Masaryk university

‘The conflict in Chechnya cannot be regarded only as a terrorist problem. A political solution is the only way to a lasting peace. The European Union will continue to closely follow the developments. Both sides must respect human rights, and those who don’t must be brought to trial without delay.’

As we see from the table ‘guerrilla’ and ‘terrorism’ distinguish for three characters: for a number of involved fighters, for a level of violence and the possible threat of regime. Here the level of violence is very specific, for example, in guerrilla war the total loss is very grievous and serious, where however it happens almost in the territory of war, but in terrorism case the tactic changes, the events happen much unexpectedly in unpredictable places and victims become absolutely guiltless people, furthermore its aim is to keep its victims in permanent fear of terror act. However, in two Chechen wars guerrilla and terror tactics become closely linked with each others, because the war in Chechnya began as a conventional guerrilla war, but since the late of 1990s and early of the 2000s, while Putin has started counter-terroristic operation in Chechnya, the area of manoeuvring of Chechen combatants seriously have been driven into the corner and in a result of it the strategy of the Chechen combatants’ shifted towards the religious terrorizing tactic which has already been shifted during the interwar period. It can be simply explained by that during the first Chechen war combatants partially had control over the territory of the state, but after the second war they have not had that chance. However, one should take into account that states, especially colonial powers, have traditionally denied the political motivations and aspirations of nationalist resistance and have employed criminalizing references to denounce them, notably terms such as terrorists or bandits.¹³⁷ Actually, it is also obvious fact that the framing of a conflict as terrorist in nature is a classic device employed by a state to denigrate legitimate resistance.¹³⁸ ‘Thus, the sum up of the dispute concludes in one point that the mode of struggle adopted by insurgents is dictated by circumstances rather than by choice and that whenever possible, insurgents use concurrently a variety of strategies of struggle, and terrorism also, which is the easiest form of insurgency, is a particularly always one of this mode.’¹³⁹

During the last two decades, terrorism in Russia developed with two, nationalist and as well as religious characters. Actually everything began since the age of perestroika. In his speeches, former president Boris Yeltsin, several times repeated the phrase of “take the sovereignty as much as you can digest”¹⁴⁰, which indeed was an initial spark and in some extent pretext for stimulating strong nationalist awakening. Although until the fall of 1991 there was not any anti-soviet separatist threat, but it was the first time that in Russia began to form ethnic-terrorism, that can be much dangerous for multi-national country. And the Northern Caucasus was much more vulnerable point in this context, where certainly Chechnya played the central role in all awakening of national-separatist terrorism in whole region.

According to the 3^rd article of Russia’s law “On the Fight against Terrorism” passed in June 1998 terrorism was defined as:

‘violence or the threat of violence against individuals or organizations, and also the destructions (damaging) of or threat to destroy (damage) property and other material objects, such as threaten to cause loss of life, significant damage to property, or other socially dangerous consequences and are implemented with a view to violating public security, intimidating the population, or influencing the adoption of decisions advantageous to terrorists by organs of power, or satisfying their unlawful material and (or) other interests…’¹⁴¹

However, today in Russia we have faced actually not even with terrorism, but in a great extent with a diversionary war, which started in a large scale after the war in Dagestan and still simultaneously continuing. To this kind of tactics have been resorted, more or less, in all warfare, and it is impossible to root out the problem without liquidating the nest of sabotage, which is in the mountainous region of Chechnya. However, it would be superficial and one-side view if to claim that all bombing of apartments and other blasts in Moscow were carried out directly by the order of Chechen religious radicals, because no one can surely claim that Kremlin is not involved in these acts too. Even more, although most of the attacks have “Caucasian footprints”, however using terror tactics are also familiar to the Russian radical nationalists.¹⁴² Detailed and comprehensively analysis of the Russo-Chechen conflict obviously manifests that Russia by involving military operations scarcely can solve the terrorism issue in Chechnya. Nevertheless, unlike general religious terrorism based on religious fanaticism, in Chechen case under the 'terrorism' factor hides some economical causes, which based on broad unemployment and total ruin of Chechen economy. This painful situation, financial dependence on Moscow and horrible corruption more or less characterized to all northern Caucasian republics. Eventually, a huge army of men who since 1994 were fighting and can do nothing more than fighting, willingly or unwillingly were seeking for easy way of financial support as well, thus just in time proposed sources by radical Islamic organizations seemed them more attractive and promising.

