Mattis, Jamestown Foundation China Program fellow, 2015

Deterrence Key to Prevent Non-China Attacks

Emboldenment

(Jack, “More Harmful Public Hand-Wringing on Possible Sanctions Against China for Cyber Theft”, 8-31, https://www.lawfareblog.com/more-harmful-public-hand-wringing-possible-sanctions-against-china-cyber-theft)

In other words, more public equivocation. And then yesterday Nakashima reports that the U.S. government “has not yet decided whether to issue” the supposedly unprecedented sanctions it has developed for China, and notes that “a final call is expected soon.” As I have explained before, figuring out how to sanction China for its cyber intrusions is hard because (among other reasons) (i) the USG cannot coherently sanction China for its intrusions into US public sector (DOD, OPM, etc.) networks since the USG is at least as aggressive in China’s government networks, and (ii) the USG cannot respond effectively to China’s cyber intrusions in the private sector because US firms and the US economy have more to lose than gain (or at least a whole lot to lose) from escalation—especially now, given China’s suddenly precarious economic situation. But even if sanctions themselves are hard to figure out, the public hand-wringing about whether and how to sanction China is harmful. It is quite possible that more is happening in secret. “One of the conclusions we’ve reached is that we need to be a bit more public about our responses, and one reason is deterrence,” a senior administration official in an “aha” moment told Sanger last month. One certainly hopes the USG is doing more in secret than in public to deter China’s cybertheft. Moreover, one can never know what cross-cutting machinations by USG officials lie behind the mostly anonymous leaks that undergird the years of stories about indecisiveness. Still, the aggregate effect of public stories about the administration's persistent inability to do come up with a serious response to China’s cyber intrusions is, I think, devastating to our public and private security. As I wrote earlier this month: A nation cannot establish any form of deterrence when the world sees that it is undecided about what to do. Any retaliation now, after all the public uncertainty about how to proceed, will hardly establish a credible deterrence policy; and the fact that the USG is [as Sanger reported] considering "symbolic" responses shows just how unserious it is about deterrence. The failure to have a credible deterrence policy has repercussions far beyond the Chinese to other State and non-State parties. This last sentence, I think, is key. If we have been secretly sanctioning China the sanctions have not been working against China. And the public fumbling and vacillation in the USG’s response to China only encourages the third parties (public and private) who would also infiltrate USG public and private networks.

Arctic Impact – 2NC

Chinese provocation collapses rule of law – spills into Arctic conflict

Odom, judge advocate in the U.S. Navy, 12

(Jonathon, “What Does a "Pivot" or "Rebalance" Look Like? Elements of the U.S. Strategic Turn Towards Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and Its Waters,” 14 Asian-Pacific L. & Pol'y J. 1, lexis)

