Masarykova univerzita

7 Conclusion

The arms race during Cold War had been one of the causes that undermined economic growth in the civilian sector. Hence, not surprisingly, a new President of Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, instantly pushed for arms cuts, particularly in nuclear arsenal with an intention to channel the money toward reforms and civilian objectives (Donaldson – Nogee 2010: 220). Yeltsin was a supporter of cooperation was he was also somewhat enchanted by President Bush's initiative on the common deployment of GPALS. However, this idea was defeated due to a strong opposition in both countries.

A much more important issue confronting Washington and Moscow was a follow-up to the START treaty. START II was linked to the ratification of START I which was delayed almost for 3 years thanks to Ukraine's initial refusal to join the Treaty. The major concession on Russia's side in START II was an agreement to eliminate all land-based, MIRVed ICBMs – that had been considered the backbone of Russian strategic forces – while both parties were allowed to retain multiple-armed warheads in submarines where the USA kept the advantage. For the first time Russia also gave up on its goal of strategic parity with the US. Not all Russians were willing to accept this new Yeltsin's foreign policy direction. Surely, there was an alarm and disquiet in military. The accession of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to START I legally opened the way to move on in ratification of START II. However, new obstacles emerged, both in Russian domestic politics and in Russian-US relations. First, a sharp change took place in Russia's foreign policy as a result of 1993 nationalist and rightist forces coming to power. Second, in 1994, a completely new issue evolved which was NATO extension. These issues plus NATO's intervention in Kosovo deferred the ratification until 2000 (Donaldson – Nogee 2010: 220).

Voices from Russia's military were heard in the issue of START II treaty, as well as in the case of revising the CFE treaty and the extended arms sales. The original CFE treaty (1990) established rules on allocation of conventional weaponry in the NATO and WTO states. Russia's military considered some of the “flank ceilings” too stern. Therefore, Yeltsin decided to propose amending the CFE treaty. This proposal met strong reaction of resistance within NATO. The military at the time of Yeltsin's presidency also demanded government back-up for arms exports in order to keep munitions and weapons production facilities in business. Russia's government understood the arms sales as a desperately needed source of hard currency. Yeltsin skillfully balanced his arms export policies elements of competition and cooperation with West. Nonetheless, on many occasions, he suffered criticism from the nationalists at home (for the loss of billions of dollars in sanction against Libya, Iraq, and Yugoslavia) as well as from abroad (for keeping lucrative Middle Eastern and Asian markets; in particular, Iran) (Donaldson – Nogee 2010: 220 – 224). By looking at the strategic security documents released during the 1990s – Foreign Policy Concept (1993), Military Doctrine (1993), and National Security Concept (1997) – we can observe that Russia's main interests were, above all else, to create and maintain political and economic stability in country.

Beginning in 1993, public statements about foreign policy has gradually put less emphasis on openly pro-Western policies and more emphasis on securing the Russia's great power role in world, strengthening the CIS, and cooperation with Asian countries and protecting Russia's major interests there. The protection of Russian borders and the interests of ethnic Russians and facilities within the borders of former Soviet satellites were taken seriously. The major external military challenges were to be dealt with nuclear potential, while internal threats were to be responded by modernized military, and the Soviet no-first-use pledge was formally revoked in 1993 Military Doctrine. There was a clear shift toward more assertive politics in the international environment in pursuit of renewed great power status. The security climate, and accordingly, the documents and arms-control treaties that emerged under Yeltsin rule responded to the internal threats to the Russia's security. Russian Federation was during Yeltsin presidency literally preoccupied with territorial integrity, its internal stability, and the economic problems. Even though Russians did not see the West and NATO as a threat in the beginning of the 1990s, this fact played only a marginal role in shaping Russia's policy at the time. The documents and treaties emerged at the time reflect the internal chaos of state, and the pressing need to solve the problem of huge military expenditures. Disarmament and arms control served as useful tools in facilitating the process of consolidation of Russian state and its adaptation to the new international environment.

In Putin's first term in office, the Moscow Treaty (2002) was signed. It established further reductions in nuclear arsenals of both nuclear superpowers, relying on verification regime from START I. The cuts were substantive; nevertheless, they did not reach the importance of the cuts in the earlier treaties. The 2002 SORT treaty and Russian acquiescence on the ABM treaty withdrawal represented Russia’s increasingly pro-Western foreign policy in Putin's first term. The major critique from Russia was that SORT did not call for the destruction of downloaded warheads. Moscow treaty left Russia, which was being forced to reduce its deployed arsenal for economic reasons, facing the USA that would be capable of rapidly reconstituting its nuclear arsenal.