Thus, defining the conflict in Chechnya as “terrorism” suffers from different approaches to the case and appeared inherent flaws in course of time. ‘Perhaps the single most important flaw in the conventional wisdom about the nature of terrorism, however, lies at the core of the generally accepted definition-that is, the claims that terrorism is the systematic targeting of civilians and that is motivations and goals are to spread terror in a wider community to extract government policy changes, which in theory such threats would justify the use of terrorism as a last resort.’¹⁴³ ‘Apparently, if to analyse the Chechen issue consequentially since the beginning of the conflict we can find that it is Russia the guiltiest part and it is directly bear the responsibility for nascency of some elements of “terrorism” in the Chechen resistance, however terrible, and more over it was peripheral to the national resistance as a whole, and has been reactive mainly to Russia’s strategy of excesses, whether to deter it, or to exact revenge.’¹⁴⁴

Role of Al-Qaida in Chechnya: Chechen Jihad

‘In Chechnya the guerrilla war was consolidated under Jihad banner since the 1995, when a nationalist and a combatant Akhmed Kadyrov as the Chief Mufti of the Chechen republic of Ichkeria, declared Jihad on Russia.’¹⁴⁵

After the wars in Afghanistan and Bosnia the new destination of Jihad was the Northern Caucasus, particularly Chechnya. Whereas, in first two wars were involved several other states too and Russia took part in wars indirectly, but in Chechen wars due to its internal character there were only two opponents-Russia and Chechen separatists. Today Chechen conflict has got a new image, although its prelude idea of secession originated from a fundamentally nationalist struggle which was persisting to win an independence from Russia, but over time the essence of the war due to the foreign influx radically changed and was superseded with an Islamic fundamentalist background.

The majority of foreign influx was almost from the Arab and Central Asian countries, but among them there were fighters from Turkey, Western Europe, Pakistan and Northern Africa too.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, most of the foreign fighters who had been in Bosnia moved to the Chechen area as a consequence of the conditions of the 1995 Accords, however, it is difficult to ascertain the exact nationalities of these fighters who moved from Bosnia to Chechnya.¹⁴⁷ ‘Mostly they were professing radical Salafi-jihadist ideology, most of whom had trained in the Afghan terrorist camps of Osama bin Laden and others who formed the emerging Al-Qaeda network.’¹⁴⁸ However, one was important what they regarded the war of Chechnya not as a national liberation movement but as a part of the global pan-Islamic struggle - a gateway for instigating revolution throughout the northern Caucasus and beyond.¹⁴⁹ Thus, the penetrated radical Islamic ideology in Chechnya grounded because of, on the one hand, in Chechen society clans and families traditionally played a more advanced role than religion, one the other hand, due to the ruined economy of Chechnya the influence and power of the society’s traditional religion and cultural elites were undermined, which this, in its turn, was fairly fit situation for successfully exploiting of the area by radical Islamist.

The first entering of Afghan Arabs to the Caucasus was at the start of the 1990s, enticed by the conflicts in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and to Chechnya they reached only in 1995, a small group led by Ibn al-Khattab¹⁵⁰, a charismatic Saudi national who had gained notoriety fighting in Afghanistan with jihadi icons like Abdullah Azzam, Hassan al Sarehi, and Osama Bin Laden.¹⁵¹ He was the most prominent leader of armed group who ‘was the embodiment of a new wave of globetrotting ‘neo-jihadis’ - a new generation of Arab volunteer jihadis had cut its teeth on the behalf of Afghan mujahidin in the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s’¹⁵². He came to Chechnya to do jihad and was mediator for foreign financial influx. However about him the Russians came to know on 16 April 1996.¹⁵³ ‘Khattab saw Chechnya as a country to liberate, Islamize, and use as a model for the conquest of all Muslim lands in the Caucasus and southern Russia.’¹⁵⁴ His introduction into the Caucasian region can explain not only the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR), but also two other Chechen terror groups- the Islamic International Brigade (IIB) and Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Batalion of Chechen Martyrs.¹⁵⁵

‘The Wahhabis, an extreme sect of Islam financed and spread largely by Saudi Arabians, had radically different plans for Chechnya, even for Khattab, Chechnya was another Muslim nation like Afghanistan under attack from the infidels.’¹⁵⁶ Among those who still provides financial support for Islamic radicals and separatists opposing Moscow are very often mentioned organizations “Al-ISAGOM”, “Taiba”, “Saar Foundation” (residence in Saudi Arabia), “Muslim Brotherhood”, the Palestinian movement “HAMAS”, the Kuwait “society of social reform”, Qatar Charitable Society, Algerian “al-Djamaa al-Musalla” (Armed Community) and so on.¹⁵⁷ Among them, the most influential and active supporters are “Jihad” and “al-Qaida”, headed by Osama ben Laden, which actually openly manifest their support to Chechen militants and even provides with fighters. However, in his speech, the director of the Israel Project to Investigate Islamic Movements (PRISM) and one of the leading experts on Islamist Ideology, Reuven Paz, commented to the addressed question as following:

‘- I'm trying to figure out when Chechnya has ceased to be interesting for the global jihad movement. As we see, after Beslan Chechen rebels have refused to use the tactic of al Qaeda. Do you think that Al-Qaeda has lost interest in Chechnya?