Finally, the United States will promote the rules-based international order through a military presence in the region, thereby preserving its access and maintaining security and stability. By its nature, [*28] the international rules-based order is derived from a body of international law where state action and inaction can have legal consequences. In particular, the international law of the sea is based upon both conventional law (e.g., UNCLOS) and customary law. That latter source of law depends upon "persistent objector" 168 actions of user states to prevent anti-access maritime laws and practices of coastal states from becoming incorporated into international law. As Admiral Samuel Locklear, the current senior U.S. military commander in the Asia-Pacific region, explained to the U.S. Senate: The U.S. Navy is a key provider of the military presence that underlies peace and stability across the globe, including in the South China Sea. I believe it is essential for the U.S. Navy to maintain its presence and assert its freedom of navigation and over[-]flight rights in the South China Sea in accordance with customary international law. Preservation of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea depend largely upon their continual exercise. Around the world, U.S. military forces conduct operations to prevent excessive maritime claims asserted by coastal states from limiting our national interest in freedom of navigation. In the South China Sea, we have expressed our freedom of navigation interest for many decades, through diplomatic protests and operational assertions against excessive maritime claims asserted by several nations. Of note, we challenge excessive maritime claims asserted by any nation, including claims by allies and partners. Our military presence in the South China Sea includes Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOps), Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations (SRO), Special Mission Ship (SMS) operations, and other routine military transits, operations, and exercises. The United States should sustain our military presence in international waters and uphold its commitments to its allies and partners in order to maintain peace and stability in the region. 169 This explanation of the relationship between access and presence was spurred by questions from the U.S. Senate about the U.S. military's role in the South China Sea; however, due to the customary nature of [*29] international law, this explanation of how presence upholds the rules-based order applies equally to waters throughout the Asia-Pacific region. As a practical matter, any method to promote the rules-based international order, such as the ones identified above, will not be employed in isolation, but rather will be leveraged simultaneously with others. Take, for example, the ongoing security situation in the South China Sea. In recent years, China has dramatically increased the size of its military. With its rising military capabilities, China "began to show some muscle." 170 In the South China Sea, it began to "assert" itself. 171 It started moving to block oil exploration to countries. 172 Given these circumstances, the United States has taken specific action in order to uphold and promote the rules-based international order in the South China Sea. One example of deliberate U.S. action designed to uphold the rules-based order is exhibited by the emphasis that senior U.S. officials have placed on the importance of that order as it has built its relations with regional institutions such as with the ARF throughout 2010, 2011, and 2012. For the South China Sea situation, Secretary Clinton "felt strongly" that the United States "had to say freedom of navigation is an international right." 173 Regarding competing territorial claims in the South China Sea, the United States has respected the methods 174 for resolving those disputes. Specifically, the United States made it clear that it would not be calling winners and losers, but rather would "strongly assert the rule of law and a rules-based approach to solving these issues." 175 Additionally, the United States has promoted the international order as a system that benefits all nations globally, as it builds a cooperative relationship with China. Consider how Secretary Clinton conveyed the following message to China's leaders: But as--I've said this to the Chinese. Take the South China Sea. If we don't have a rules-based approach in the South China Sea that looks at international law and custom, and resolves disputes through these mechanisms that either are [*30] already established or need to be created, then what are you going to say when you decide you want to go through the Arctic because now there's less ice, and the Russians say no, it's ours, or anywhere else that people are going to start claiming by force as opposed to international norms? 176 Thus, the United States seeks to remind the world via the myriad of relationships--with allies, partners, regional institutions, and China alike--that the rules-based international order "is not just about any one nation." 177 Instead, it is about "how we're going to have a global set of that people are going to follow in order to maximize positive results everyone." 178

Nuclear war

Wallace and Staples 10 (Michael Wallace and Steven Staples. *Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia and President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue,”http://www.arcticsecurity.org/docs/arctic-nuclear-report-web.pdf)

The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.” 55 Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years. 56 In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic. 57 The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military training base and a deep-water port. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with shipbased helicopters able to drop troops anywhere. 58 Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000 soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs. 59 The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved. 609 Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states – the United States and the Russian Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world – converge on the Arctic and have competing claims. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons.” 61 Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly. The current geo-political threat level is nebulous and low – for now, according to Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary, “[the] issue is the uncertainty as Arctic states and non-Arctic states begin to recognize the geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of climate change.” 62

Norms Impact – 2NC

Erodes every international norm – China is key

Erickson, 2013, PhD, associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard’s Fairbank Center (Andrew, “Deterrence by Denial: How to Prevent China From Using Force”, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/war-china-two-can-play-the-area-denial-game-9564)

In contrast to ongoing limitations, shared interests, and even opportunities for increasingly-robust cooperation far away, China’s navy and other services are achieving formidable [4]anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) [4] capabilities closer to shore. Beijing is prioritizing an “anti-Navy [5]” to deter U.S. intervention in the Western Pacific over a blue-water, power-projection navy. The Chinese have identified, and are exploiting, limitations in U.S. weapons systems that stem from fundamental physical principles. For example, quiet diesel submarines will always be difficult to detect, track and kill. Fixed targets like airbases will always be difficult to defend against ballistic missiles. Beijing seeks to wield this growing might to pursue outstanding territorial and maritime claims and to [6]carve out [6]in the Yellow, East and South China Seas and airspace above them a “zone of exceptionalism” within which existing global security, legal, and resource management norms are subordinated to its parochial national interests. This can only weaken the global system on which all nations’ security and prosperity depends, and will continue to destabilize a vital but vulnerable region that remains haunted by history. If not addressed properly, China’s rise as a major A2/AD military power could give it unprecedented capacity to deny sanctuary and communications to U.S. forces, and thereby challenge the type of military operations for which the U.S. has equipped and prepared. While the Soviet Union posed significant challenges to the U.S. Army and Air Force based in continental Europe in the Cold War, the precision-weapons revolution and the maritime geography of the Asia-Pacific theater enable Chinese A2/AD to render U.S. forces, largely naval and island-based air forces, far more vulnerable. While conflict with China should be avoided, China must also be prevented from significantly coercing its neighbors or unilaterally altering the region’s status quo in ways that are inimical to the interests of the U.S. and its allies, as well as to regional stability in general. Failure to emphasize this point as well risks making the U.S. appear weak and acquiescent to mounting Chinese assertiveness, both to Beijing and to regional allies, friends, and partners. This risks miscalculation on Beijing’s part. It also makes taxpayers and their representatives question why significant U.S. military investments are needed in a time of austerity. This should be framed in terms of ensuring the continued functioning of the existing international system. Washington should clarify, as necessary, that it is not trying to contain Beijing per se, but rather to resist any Chinese actions that would harm the existing system. Conversely, positive Chinese behavior—such as providing international public security goods in the Gulfs of [7]Aden [7] or [8]Guinea [8], or helping to stabilize the North Korean border if the [9]barbaric Kim Jong-un regime [9] collapses, should be encouraged and applauded.