Although Russia showed unprecedented solidarity with West right after the terrorist attacks on WTC, the warm-up in the mutual relations was to be ended soon. The security documents expressing negative feelings towards West which had been published before the events of 11/9 remained unchanged until the end of Putin's presidency. One of the most open expressions of negative position was presented by Putin himself at the annual Munich Security Conference where he blamed the current political climate created by the US and the West for igniting a new round of arms race. The main characteristics of Putin's attitude have been assertiveness towards the West, pragmatic attitude in using the energetic resources as a tool of foreign policy, and the emphasis on use of military means if necessary (the 2000 National Security Concept and the 2000 Military Doctrine permitted the use of nuclear weapons to counter aggression). Except for a short time of cooperation and support for West in a wake of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, Putin has always behaved more as a pragmatist than a friend in the relationship with the West. The brief period of reapproachment could be better understood as an ad hoc act of support in fighting against a common foe rather than an expression of approximation of common interests.

Given the effective monopoly that Putin and his party United Russia enjoyed in Duma after the elections in 2008, tandem Medvedev – Putin virtually gained dictatorial powers. In spite of the unfavorable international economic developments, the foreign policy of Russia has become even more assertive. This trend was demonstrated, for example, in Russia's suspension of the CFE Treaty – a cornerstone of strategic stability in Europe – as it was often called. In 2007, the Russian side formally suspended the CFE Treaty over the US plans to station elements of a missile defense system in Europe, and NATO’s “failure” to ratify its revised 1999 Istanbul version. The 1999 adapted treaty never entered into force because of NATO's disagreement with Russian military presence in Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia and the Transndestrian region of Moldova (RIA Novosti 2012b).

However, in the field of control of nuclear weapons a new agreement was reached. The “New START” set the further limits on deployed of nuclear warheads. The treaty was a subject of critics for allowing the Russians to gain a strategic advantage. Russia was often blamed for using the treaty only as a tool of getting rid of the old systems. Thus, according to some, the “New START” meant no real progress in arms control.

When he took office, President Medvedev introduced a new edition of security documents: the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept, National Security Strategy until 2020 with long-term objectives, and 2010 Military Doctrine. All the Medvedev's documents bear a resemblance with the edition of his predecessor in office. Nevertheless, there also appeared new aspects. The last edition of Russia’s major security documents reflected the new strategic environment. The documents revolved around the “newly emerged threats”, such as terrorism, WMDs' proliferation, smuggling, or cybercrime. At the same time, the documents took into account the constraints posed by severe economic crisis and volatile prices of oil. The military should have become more effective for sake of Russia's security and economy. By now, the military sales have remained important source of income for Russian Federation. The military-industrial complex has been still viewed as a source of incomes and employment for Russians by Russia's leadership. The attempts to make Russia's military and its military-industrial complex more effective have been made, however, the pace of change has been desperately slow.

Under presidency of Putin and his follower Medvedev the Russia's attitude towards NATO and the West has somewhat hardened. On the one hand, the declaratory language of Russia's representatives has been sometimes pretty sharp. On the other hand, though, the Russia's security thinking has started to adapt itself to the new international environment where the relations with the other states are more interdependent, and where the threats have gained unconventional character. The latest documents and treaties responded more to these new threats than to the often declared perception of NATO and the West as a threat. Thus, it can be concluded that, compared to the Cold War times, this apprehension of “Western threat” no longer played the main role in shaping Russia's strategic documents or strategic arms-control treaties.

In general, Russia’s attitude towards arms control shows the similarities and continuity with the arms-control politics of the former Soviet Union. The old patterns of Soviet thinking persist. What changed is the domestic situation in Russia and the international environment. The most breaking arms-control treaties – INF, CFE, and START I – were negotiated mostly in the last days of the Soviet Union before Yeltsin became the President of the Russian Federation under severe political and economic circumstances. In the beginning of the 1990s, Russia signed START I and START II Treaties (though, the latter was ratified much later), welcoming the possibility to cut its extensive military expenditures, especially given the political and financial support from West. Both the treaties brought about important quantitative and qualitative reductions of arms. Although, compared to the INF, which banned the whole category of nuclear weapons, or to the CFE Treaty, which required unprecedented reductions of conventional armaments, these cuts were not that significant.