-I think that Chechnya has never been a priority for al-Qaeda as part of a global jihad. Khattab's Arab battalion, of course, arrived in Chechnya in the mid-90's from Afghanistan or Bosnia, but not on the orders of al-Qaida. Al-Qaida has not resolved an ideological problem: how to relate to the War of Independence such as Chechnya or Palestine. But I think that the main turning point for Chechnya was in 2003 - the beginning of arrival of volunteers in Iraq. Emphasis on Iraq as an alternative to Afghanistan forced al Qaeda to reduce interest in the Chechen struggle for Russia. Arab volunteers are going to Iraq and stopped arriving in Chechnya. While some Saudi Islamists, as Yousef al-Ayiri (one of commanders of al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia and the personal bodyguard of Osama bin Laden, who was killed in 2003, approx.) attempted to treat the Chechen conflict as part of a global jihad. However, it seems that in Chechnya, at least for a while, went into the background in the strategy of Al Qaeda.’¹⁵⁸

Even Reuven Paz’s opinion was affirmed by Adam Dolnik, Chief Instructor of the International Centre for Research in political violence and terrorism at the Institute of Defence and Strategy Studies in Singapore (IDSS):

‘- How do you appreciate the presence of al-Qaeda in the North Caucasus?

-There are financial and ideological influences of al-Qaeda in the North Caucasus, but it is not decisive [...] the absence of new terrorist attacks by suicide bombers after Beslan actually is the strategic decision of Basayev. If Basayev figure out after some period that this strategy is not working, so in that case we can expect that the suicide bombers attack will be repeated. [...] Evidence about the presence of foreign Islamists in Chechnya has become smaller, which can be explained by two factors, either their role really is declining or the media presence in the region is practically prohibited which does not allow to do articles regardless of facts.’¹⁵⁹

These approaches actually were confirmed by Maskhadov’s interview for Le Monde in October 2003. He denied each fictitious association/cooperation with al-Qaeda:

‘-We have nothing in common with international terrorism. What is going on here is a national liberation struggle. We do not recognize bin Laden. He represents nothing for us. [however, on the issue of Basayev he was more circumspect] Basayev has no links with international terrorism. He has no contact either with al Qaeda or with bin Laden... Basayev is a warrior. He is someone who is taking revenge. He is using the same methods as the enemy, who uses those methods against Chechen civilians. It is an eye for an eye...’¹⁶⁰

Thus, by analyzing these views, one comes out to the spotlight that although may be Chechen fighters play some role in Osama bin Laden’s global jihad project and get a large financial and manpower support, however, one is important also to stress that ‘there still has not been proved direct connection between Chechen fighters and Osama bin Laden, only some indirect evidences’¹⁶¹ which can in much extent pull into the erroneous point of view. Furthermore, it should be taken into consideration that foreign radical Islamic leaders for indicating the largeness of their scope of influences sometimes artificially exaggerate the scale of their involvement, so, from this point of view Russia's internal-Muslim life is not exception too.

‘The numbers of foreign fighters in different sources notes differently, but majority of free medias estimate that by the end of 1995 the number of “Arab Afghans” in Chechnya did not exceed 300 fighters.’¹⁶² According to the Russian secret services in the 90s in the camps of Khattab were trained from 1600 to 2500 militants, even on the eve of the invasion of Chechens into Dagestan such camps were more than dozen, and in additional each of them had its own speciality.¹⁶³ Furthermore, in 1996 at the International Meeting of Islamic radicals in Mogadishu in the capital of Somali, where was attended by representatives of the factions from Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Yemen, was decided during the autumn to send in Chechnya from 500 to 700 fighters.¹⁶⁴ However, sometimes their numbers exaggerated in some official sources, for instance, according to Kremlin’s claim their numbers were up to 6000. On the other hand, the witnesses of the war claim that the number of foreign fighters did not exceed 1-2 per cent. Alongside with fighters from Muslim countries, there were also fighters from Ukraine belonged to Ukrainian Nationalist political organisation-the UNA-UNSA. All the same, the majority of them are local people, from Chechnya and neighbour countries. Especially after the victory in the Jihad in first Chechen war their numbers increased, and today it is very difficult to define the exact number of “combatants” in the whole North Caucasus, ‘but different sources register the figure between 2 to 10 thousands potential “fighters”.’¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, Officer of the North Caucasian Academy of Civil Service, Igor Dobaev, announced that in Dagestan there are up to five thousands Wahhabits, who have the “Islamic” patterns too.¹⁶⁶ Thus, it is much blurring point to define their exact number, but one thing is clear that their influx was the main reason for distortion of the essence of the war in Chechnya.

The current step of separatist armed movement in Chechnya leads by Doku Umarov¹⁶⁷. By declaring the Chechen president Ramzan Kadirov as the first target of destroying he became common enemy for both Putin and Kadirov. However, his name was brought to the headline after the bombing event of the Moscow metro in March 2010 event. Russian media introduced him to the entire world under the title as leader of “Black Widow”¹⁶⁸ organization. In his before assault done statement that "the war will spread deeper inside of Russia" has made him number one perpetrator for Russia. After that the president of Russia adopted strict measures for removing the reasons, even in this line ex-president Putin, who since 1999 was implementer of rigorous military measures, supported him. According to the Medvedev’s project the issues were tried to settlement via economic and social preferences instead of a long time provided military attempts. Maybe this kind of deliberate project is a part of the delicate policy employed not only in Chechnya but in whole Caucasus. Achievement of stability in Chechnya is much important for Russia, because the 2014 Winter Olympiad Games will take place in the Northern Caucasus, in Sochi, and the high confidence of the region is much important for Russian global image.

The breaking point for Doku Umarov became admission his name to the list of terrorists by US under the pressure of Russia. But his left the leadership position to the loyal commander Aslambek Vadalov upseted the balances and set thinking. The common advanced idea of Jihadism¹⁶⁹ in Chechnya was concluded by an achievement of success for resistances in the first war. Whereas, it is important to point out that despite in the first Chechen war the Jihad was encouraged with religious motivation but absolutely was not in that extent as it could be considered as a part of international terrorism and linked with a rise of radical Islamism. In this phase of conflict the Islamic patterns still were not that influential which could significantly change the core essence of the conflict.¹⁷⁰ However, the gradual radicalization in Chechnya was a direct product of the experience and practice of violence in the first war and the emergence of a new “meta-cleavage” within the Chechen national movement along a religious fault line.¹⁷¹

Chechen Conflict after 9/11

The disruptive and violent potential of religious and religiosity has become a topic of concern and interest since the 1990s, in the years leading up to the 2000 ‘Millennium’, where religious violence had been widely expected to erupt, and especially since the events of 11 September 2001.¹⁷² After 9/11 events the global opinion about terrorism was obliged to review and re-estimate the situation. And in this case, Chechnya became the attractive focus point, simultaneously the Chechen terrorism was pointed out as a part of the global terrorism, and almost since that time became a discussion point in international agendas. The war started in Chechnya in 1994 was portrayed until the September attack by Russian government as a war against bandits and Islamic fundamentalists, but after that events the essence was shifted and the label changed—now Chechens are referred to simply as “terrorists”.¹⁷³ In the aftermath of 9/11, many observers in the West and Russia predicted a fundamental re-orientation of Russian attitude and policies toward the Islamic world, and the Middle East in particular, that would bring them in line with policies conducted by the US and even Israel.¹⁷⁴ ‘The post 9/11 scenario witnessed the growth of mutual understanding between the West and Russia regarding the menace of international terrorism which became the turning point of the relations: before 9/11 crisis the West was more concerned with violation of human rights and related issues in Chechnya; however, after 9/11 the scenario witnessed a shift in the policy of the West toward the Chechnya issue, already considering that Chechnya is an internal matter of Russia.’¹⁷⁵

This event radically changed world politics. The claim done by the US President George W. Bush—“those who are not with us are against us”—was very strongly stressed warning hint toward many countries demanding them to define their position in respect to the fight with terrorism. And it was actually obvious and direct warning for each country to find in which side it wanted to be. Russia was among the most active countries in this respect because—according to its own words—it has been for nearly three years occupied with its own “anti-terrorism operation”.¹⁷⁶ Accordingly, the ties between Putin and Bush got stronger, Russia as a country which has been suffering from the terrorist attacks was one of the first countries suggested cooperate and international coalition to conduct the war on terrorism. Even on September 24, Putin followed his words of support the American war against terrorism pledging that his government would share intelligence, open Russian air space for flights providing humanitarian assistance, cooperate with Russia’s Central Asian allies to provide air space access to American flights, participate in international search and rescue efforts and increase direct assistance—both humanitarian and military—to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.¹⁷⁷

Since the beginning of the second campaign until the autumn of 2001 one of the important areas of the Russian foreign policy in accordance with its relations with foreign countries was emphasising existed threats from international terrorism in connection with events surrounding the Chechen Republic, ‘moreover in these years Russian leaders had pointed out to their Western colleagues the threat of terrorism emanating from an arc of instability stretching from hotbeds of Islamic fundamentalism, through Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, Central Asia the Middle East and Kosovo in Europe’¹⁷⁸. ‘This prediction was based on Putin’s own obsession with the international ramifications of terrorism that plagued Russia as a consequence of the war in Chechnya.’¹⁷⁹ So, the 9/11 event, actually, was in favour of Russian policy for announcing that the Russia's combat against Chechen militants is nothing else than war on terrorism. Even, these posed targets of Russia government was strengthened by the Moscow theater crisis in 2002, Beslan tragedy in 2004 which can be consider the most shocking terroristic attack since 2001 September events, and some other terror acts executed by Shamil Basayev.