A2: Credibility Theory False

AFF studies disregard that credibility influences how opponents perceive interests AND exclude data points because opponents didn’t directly recall the past.

Weisger, Pennsylvania political science professor, 2015

(Alex, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics”, International Organization, 69.2, Cambridge)

First, we examine the claim that backing down in a dispute increases the likelihood that states face subsequent challenges. Having found support for that prediction, we then turn to the generalizability of reputation, examining whether states can also acquire a good reputation for resolve, whether reputation generalizes beyond dispute participants to observers, and whether reputation applies only to the specific issue area or leader involved in the initial dispute or is more general. Except where noted, we use a probit specification, clustering standard errors by directed dyad. Reputation and Crisis Onset Because the reputation critics have focused in particular on the argument that there is no cost to backing down, we focus our analysis primarily on tests related to “bad” reputation. Table 1 presents a series of regressions that examines the basic proposition that countries that have backed down in the past are more likely to be challenged subsequently. Model 1 demonstrates that, consistent with H3 and inconsistent with H1, a country that backed down in the recent past is more likely to be the target of a subsequent militarized dispute. Substantively, the result indicates that a country that yielded in a dispute in the previous year is more than two and one-half times as likely to be challenged than is a country that has not yielded in the previous ten years. Model 1, however, does not preclude the possibility that the apparent effect of reputation simply reflects the greater involvement of some countries in international politics. Some countries are involved in more international disputes, and hence are both more likely to occasionally yield and to face additional challenges. Model 2 thus inserts a control for the potential target's recent level of international activity. Consistent with the alternate explanation, the control variable is highly significant and the coefficient for the reputation variable is smaller, suggesting that at least some of the effect observed in Model 1 is spurious. That said, the reputation variable remains highly statistically and substantively significant: a country that yielded the previous year is more than twice as likely to face a challenge than is one that has not yielded in the previous ten years. Model 3 examines the role of international activity in a different manner, restricting the analysis to the subset of potential targets who had been involved in at least one militarized dispute in the previous ten years. Again, the coefficient is smaller than in Model 1, but the effect of reputation remains both statistically and substantively significant.38 The primary analysis uses a measure of reputation that codes a country as losing reputation when it yields in an MID. This is, of course, not the only possible measure of bad reputation. Model 4 presents results using a different specification based on the International Crisis Behavior data set. Specifically, a country is coded as acquiring a bad reputation in this specification if it is the coded loser of a crisis in which it did not escalate to the use of force. The observed effect is substantively indistinguishable from that reported in Models 2 and 3.39 Model 5 in turn substitutes the alternate formulation of the reputation variable (AltRep it ) that takes into account behavior in all recent MIDs; again results are quite comparable.40 All of these regressions make use of pooled time-series cross-sectional data, an approach that, although standard in the international relations conflict literature, has been criticized for neglecting the importance of unobserved differences across dyads.41 Model 6 thus presents results using a logit specification with dyad fixed effects. In any dyad in which no conflict occurs, the absence of conflict is ascribed to the dyad fixed effect and all relevant observations are dropped from the analysis, substantially limiting sample size. Nonetheless, reputation based on past yielding remains a significant predictor of subsequent challenges. Control variables in Table 1, and in subsequent analyses, perform as would be expected from findings in past work. More unequal dyads are less likely to experience conflict (albeit at a statistically insignificant level in Model 6), whereas dyads that are stronger overall experience more. Consistent with past findings, alliances are typically associated with an increase in conflict onset. More contiguous dyads are similarly consistently more likely to experience conflict, whereas increased levels of dyadic democracy are associated with less conflict. Finally, as predicted, the presence of a major power in a dyad is associated with an increased probability of conflict, although this effect is offset somewhat in jointly major power dyads. Figure 1 graphs marginal effects for substantive variables in Model 2 of Table 1, in every case holding other variables at their medians.42 Graphs are on a common axis to facilitate comparison across variables; we omit contiguity, whose substantive effect is sufficiently larger than that of other variables that a common comparison is impractical. A country that backed down the previous year is more than twice as likely to be targeted than a country that has not backed down in the previous ten years. This effect, though smaller than that for many traditionally realist variables, is slightly larger than that associated with a move from a dyad in which one country is fully autocratic to a jointly fully democratic one. Including a range of