Many of the long cards in the 1ac (including ones that have tags that start with ) are useful to answer the counterplan in the packet

Regulatory Barriers Blocking Aquaculture

Regulatory inconsistency deters ocean aquaculture

　U.S. marine aquaculture leasing and regulatory policies cannot be characterized in terms of any particular policy of any particular agency. They constitute a very wide range of policies of multiple agencies at federal, state and local levels, which differ widely for different types of marine aquaculture in different states and regions. However, it seems reasonable to conclude that the combined effect of these policies has been to make many kinds of marine aquaculture difficult or impossible in large parts of the United States. Here are some examples:

Alaska finfish farming ban: Although Alaska accounts for more than half of United States capture fisheries production and more than half of the United States coastline, all finfish farming is banned by the State of Alaska.1

Absence of enabling regulatory mechanism for federal waters: There is no enabling regulatory mechanism for marine aquaculture in federal waters (generally defined as more than three miles offshore). There is no way to apply for or obtain leases to farm fish in federal waters.

Regulatory complexity, consistency and delays: Fish farmers face numerous complex, inconsistent, shifting, and time-consuming regulatory requirements. Consider this description by a representative of a major U.S. shellfish farming company based in Washington of challenges faced by the company in obtaining leases:

　　[One challenge] facing his company and the production of shellfish in the United States is the Army Corps of Engineers’ Nationwide Permit 48. Although issued in March 2007, it has yet to be implemented in the Pacific Northwest, and is resulting in inconsistent application in the other shellfish producing states. In addition, there are delays in ESA/MSA consultations and other certification requirements. One of the results of these bureaucratic inactions is that his firm is still waiting － after 15 years － to get a site license in Washington State. These delays have forced the company to purchase leases in Canada, where production has begun and 100 people are employed. Another reason for these delays is that the State of Washington’s Shoreline Master Program is being updated. It includes new regulations on the growing of geoducks, a saltwater clam with which [the company] wants to expand its production (United Soybean Board-Aquaculture Industry Coalition, 2011).

　In a survey of U.S. molluscan shellfish growers (who account for about two-thirds of U.S. marine aquaculture), Rioux (2011) found that growers perceived significantly higher institutional risks associated with regulation and leasing than risks associated with markets, the environment, or climate. She noted, “through discussions with growers as well as their answers to [an] open ended question, the tie that makes all state and local regulations, regardless of the state or local, the highest risk is the rate at which they are changed. Growers find that state and local regulations are constantly changing and it is difficult to keep up with them.”

Fragmented regulatory framework prevents development of ocean aquaculture

　One reason is that leasing and regulatory authority for U.S. marine aquaculture is fragmented among multiple branches of government (executive, legislative, and judicial) at multiple levels of jurisdiction (local, state, and federal agencies). Federal agencies with leasing or regulatory authority for marine aquaculture include, but are not limited to the National Marine Fisheries Service, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Department of Agriculture, and the Food and Drug Administration. Similarly, at the state level, environmental and fisheries agencies typically have regulatory authority. Local governments may exercise additional authority, such as zoning regulations. In the legislative branch, the U.S. Congress and state legislatures enact laws affecting aquaculture, and many issues are decided by the courts at both the state and federal levels.

　Several structural biases against aquaculture result from this fragmented governance system. One bias is that most agencies have a limited focus. Rather than considering the best interests and/or preferences of society as a whole, or balancing both costs and benefits of marine aquaculture, they are charged with more narrow and specific goals, such as protecting water quality or promoting economic development. Even though some agencies may be charged with considering the benefits of marine aquaculture, this does not result in an unbiased governance system. A single agency － at any level － can stop marine aquaculture even if all other agencies are willing or eager to promote it. For example, if a single agency establishes impossible water quality regulations or simply takes too long to decide what the regulations will be, it can stop or indefinitely delay aquaculture investments.

　A second structural bias is that agencies may be biased internally against aquaculture. For example, fisheries management agencies may be strongly influenced by constituents who oppose aquaculture, such as fishermen. Their staff may have little interest in or knowledge of aquaculture, or may actively oppose it. This is particularly likely to be the case because aquaculture is new and small, so regulatory jurisdiction is typically within agencies established to regulate and promote older and larger industries.

　A third structural bias is that agency budgets for aquaculture leasing and regulation are limited. When budgets are limited, agencies do less. But U.S. marine aquaculture can only develop if agencies are proactive in developing enabling leasing and regulatory frameworks. Doing less will delay the development of marine aquaculture.

Seafood Trade Deficit Now

9 billion dollar seafood trade deficit now

“Our current trade deficit in seafood is approximately $9 billion,” said Locke. “Encouraging and developing the U.S. aquaculture industry will result in economic growth and create jobs at home, support exports to global markets, and spur new innovations in technology to support the industry.”

“Sustainable domestic aquaculture can help us meet the increasing demand for seafood and create jobs in our coastal communities,” said NOAA Administrator Jane Lubchenco, PhD. “Our vision is that domestic aquaculture will provide an additional source of healthy seafood to complement wild fisheries, while supporting healthy ecosystems and coastal economies.”

Global wild fisheries are in decline, with habitat such as estuaries in critical condition.

Aquaculture Solves Seafood Trade Deficit

Expanding ocean aquaculture solves seafood trade deficit

http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/oceancommission/documents/prelimreport/chapter22.pdf, JMP)

As traditional harvest fisheries have approached and exceeded sustainable levels, the farming of fish, shellfish, and aquatic plants in marine and fresh waters has become a burgeoning global industry. These animals can be raised in everything from nearly natural environments to enclosed structures, such as ponds, cages, and tanks, where they are fed and treated to maximize their growth rate.

AT: Economic Decline Doesn’t Cause War

Economic decline triggers worldwide conflict
Royal, 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, (Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana. 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1990, DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

Economic decline undercuts interdependence and triggers nuclear conflict

Kemp ’10 [Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4]
The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

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