Nevertheless, the West demonstrated double standards in regard to terrorism. For example, in Chechen case the desired cooperation with the West has not been obtained, especially with US, and moreover the Chechen events are constantly used to discredit Russia in the international arena, bringing charges of “inappropriate” use of force in violence of human rights, etc. The West accuses Russia because it has not changed its methods of war in Chechnya since 1999. These cases demonstrate that there was an international reluctance to deal with Chechnya on Russia’s terms—that is, as a case of terrorism—even after 9/11, countries were reluctant to cooperate with Russia on Chechnya, despite the fact that Russia increasingly framed its policy on international terrorism along Western lines by compiling lists and focusing on “Islamic” terrorism supposedly related to al-Qaeda.¹⁸⁰ Even it was clearly stressed by Bush administration by condemning Russian military conduct in region. ‘When pressed to talk about Chechnya, Condoleezza Rice has continued to express a more complex view of the war:

...We clearly have differences with the Russian government about Chechnya. We’ve said to them that we fully agree that the Chechen leadership should not involve itself with terrorist elements in the region, and there are terrorist elements in the region. But that not every Chechen in a terrorist and that the Chechens’ legitimate aspiration for political solution should be pursued by the Russian government. And we have been very actively pressing the Russian government to move on the political front with Chechnya.’¹⁸¹

Furthermore, inconsistence happened when Russia took a similar position on Hezbollah in Lebanon—which is considered a terrorist organisation by the United States—during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of August 2006, even repeatedly when Russia published its own official list of seventeen terrorist organizations in July 2006, all of the groups included were Islamist—mainly Chechen—but Hamas and Hezbollah were not listed.¹⁸²

In the second hand, west foreign policy officials pretty good perceive that achieved relationship between Russia and US is much important than any issue, especially the US administration would never want to sacrifice bilateral cooperation with Russia for sake of Chechnya. This foresight of the US in respect to Chechnya can be explained in two ways: first, US administration believes that they have some tools which give them opportunity to impact to the course of the conflict in Chechnya; second, ‘for Bush in 2001, it was obtaining Russian acquiescence to American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty’¹⁸³

Finally, after the terrorist attacks in September 2001, international coalition has become a fact, and as a main struggle the “fight against international terrorism” has become a formal basis for union.¹⁸⁴ Two weeks after 11 September, US President George W. Bush remarked, “Our initial phase of the war on terrorism is against the al Qaeda organisation, and we do believe there are some al Qaeda folks in Chechnya”.¹⁸⁵ In the following months of September 11 event, Western and Russian scholars expressed the view that a new lasting alliance between the US and Russia would be formed on the basis of the common threat of Islamic militant fundamentalism.¹⁸⁶ It was in the context of the post-9/11 global war on terror, and slightly more than nine years after the violent conflict in Chechnya began, that the United States added three Chechen groups to the FTO (foreign terrorist organisations) list in February 2003.’¹⁸⁷ Thus, Russian position in Chechnya was strengthened in world agendas, US manifested its support to Russia’s aim and no one from the administration and even no one Muslim country recognized Chechnya as an independent state. Furthermore, the Chechen crisis openly displays the limit of US’s power which actually begins from the boundaries of Russian Federation. Nevertheless, one is worth to esteem that after 9/11 it was the first time since the period World War Second the US, Russia and Europe come together to address what all of them viewed as vital security interests and got one common goal as fight against international terrorism.¹⁸⁸

‘Tony Blair maintains that intervention in one place where people are tortured and oppressed does not mean we can or should intervene everywhere. But Chechnya is a shameful example of western leaders refusing to confront another government on human rights abuses and war crimes because, in the end, strategic and political issues matter more. Chechnya is complex and dangerous and miserable, and just do not care enough to try to make a difference.’¹⁸⁹

It is very regret case that world community still has not been able to give definitely right value to the Chechen dispute. The struggle of the Chechen people for independence and the international reaction to it is one of the most striking examples of discrepancy of the requirements of morality, the principles of international law and the interests of the world’s leading powers.¹⁹⁰ The Chechen conflict since its beginning was much important case for Russian foreign relations with US, EU countries, Commonwealth of Independent States, Turkey, and Chine, discredited its authority in intergovernmental organizations such as UN and OSCE. ‘However, they began to react only when the atrocities were reported on the front pages of the Western press—and particularly in dramatic television images—did Western political leaders feel compelled to react, but then mainly in mild language expressing regret at the loss of civilian lives and appealing to the parties to find a political solution to the conflict.’¹⁹¹ The Chechnya has witnessed to death thousands of lives, massive abusing of human rights and extensive violations of international law.

Almost since December 1994, before the outbreak of the war UNHCR was engaged in the North Caucasus by the reluctantly will of Russian authority, which was forced under the UN agencies pressure. Most of the violations have been documented by the Russian President’s Human Commission, the US State Department’s Annual Report on Human Rights Practices, Committees of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Weekly Situation Reports from OSCE’s Assistance Group in Chechnya during the first war (unpublished), the International Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International, Medecins sans Frontieres, the Human Rights Centre “Memorial”-the most important Russian human rights NGO, the Dutch Pax Christi-one of the respected national NGOs from the west, the Danish Refugee Council’s about conditions of internally displeased persons.¹⁹² The conclusion of all above mentioned reports unanimously point out that in both wars Russia seriously violated international humanitarian law, but no-one can consider that the Chechen separatists are not guilty, they also committed serious violations of rights and bears the same responsibility in this war as Russian side. However, Russia is considered directly guilty side of this war because of its massive bombing attacks by helicopters, air planes and heavy artillery of civilian districts of Chechnya. Even in its response the Committee of Legal Affairs and Human Rights in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in April 2000 quoted that the scale and number of human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law on Chechen side cannot even remotely compare to those of the Russian side, which are of much greater magnitude, and, due to Russian being a state party to the European Convention on Human Rights and thus bound by duty to protect the rights she is violating, much more serious.¹⁹³

‘Russia is a member of plenty organisations—such as the Council of Europe, a State Party to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom (European Convention), a State Party to the Geneva Conventions, and a signatory to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide—which obligate Russia to respect human rights and humanitarian law guaranteed by these instruments.’¹⁹⁴ Nevertheless, there were several times observed disregard to treaties with organisations, even after being witnesses to the bloody Grozny fight in the early 1995 the EU for constraining bloodshed postponed the bilateral Interim Agreement on Partnership and Co-operation which was in interest of Russia, and for coming into force of the Agreement the EU worked out terms consisted of four following demands:

1. 
   Establishment of a permanent OSCE presence in Chechnya;
   
2. 
   Access for humanitarian assistance;
   
3. 
   Cease-fire;
   
4. 
   Opening of negotiations for a political solution to the conflict.¹⁹⁵
   

‘The Chechens’ sense of injustice lies, not only in their treatment at the hands of successive Russian regimes, but also in the attitude of the outside world to what is as extremely bloody and amoral conflict.’¹⁹⁷ Strike duality of the attitudes clearly sense if to compare Chechen war with Kosovo war. There are very important cases such as: first, the Kosovan conflict is in Europe, and directly affects the major European powers, unlike it the Chechen conflict is taking place in the world’s backyard and refugees from Chechnya are not heading for Germany, only Georgia and Ingushetia; second, Russia is a nuclear power, and still remains a large and powerful nation despite the changes that have taken place since the Soviet collapse and to offend it by raising the issue of human rights abuse against Chechens by Russian forces would be dangerous; third, Russia has successfully presented the conflict, not as a political contest for power, but as a fight against extreme Islam and forces of “global terrorism”, however, after 11 September by supporting for US-led “campaign against terror” Furthermore, even during both Russian—Chechen wars Russian political actors for constrained external interventions repeatedly claimed that the conflict arose in the background of “internal matter” of the Russian Federation and decisively no other states had right to meddle in.¹⁹⁸

The war in Chechnya has become an important factor in a noticeably decrease of confidence to Russian government among the centric and moderate right-wing groups in Europe and America, adhering to the liberal-democratic orientation. There is fairly clear understanding in liberal—democratic circles of the West that the Chechen wars make Russia position weaker, keeping its modernization and constricting its possibility to participate in international politics. War in Chechnya has highlighted the characteristic features of the Russian political elite, its backwardness, ignorance, inability to setting long-term problems, deep-seated anti-Western attitude and the existence of a special Russian path of development. Some liberal—democratic views of the West even believe that at the moment the war is going on lesser of the evil.

The paradox of the Chechen war is that on the one hand, it reinforce the fears of the West, because Chechnya is still a potential region where exist crowd of radical fundamentalists and Russia still has not been able to manage to liquidate it, but on the other hand, the war with Chechnya provides a temporary guarantee of the west, that at least during the continuous of the war the realization of any fears in the west has less chance. In this sense, liberal-democratic views of the west appreciate this war in two aspects: firstly, the long-lasting war leads to the consequence that in the country still will not any alternation of the power and Russia primitively follows anti-westernism; secondly, war is doing possible to substantially westernizing of the Eastern Europe. Thus, the Chechen war has demonstrated to the west, Russia’s political elite and high public bureaucracy among whom very few true democrats.