control variables and across a number of robustness checks, therefore, there is a consistent observation that countries that yield in disputes with other countries are more likely to face a subsequent challenge than countries that do not. This finding, our most important, suggests that there is good reason for leaders to fear adverse consequences associated with backing down in disputes. Table 2 presents results that examine how general the effects of past action are. Model 1 shifts the focus from bad reputation to good reputation, examining the proposition that countries that have fought and won in a past dispute generate a reputation for resolution that makes them less attractive targets. Consistent with H3, states that demonstrated resolve in the past are less likely to be challenged.43 Holding control variables at medians, a country that has not fought to a victory in the previous ten years is 50 percent more likely to be challenged than is a country that achieved a military victory the previous year. This result holds for a variety of robustness checks, analogous to those we presented earlier.44 The remaining models in Table 2 focus on the degree to which reputations gained in interactions over a particular type of issue or involving a particular actor generalize. Reputation critics have made a convincing case that reputation does not generalize to the degree that early scholars such as Schelling implied, but we argue that the opposite position—that reputation is extremely context-bound—is also inappropriate. As H4 states, we expect the effect of reputation to be stronger when the actors or issues involved are more similar to the previous dispute in which the country gained its reputation. We also expect that reputation's effects will be observable outside the immediate context of the prior dispute. One question is whether reputations exist only dyadically, or whether potential challengers make decisions about whether or not to initiate a dispute based on incidents they are not a party to. If the effects observed in Table 1 turn out to be driven entirely by further challenges by the country to whom one acquiesced, then that implies significant limits to the generalizability of reputation. To examine this possibility, in Model 2 we simply drop observations containing the potential challenger against whom the actor in question backed down. Any positive effect of past action in this case thus reflects the behavior of previously uninvolved observers. Backing down is still associated with an increased probability of being challenged, although the effect is substantively weaker, with the change in the probability of a challenge dropping from above 100 percent to about 60 percent. This result implies that the inferences drawn from past action are stronger for countries involved in the previous disagreements, but that observers also draw lessons that affect their policy decisions.45 Model 3 extends the analysis by focusing on a specific issue, namely territorial disagreements. We code an MID as territorial if any participant has territorial aims (as captured in the MID revision type variables), and code countries as acquiring a bad territorial reputation only if they back down in a territorial MID. We then examine the effect of backing down on the onset of new territorial MIDs, setting aside cases in which disputes did not relate to territory. To provide a comparison, we also include a variable that captures recent yielding in nonterritorial disputes. Consistent with expectations, backing down in a territorial dispute is associated with a dramatic increase in the probability of a new territorial challenge. A country that backed down in a territorial dispute the previous year is more than fifteen times more likely to face a new territorial challenge than one that had not backed down in the previous ten years. However, bad reputations in nonterritorial disputes do not have the same effect on the onset of new territorial disputes—although still positive and not far from conventional statistical significance (p = 0.067), the relevant variable is statistically insignificant and substantively far smaller.46 This result suggests, consistent with H4, that the generalizability of reputation has its limits.47 Finally, Model 4 shifts the focus from states to specific leaders. The unit of analysis here is the leader-year, with leaders identified on the basis of the Archigos data set. We then generate two reputation variables: one that corresponds to the value for the bad reputation variable when the leader who backed down is still in power, and one corresponding to the value for the bad reputation variable in cases where the leader who backed down has left power. If reputation applied only to the leader in power at the time the country backed down, we would expect the results for the first variable to be stronger than those for the second. In the event, however, the two variables are statistically indistinguishable, suggesting that leadership turnover does not produce a clean reputational slate. Our findings provide strong evidence that reputation for resolve matters. Although studies by reputation critics are correct to argue that realist variables such as power and interests play an important role in states' behavior during crises, past actions have significant consequences. Countries that have backed down are substantially more likely to face subsequent challenges. We argue that the discrepancy between our results and those advanced by reputation critics may stem from their focus on crisis decision making, where information gleaned from past action will already have been incorporated into broader estimates of interests and hence is less likely to be referenced directly, as well as from their failure to recognize that reputation acts through estimates of an opponent's interests.