The Umbach's premise from the introduction that the Russia's perception of NATO and the US as lesser threats downsizes the extent of arms control turns out to be only partially valid in the beginning of the Yeltsin's presidential term. It is true that in the early 1990s, Russian leadership apprehended less danger from the US and NATO. However, Russians did not execute deeper reductions comparable with initiatives and treaties of the late USSR. The extent of reductions was determined by two main needs: to maintain political and economic cooperation with the West, and to cut Russia's immense military budget. Besides the needs, Russian government had two intertwined goals: to heal Russian economy and to stabilize the country. Russia's internal pursuit of political and economic stability during the difficult transitional period shaped its attitude towards the arms control process considerably more than any other factor, including its foreign relations, or its outlook on the US and NATO.

The process of ratification of START II in the late 1990s presents a contradictory phenomenon to the implications of the research premise. The more Russia saw NATO as a threat, especially in the late 1990s, the less it was willing to advance arms-control agenda. Mainly due to the Kosovo campaign and its enlargement policy, NATO was understood as a threat to Russia's national interests. Russia's leadership delayed the launch of START II for almost a decade and hampered the CFE negotiations. By the end of the 1990s, Russian Federation has slowly turned back to the traditional suspicious attitude towards the West's intentions.

Under Putin and Medvedev, Russia has openly and frequently declared that the US and NATO are one of the most important threats to Russia's national security. Namely, NATO's eastern extension, US' suspension of the ABM treaty, and the deployment of anti-ballistic facilities in Eastern Europe have been seen as acts of hostility by the Russia's leadership. However, the more Russia dubbed the US and NATO a threat, the fewer arms-control treaties have evolved (having become of lesser significance to Russia). On the one hand, two treaties in the field of nuclear weapons: SORT Treaty (2002) and “New START” (2010). On the other hand, though, nuclear weapons reductions did not reach the importance of the first START, or INF, and the CFE process has gradually come to an end.

Interestingly, though, the general analysis of security documents and political outputs suggests that Russia under Putin – Medvedev tandem has viewed NATO rather as a power competitor than a real security threat. It appears that Russia has used many arms-control initiatives to assert its interests in the international arena, and to limit its military spending rather than to preserve its very existence. Therefore, taking into account all the analyzed circumstances, as they are reflected in Russia's security documents and political outputs (namely, the gradual adaptation on a new kind of threats, Euro-Asian shift in security and foreign policy, and persisting economic straits), the research premise offers only a fragment of explanation. It appears to be valid in a way that Russia's attention has moved on from the Cold War view on NATO as an enemy “number one” towards the new security challenges. In this sense, compared to the emerging unconventional threats, the US and NATO have become a lesser danger in Russia's eyes. Thus, Russia's leadership may keep on calling NATO a threat but, the fact remains that it does not seek to curb the US' or NATO's military potential using the arms control tool. As Graham Smith (1999: 491) puts it:

While no longer viewing the West as an anniversary, statists [Russian geo-politicians] have lost neither Russia’s anti-Western instincts nor its desire to find a new identity for itself distinct from the West.

Beginning in the late 1990s, the shift in development of Russia's security policy was brought mainly by the change in nature of the international security environment which has brought challenges and threats that prevailed over the NATO's reputed threatening potential. This change was formally reflected in the strategic security documents released by president Medvedev.

Since the disintegration of the USSR, Russia has always followed its national interests. First, in the 1990s, Russia had to stabilize itself internally. Later, Russia has oriented its interests more outwards, on increasing its power in the international environment. The arms-control process has been viewed mainly as one of the many tools in pursuit of economic prosperity, political stability and last but not least, great power status.

Actually, in this light Gray's central paradox of arms control fits perfectly to modern Russia: “if arms control is needed in a strategic relationship because the states involved might go to war, it will be impractical for that very reason of need, whereas, if arms control prove to be available, it will be irrelevant”. Gray claims that if states are not threatened by the likelihood of war they do not need to commit themselves to arms control. Since Russia no longer sees NATO and the West as a threat equal to possible arms conflict, it does not seek any more binding arms control regime. Accordingly, Russians left the CFE Treaty regime, and they did not seek radical solutions during the latest part of START process, either. Also, Russia's strategic documents and changes in their nuclear and conventional arsenal indicate that Russians seek to secure themselves primarily against different threats than NATO and its forces would pose. Russian forces are to be smaller, better deployable, and more effective. This direction does not suggest either expectation of conventional conflict on the European theater, or extensive nuclear exchange with NATO or the US. Russia's latest security documents tend to respond to the threats in a new security environment with adequate means.

9. 
   
   Download 0.58 Mb.
   
   Share with your friends: