2011. 1 Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2007), 380. 2 Upon further investigation, 12 percent of the total population are Sri Lankan Tamils, while 6 percent are Up-country or Hill country Tamils from southern India. See: Robert I. Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation (Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 4. Conversely, the CIA World Factbook reports that in 2012, Tamils originating from India and Sri Lanka only made up approximately 9 percent of the total population. CIA does note that 18 percent of the Sri Lankan population speaks Tamil rather than Sihalese, however. See: CIA, “Sri Lanka,” CIA World Factbook, December 5, 2012 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ce.html. 3 CIA, “Sri Lanka.” 4 Mahānāma, 5th cent., Wilhelm Geiger, and Mabel Haynes Bode. The Mahāvaṃsa: Or, The Great Chronicle of Ceylon, (London: Pub. for the Pali text society by Luzac & co., 1964). Also, Gamini Samaranayake, “Political Terrorism of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka,” Journal of South Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (April 2007): 172. 5 Sinhalese originates from the Indo-Aryan language family, while Tamil remains one of the oldest languages in use in the Dravidian family. Linguistic studies reveal the divides between the languages. See: Robert Caldwell, Comparative Grammar of Dravidian Or South Indian Family of Languages (New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 1998). 6 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 46. 7 Rotberg, Creating Peace, 4. 9 CIA, “Sri Lanka.” 10 Rotberg, Creating Peace, 5. 11 Ibid., 4. 12 Thomas A. Marks, “Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, eds. Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007). 13 Rotberg, Creating Peace, 5. 14 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 48. 15 Ibid., 49. 16 Throughout the 1960s, the Federal Party promoted the restoration of the “Historical Homeland” for Tamils in the former Jaffna Kingdom which ruled over the northern and eastern regions of the island from the 13th century until the Portuguese arrived in the 16th century. However, the concept never garnered widespread public support. See: Samaranayake, “Political Terrorism,” 173. 17 Rotberg, Creating Peace, 7. 18 Ibid., 6-7. 19 Ibid., 6. 20 Marks, “Sri Lanka,” 486. 21 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 50. 22 The People’s Liberation Front, or JVP, conducted an insurgency in 1971 which led to the deaths of approximately 20,000 Tamils and Tamil sympathizers. See: Marks, “Sri Lanka,” 486. 23 In addition, the Tamil New Tigers, the precursor to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, emerged in 1973. See: Rotberg, Creating Peace, 7. 24 Rotberg, Creating Peace, 7.; Marks, “Sri Lanka,” 487. 25 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 51. 26 Ibid., 51-52. 27 Manoj Joshi, "On the Razor's Edge: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam," Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 19, no. 1 (January 1996): 23. 28 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 53. 30 Since violence broke out in the 1970s, the Tamils have found refuge in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu; the area provides a safe haven and training grounds for LTTE forces today. See: Chaliand and Blin, The History of Terrorism, 380. 31 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 54. 32 Ibid. 33 Marks, “Sri Lanka,” 490. 34 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 45-46. 35 Marks, “Sri Lanka,” 488. 36 Bruce Hoffman and Gordon H. McCormick, "Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack," Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 27, no. 4 (July 2004): 258. 37 The TNT, created to quiet any Tamil support for the pro-Sinhalese government, served as Prabhakaran’s stepping stone to greatness as he formulated a plan to spearhead the making of a radical militant Tamil organization of his own. See: Hoffman and McCormick, “Suicide Attack,” 258. 38 Hoffman and McCormick, “Suicide Attack,” 257-258. 39 Joshi, “Razor’s Edge,” 21. 40 Rohan Gunaratna in Hoffman and McCormick, “Suicide Attack,” 258. 41 Hoffman and McCormick, “Suicide Attack,” 258. 42 No pro-Tamil organization has outright claimed to be doing religious duty in supporting the Tamil cause. Groups typically find their motivation and justification for action from the political plight of the Tamils, especially because the group fell from their position of power under British colonial rule. 43 Jerrold M. Post, The Mind of The Terrorist (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 85. 44 Samaranayake, “Political Terrorism,” 174. 45 Marks, “Sri Lanka,” 494. 