The early years of China-Africa cooperation were characterised by Chinese support of the anti-colonial movements (Beri 2007, 298). China backed the idea of Panafricanism which ventured into AU and in some form was reborn into FOCAC. China did not contribute to the balkanisation of West Africa. Since 1992, Ghana has enjoyed a stable democratic regime and has not required any military intervention, military support, conflict resolution or peace-keeping mission from the Chinese part (Sithole 2012, 1). In 2005, China was involved in a corruption scandal concerning illegal arms trade. China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation made a deal through a British arms dealer with the Ghanaian government. Ghana Armed Forces purchased fighter jets valued at $4 million from the dealer who did not obtain any license (Joy Online 2013). The Chinese corporation confirmed that the dealer was their agent. The Revenue and Customs Authority has been investigating the case since 2007 (Essel 2013). In 2008, the Chinese government and Ghanaian president Kufuor inked a $160 million pact, which committed Ghana to purchase two jet fighters in order to re-equip Ghana Armed Forces (Bessey 2008). In 2010, the Ghana Armed Forces received military vehicles from China which valued at $1.5 million. The vehicles comprised of troop carriers, trucks, field ambulances and one tanker (CCS 2010c, 16). Ghanaian borders are fairly protected and cross-border arms trafficking were reported (Schroeder and Lamp 2006, 70). Ivorian rebel group Forces Nouvelles illicitly transfers small arms to Ghana. It is important to note that Africa imports majority of small arms and light weapons from China (Enuka 2011, 18).
In its analysis of corruption risk in defence establishments, Transparency International draws the conclusion that Ghanaian defence sector is inclined to corruption (Quandzie 2013b). The anti-corruption policies were declared ineffective and the Parliament incompetent to make decisions about arms control. ‘There is a severe lack of transparency concerning defence policy and a consequent lack of public debate surrounding it, as well as scepticism over levels of integrity’ (TI 2013). Despise this fact, the Ghanaian Parliament has a decent control over its defence budget. The report concurs that the institutions of the defence sector are non-transparent and provide very limited information to the public. The most prominent defence expenditures are not included in the budget and the reports of the Public Accounts Committee do not contain all the defence transactions. The report denies the presence of any defence agreement in return for access of natural resource and confirms that the military officials do not receive any training in the matters of anti-corruption, whistle-blowing or code of conduct (TI 2013).
5.7.1 Analysis of Military Relations
The report of Jorge Benitez (2013) on the Atlantic Council News blog reveals Chinese interest in establishing overseas naval military bases. In 2011, China announced that it would set up its first military base abroad in Seychelles (Times of India2011). Establishment of a military base and stationing troops is a privilege of neo-colonial powers. The stationing troops are guaranteed rights to issue papers and manage custom duties (Nkrumah 1965, chap. 18). The military cooperation has not reached to degree of establishing base or Chinese control over issuing papers and managing custom duties. As analysed in the previous chapters, the only actions concerning the custom duties are illegal immigration and bribery of public servants. It proved fairly impossible to analyse the actual depth of China-Ghana military cooperation. The Chinese government does not publish official figures of the arms sales and Ghanaian defence sector is non-transparent (The Guardian2013; TI 2013). The media coverage and data accessibility is limited to the official arms transfer and military cooperation. All factors considered, China does not have any military control over Ghana. The positive outcomes of the military cooperation are the arms sales and re-equipment of the Ghana Armed Forces.
5.8 Cultural Relations
In 2007, Hu Jintao stressed the importance of soft power and promotion of Chinese culture (Fook 2010, 549). China has engaged in establishing Confucius Institutes across Africa, taking part in cultural exhibitions, events and educational exchanges (Wu 2012, 6). This China-Ghana cultural cooperation has been very fruitful. In 2006, the Chinese government offered 40 scholarships and trained 300 Ghanaian professionals (Tsikata et al. 2008, 25). In 2007, Gyimah Boadi, Executive Director of the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development, stressed on the importance of learning about Chinese culture, language and politics in order to facilitate business (CCS 2007a, 15). The same year, a group of 43 members of Bank of Ghana visited Canton Fair in Guangzhou and gained knowledge of Chinese business culture (CCS 2007b, 15). The University of Ghana (UG) offered courses on Chinese language and culture during the academic year of 2008/2009, assisted by two Chinese teachers (CCS 2008b, 20). In 2009, a UG obliged to give lessons of Chinese language and in exchange received 600 textbooks from the Chinese Embassy. In 2009, 35 Ghanaian students were granted a three-year Chinese scholarship (CCS 2009b, 15-7). Chinese Embassy decided to establish Cultural Centre in Ghana in order to provide Chinese and African language courses and lectures on Chinese culture (CCS 2009c, 15). In 2010, Chinese Embassy in Ghana granted a new batch of 600 books to UG, which covered various topics including history, politics, economy, philosophy, arts, culture, sports, geography, tourism and medicine (CCS 2010b, 16). Two Ghanaian Ministers of Education participated in Chinese government funded project which focused on deepening the knowledge of Chinese language and culture (CCS 2010c, 17). The same year, eight Ghanaian journalists participated in training in China focused on journalism, Chinese culture and Chinese development achievements. The Chinese government stated that so far it has offered 271 scholarships to Ghanaian students (Daily Guide 2011; Ghana Business News2013).
5.8.1 Analysis of Cultural Relations
From the data obtained, it is obvious that China increasingly propagates its culture and language in Ghana. Sappor (2009) deems that such promotion is a neo-colonial mechanism. In comparison with Zambia, where Chinese language is incorporated into the national education system (Hanban News 2013), the language promotion in Ghana is limited to university students, businessmen and state officials. China does not promote its political ideology and religion. China does not promote its culture in order to make Ghanaian population conformable, but to facilitate communication in economic and political sphere. Kabunda Badi (1966, 67) contends that students studying in the neo-colonial country accept neo-colonial values and apply them in their homeland. Interestingly, many of the students who were provided Chinese scholarship established trading businesses and thus increased the mutual benefits (Marfaing and Thiel 2011, 11). This finding supports the previous analysis which revealed Chinese profit-making character, but it does not support the idea that Ghanaian students would apply neo-colonial patterns in Ghana. Moreover, the Chinese development model serves as a motivation for African countries, not as an exploitation system. It can therefore be assumed that China does not have a cultural control over Ghana. However, the recent announcement by Chinese political advisers to create a well-coordinated system for the promotion of Chinese language and culture shows that China is interested in more than just economic cooperation (Haiyan 2013). In the field of culture and education, Ghana has benefited vastly through extensive professional training, scholarships, school materials and distance-learning facilities provided by China. The cultural cooperation based on win-win outcome contributes to mutual facilitation of business.