When sum up the topic we can be witness that the West during both wars has remained indifferent in a conflict and do not want to venture bilateral relations with Russia. Although humanitarian organizations did actively participate in Chechnya their opportunities were limited too, neither OSCE nor UNHCR was successful in effectively implementation of humanitarian aid. However, one remains openly clear that from the war mainly suffered Chechen people, they paid for it enormously high cost with an inadmissible number of civilian deaths. Thus, the indifferent attitude and the self-seeking position indicated by the West has gradually alienated Chechnya from it and was compelled one more time to think over the West promised values and ideas.

‘Chechens cannot ever be defeated, they can only be killed.’

The Chechen crisis has left behind very big moral—psychological and material consequences in both the Chechen and the Russian people memories. With the beginning of the war in Chechnya yet unrecovered wounds from the past animosity have once again been bled. In a result of conflict, started substantially on the background of the 'political transition' of the post-Soviet Russia, almost the entire infrastructure in Chechnya was destroyed. The war on the one hand showed a broad influence on a shift of Russian internal political life and it was indirectly the substantial cause to the deepening of the unpleasant inter-ethnic attitudes not only between Chechen and Russian’s Slavic population but also among the Northern Caucasian ethnicities (between Ossetia and Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan and others), on the other hand, it has brought about the re-orientate of the Russia's foreign policy. Furthermore, the war has also become an endurance test of Russia’s post-Soviet borders.¹⁹⁹

While comparing the first and the second Chechen wars we can find out that the first war was bloody because of the incompetence of commanders and indifferent behavior of Boris Yeltsin, but the second war was engraved in memories with several unforgettable terroristic attacks carried out by Chechen terrorists in Beslan and Nord-Ost, blow up of buildings, suicide attack in Domodedov airport and lots of others. However, the common outcome of both campaigns has been resulted with the general re-organization in the structure of Russian military forces.

Actually, the fire-cease obtained by Khasavyurt agreement in 1996, from politic point of view was the second chance for the forthcoming second war and radicalization of the religious views in Chechnya was deeper rooted particularly from the anarchy occurred in this period. The war in Chechnya involved extraneous radical Islamists to the Northern Caucasus, and this appeared auspicious condition facilitated the increasing of numbers of the extremism in the region. The arriving extremist groups to Chechnya brought about the distortion of the core idea of the Chechen resistance and even have pulled it into the terrorism. Thus, while to compare the first and the second wars we can face with that during the first Chechen war most of the Chechen rebels had maintained their nationalist intentions, even although foreign fighters played some role in the Chechnya resistance, but their numbers were not in that extent which had been able to shift the main course of struggle. Nevertheless, ‘during the second Chechen war the character, actors, tactics and the very nature of the ongoing war have all been profoundly influenced by the activities of the foreign mujahedeen who have successfully “sacralised” a separatist conflict into a militant Islamic uprising.’²⁰⁰ Even, since 9/11 due to the new world order the international attitude toward the Chechen conflict has thoroughly changed, the majority of world countries adopt Chechnya as a nest of terrorism and extremism. However, the hopes of Kremlin to obtain from the West carte-blanche for its activity in Chechnya was not approved, thus the West let know to Kremlin that the war in Chechnya and the war against the terrorism are not identical meanings.²⁰¹

Apparently, after invasion of the Chechen fighters under the lead of Shamil Basayev and Khattab, Russia carried out the second war as a counter-terroristic operation and protection of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. In this case, the Russian president Putin has achieved to some substantial results and was able to manage to eliminate the power of the terrorists. No doubt that these operations carried out during the second campaign dealt a blow on Chechen insurgences’ positions and have also played a quite significant role for Putin’s turning into the reputable political figure. But it is undeniable fact that the fulfilment of counter-terroristic operations cannot root out terrorism in Russia as long as there will not worked out earnest development project of Chechnya. The point here, actually, is not in the status of Chechnya. For Russia the disturbing point should be the remaining of Chechnya in ruins and suffering of people from this destruction, which it gives in its turn a dangerous feedback as a direct and unpreventable threat to the country. It is important to eliminate and remove the reasons of the terrorism but not to deploy large-scaled anti-terrorist operations. Otherwise it means that in Chechnya will support the long-term guerrilla war, as global practices also witness that the guerrilla wars could be prolonged for decades, turning into a constant background of political and economic activity for some, and assumed life style for others. Thus, from the standpoint of commonsense the Chechen fight with Russian state machine is pointless and victory certainly impossible, however, the other side of the coin is that the war in Chechnya has remained fraught with unintended consequences for Russia.