46 Suthaharan Nadarajah and Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, “Liberation Struggle or Terrorism? The Politics of Naming the LTTE,” Third World Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2005): 88. 47 Marks, “Sri Lanka,” 492. 48 Sarah Wayland, “Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora,” Review of International Studies 30, no. 3 (July 2004): 414. 49 Hoffman and McCormick, “Suicide Attack,” 261. 50 Samaranayake, “Political Terrorism,” 175. 51 Chaliand and Blin, The History of Terrorism, 380.; Wayland, “Ethnonationalist networks,” 413. 52 Neil DeVotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey 49 (November/December 2009): 1023. 53 Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, “Liberation Struggle or Terrorism?” 89. 54 Rotberg, Creating Peace, 2. 55 Kyle Beardsley, “Rebel Groups as Predatory Organizations: The Political Effects of the 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (August 2009): 624-645. 56 Shawn Teresa Flanigan, “Nonprofit Service Provision by Insurgent Organizations: The Cases of Hizballah and the Tamil Tigers,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31 (2008): 503. 57 Ibid., 511. 58 Ibid., 512-513. 59 Kristian Stokke, “Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions and Forms of Governance in LTTE-Controlled Areas in Sri Lanka,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 6 (2006): 1029. 60 Joshi, “Razor’s Edge,” 22.; Rotberg, Creating Peace, 2; Beardsley, “2004 Tsunami,” 625. 61 “Taming the Tigers from here in the U.S.” FBI, January 2008, http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/ tamil_tigers011008. 62 G.H. Peiris, “Secessionist War and Terrorism: Transactional Impulses,” in The Global Threat of Terror: Ideological, Material and Political Linkages (New Delhi: Buwark Books, 2002), 85–126. 63 Of these groups, the Federation of Association of Canadian Tamils, or the “Snow Tigers,” gives the largest share of funding and political support to the LTTE. See: Stewart Bell, “The Spillover Effect: The Canadian Diasporas and Terrorism,” in The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism, eds. Doron Zimmermann and William Rosenau (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2009), 44. 64 Samaranayake, “Political Terrorism,” 175. 65 Rotberg, Creating Peace, 8. 66 Ibid., 2. 67 Tilly would argue that taxation of the public would make the organization more responsible to the populace, which could prove detrimental when group members seek political goals that do not align with popular desires. See: Charles Tilly, “Terrorism as Strategy and Relational Process,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 46, no. 1 (2005): 11-32. 68 Beardsley, “2004 Tsunami,” 633. 69 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 46. 70 Ibid. 71 If the LTTE was unable to form its own country outside of the Sinhalese Sri Lankan state, its next aim was to establish home rule for the Tamils in their traditional territory in the northern and eastern regions of the island. See: Samaranayake, “Political Terrorism,” 175. 72 David Galula. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006): 2. 73 Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006), 44-55. Also, the LTTE only loosely followed the precedent set by Mao. O’Neill states that a Maoist people’s war consists of three distinct phases: strategic defensive, where the state pursues the fleeing insurgents; strategic stalemate, where the insurgents use guerilla warfare to wear down the counterinsurgents; and strategic offensive, where the insurgents pursue the weakened counterinsurgents until state collapse. Insurgents increasingly use more conventional methods of war-making through this process. In all, this strategy aims to break down state power by winning the population’s support politically and patiently waiting for the state to lose its drive and capability to fight. The LTTE never had a true stage of strategic defensive, and failed during the third stage due to the death of Vellupillai Prabhakaran in 2009. See: Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. 2nd, Revised ed. (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 45-67. 74 Samaranayake, “Political Terrorism,” 175. 75 Marks, “Sri Lanka,” 487. Also, see “Endgame: the ‘collapse’ of the LTTE” section in part IV. 76 DeVotta, “Lost Quest for Separatism,” 1045. 77 Samaranayake, “Political Terrorism,” 176. 78 Rotberg, Creating Peace, 9. 79 Marks, “Sri Lanka,” 494. 80 Samaranayake, “Political Terrorism,” 177.; Hoffman and McCormick, “Suicide Attack,” 257. 81 Samaranayake, “Political Terrorism,” 176. 82 Ibid., 177. 83 By 2003, the conflict in Palestine and the surrounding area produced a higher number of suicide attacks than the LTTE. See: Bloom, Dying to Kill, 60. 84 For more information regarding the Black Tigers, see “Specialized tactical teams” section below. 85 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 61. 86 Samaranayake, “Political Terrorism,” 179.; Hoffman and McCormick, “Suicide Attack,” 256. 87 Post, Mind of The Terrorist, 94.; Arjuna Gunawardena, “Female Black Tigers: A Different Breed of Cat?” Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 84, no. 1 (August 2006): 89. 88 Ibid. 89 Hoffman and McCormick, “Suicide Attack,” 259. 90 Ibid. 91 Gordon Weiss, The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers (London: Bodley Head, 2011), 68. 92 Ibid. 93 Hoffman and McCormick, “Suicide Attack,” 254. 94 Chaliand and Blin, The History of Terrorism, 380. 95 P. Chalk, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International Organization and Operations – A Preliminary Analysis,” Commentary no. 77, a Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Unclassified Publication, 1999. 96 Weiss, The Cage, 69. 97 Gunawardena, “Female Black Tigers,“ 81. 98 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 64-65. 99 Weiss, The Cage, 7. 100 Chaliand and Blin, The History of Terrorism, 381. 101 Weiss, The Cage, 88.; Marks, “Sri Lanka,” 509. 102 Weiss, The Cage, 88-90. 103 “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” South Asia Terrorism Portal (Institute for Conflict Management), http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM. 104 Yael Stein and Alex Barnea Burnley, “Sri Lanka-Tamil and Sinhalese Conflict Timeline 1971-2010,” Genocide Prevention Now (2010): 32-33. 105 Weiss, The Cage, 70. 106 Weiss, The Cage, 272n32. 107 Chaliand and Blin, The History of Terrorism, 228-9. 108 Those attacks previously mentioned are not included in this section. Notable LTTE operations already discussed are the first Black Tiger suicide truck bombing in 1987, the LTTE’s deadliest massacre of police forces at Kalmunai in 1990, the 1995 Tincomalee Sea Tigers attack on two Sri Lankan vessels, the 2007 Katunayake Air Force Base attack by the Air Tigers, and the failed Colombo air raid of 2009. 109 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 55. 110 Bruce Hoffman, "A nasty business," Atlantic Monthly 289, no. 1 (2002): 50.; John Parachini, “Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective,” The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4 (2003): 39. 111 Weisman, Steven R. "ASSASSINATION IN INDIA; Rajiv Gandhi: A Son Who Won, Lost and Tried a Comeback." The New York Times, May 22, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/22/obituaries/assassination-in-india-rajiv-gandhi-a-son-who-won-lost-and-tried-a-comeback.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 112 Gargan, Edward A., “Death in Sri Lanka A Paradise That Lost Its Peace,” The New York Times, May 3, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/03/world/death-in-sri-lanka-a-paradise-that-lost-its-peace.html. For more informa-tion regarding the Indo-Sri Lankan Accords, see “International ties, especially to India” section. 113 Rotberg, Creating Peace, 2. 114 Dugger, Celia W., “Rebel Attack on Airport Shocks Leaders of Sri Lanka,” The New York Times, July 25, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/25/world/rebel-attack-on-airport-shocks-leaders-of-sri-lanka.html. 115 Rajat Ganguly, “Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict: At a Crossroad between Peace and War,” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 5 (2004): 903, 910; Marks, “Sri Lanka,” 495. 116 Proscribing Of Liberation Tigers Of Tamil Eelam And Other Similar Organizations Law (No. 16 of 1978), (Commonwealth Legal Information Institute), http://www.commonlii.org/lk/legis/num_act/poltoteaosol16o1978790. 117 Marks, “Sri Lanka,” 488. 118 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 57. 119 Rotberg, Creating Peace, 9-10. 120 Rotberg, Creating Peace, 3. 121 See “Major operational milestones” section. 122 Ganguly, “Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict,” 905-906. 123 See “Financing from internal sources and international diaspora” section. 124 The United States declared the LTTE a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1997. See: Bruce Vaughn, “Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service (2011) : 2. 125 Rotberg, Creating Peace, 8.; Marks, “Sri Lanka,” 491. 126 Joshi, “Razor’s Edge,” 21. 127 Ibid., 22. 128 Rotberg, Creating Peace, 8-9.; Joshi, “Razor’s Edge,” 23.; Marks, “Sri Lanka,” 505. 129 Stokke, “Building the Tamil Eelam State,” 1022; DeVotta, “Lost Quest for Separatism,” 1023. 130 Jayadeva Uyangoda, “Sri Lanka in 2009: From Civil War to Political Uncertainties,” Asian Survey 50, no. 1 (January/February 2010):104-05. 131 Ibid. 132 Vaughn, “Sri Lanka,” 2. 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