Actually, everybody knows that on the whole for finding some common solutions for any issue at first should be taken into consideration and compare the targets of disputing parties. However, the first step before singing any agreement parties has to pass through bilateral negotiations based on international law principles. The conflict sides have to take into consideration that in a nuclear era they have no choice than to come in compromise. Thus, in this case, obtaining of some solution in the Chechen conflict is important not only for Russia but also for the security and stability in whole world. Because each frozen conflict is a potential ticking-bomb ready for any moment to burst. Furthermore, the regions remained without control will facilitate the fit condition for working of narcotics and play suit transit role for their transportation.

In a conclusion, terrorism cannot be justified despite of its motives, each act of violence will give negative feedback and it will continue until endless. There must be obtained some rational ways which will satisfy the conflicting parties, same like in present Chechnya case.

The end

APPENDIX

Table I

KEY FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN-CHECHEN CONFLICT

Conflict Initiation Russian metropolitan politics: intra-elite power struggle

(1991-1994) Chechen peripheral nationalism

Russian energy and military sectional interests

Chechen regional interests

Conflict Cessation Russian metropolitan politics: presidential election

(1996-1997) Chechen military success

War weariness

OSCE ‘presence’

Conflict Resumption Russian metropolitan policies: presidential alternance

( 1999-) Chechnya as a failed regime

Chechen ideocratic interests

Dual Radicalization

(Hughes, James (2001). Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/641/1/Hughes.Chechnya.Civil_Wars.pdf)

Table II

Major terrorist acts since 1994 until 2006

-5 killed

-4 killed, 15 wounded

1,600 persons, including children and pregnant women) – 166 killed, more than 400 wounded; a terrorist gang was headed by Shamil Basayev

-78 killed, hundreds wounded; Salman Raduyev headed about 500 terrorists

-8 killed, 23 wounded

-18 killed, 160 wounded

-62 killed, 118 wounded

-61 killed, 130 wounded

-94 killed, 164 wounded

-124 killed, 9 wounded

-18 killed, 130 wounded; this series of September explosions is considered

one case by intelligence services, masterminded by Arab mercenaries Khattab and Abu Umar; most of the executors were later killed in Chechnya
24.03.2001 Explosion of cars in Mineralnye Vody, Essentuki and Cherkessk

-21 killed, 140 wounded

-42 killed, over 100 wounded

-129 killed; 41 militants, headed by Movsar Barayev, nephew of terrorist Arbi Barayev, killed by federal forces in Chechnya

-16 killed, 69 wounded; carried out by two female suicide-bombers, Zelikhan Elikhadgiyeva, a 20-year old from a Chechnya village, and Zarema Mugikhoeva, who was arrested five days later in Moscow. They had been trained by Khamzat Tazabaev, who was close to Shamil Basayev and who was killed during the special operation in Ingushetia

-5 killed, about 40 wounded

-47 killed, 180 wounded; blamed on members of the ‘Nogai battalion’

Paveletskaya stations

-40 killed, 134 wounded; attributed to an Arab from Chechnya, Abu al-Valid, the successor of the eliminated Khattab
09.05.2004 Grozny, the explosion at Dinamo stadium

-6 killed, over 40 wounded; Shamil Basayev claimed responsibility

the 137^th frontier detachment in Nazran, Karabulak and Stepstovskaya

-100 killed
24.08.2004 Bomb attacks on two airline flights, Moscow-Volgograd and Moscow-

Sochi

-11 killed, 41 wounded; Shamil Basayev claimed responsibility, the ‘Karachai battalion’ were accused

adults)

‘Jenet’ and ‘Sharia’ Dagestan jamaats

-33 law enforcement officers and 12 civil servants were killed; a large majority of the over 100 wounded were secret service officers; 80 militants were killed and 27 captured; responsibility claimed by the Kabardino-Balkaria Jamaat

-4 law enforcement officers were killed; 12 militants of the ‘Nogai battalion’ (which is part of the Chechnya Shelkov jamaat) were killed

(Malashenko, A and Yarlykapov, A (2009).

Available at: http://www.microconflict.eu/publications/PWP9_AM_AY.pdf)

Human loss in the Chechen-Russian Wars

Killed Civilian Inhabitants of Chechnya

Less than 20.000 According to: Anatoly Kulikov: Minister of Interior in 1995-

1998s.
Between 80.000-100.000 According to: Alexander Lebed: secretary of National Security

Council in 1996.
100,000 According to: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chechen

republic of Ichkeria.

Killed Russian Soldiers

4,500 According to: The Second Chechen War: The Information

Relations Advisor.

Olkot, M., and others.

Russia.

Killed Civilians Inhabitants of Chechnya

14,000 According to: Russian Government
80,000 According to: German Secret Service report to Chancellor

Schroeder

Killed Russian Soldiers

14,500 According to: Ivan Rybkin’s presentation; Towards Peace in

Russia (including soldiers who are missing)

371,000 Chechens According to: World Refugees Survey 2002

Republic of Ichkeriya

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