Prefer our studies – unspoken assumption bias

Dafoe, Poli Sci Prof @ Yale, 14

(Allan, “Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2014. 17:371–93)

We thus have persuasive evidence from many sources that states, leaders, and publics care about their reputation and status. Scholars do not agree, however, about whether observers do, in fact, draw reputational inferences. Several important works on reputation have failed to find evidence that policy elites’ beliefs are influenced by others’ crisis behavior. Hopf (1994) examines how Soviet policy elites responded to American behavior in various crises and does not find evidence that US military behavior influenced Soviet inferences about US credibility. Similarly, Mercer (1996, p. 212) contrasts a version of deterrence theory with his theory based on the confirmatory attribution pattern and finds evidence that “people do not consistently use past behavior to predict similar behavior in the future.” Most recently, Press (2005) examines a set of crises in which “past actions” theory—Press’s null theory of reputation—predicts that leaders should have used prior crisis behavior to inform their assessment of the credibility of a leader’s threats. Press reports finding almost no evidence that past actions informed observers’ inferences, whereas perceptions of “interest” and “power” played a substantial role in assessments of credibility. In summary, three prominent scholars examining primary historical documents do not find clear evidence that policy elites used others’ past actions to draw reputational inferences and inform their assessments of credibility. Yet, this evidence stands in stark contrast with the confident theoretical beliefs of many IR scholars about the importance of reputation, as well as with the beliefs of publics, elites, and leaders. As summarized by Jervis et al. (1989, p. 14), statesmen “often use the recent behavior of others as important sources of information.” In fact, evidence of reputational inferences would seem to be present any time an observer appends an adjective (e.g., “unreliable,” “weak,” etc.) to a description of a leader because of that leader’s past behavior. We also know that reputation and status are prevalent in many aspects of human societies and among most social animals (see Grosenick et al. 2007, Whitfield 2011). This tension signals a productive puzzle for future scholars to explore. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that “decision makers wrongly believe [that] they obtain reputations” (Mercer 2013, p. 221) and that “those countries that have fought wars to build a reputation for resolve have wasted” money and lives (Press 2005, p. 1). There are a number of methodological and theoretical reasons why one should interpret the above studies with caution. First, all these studies involve a similar method: evaluating the beliefs of policy elites during or after crises using historical documents. Any bias or flaw associated with this method could influence all of their results (for a broader discussion of potential problems, see Weisiger & Yarhi-Milo 2013). Consider first the bias induced by unspoken assumptions. Information that is already known by all participants would not be informative to discuss, and thus should be underrepresented in policy discussions and the documents that emerge from them. As highlighted by Larson (1988), common knowledge and shared beliefs and experiences are rarely stated outright. The reputation and status of a state are likely to be commonly known at the beginning of the crisis, and thus should be underrepresented relative to their importance (Weisiger & Yarhi-Milo 2013, pp. 8–9). Second, selection bias is especially severe in the study of reputation and status. If we are interested in the adverse effects on one’s reputation (or on one’s domestic political support) from backing down, and leaders care about reputation (or domestic support), we can expect the observed effects to be biased toward zero (Schultz 2001a, 2012). Furthermore, we should be cautious about drawing inferences from any study that looks only at crises, conflicts, or wars. Such a design is conditioning on a crucial post-treatment factor—the occurrence of some level of conflict—and thus the meaning of any observed pattern is confounded by selection effects (Fearon 1994a, 2002). The problems caused by nonignorable missing data are not easily overcome, and these problems will be more severe the more influence that decision makers have over the behavior of their states.

Psychology research is NEG

Dafoe, Poli Sci Prof @ Yale, 14

(Allan, “Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2014. 17:371–93)

A theme of scholarly debate is whether inferences about reputation and status are rational. Many scholars employ a rationalist foundation, although they vary in their assumptions about the relevant actor (state, leader, organization) and the specific logic of the particular reputation or status. Other scholars prefer to begin from models of inference based on psychological, cultural, or other frameworks. These different approaches are then often posed in competition with each other. We argue that although it is productive to draw from both of these traditions, viewing them as competing alternatives is largely unproductive for the simple reason that the competing models of inference are insufficiently specified to yield divergent testable implications. Below, we show how rationalist models are in fact consistent with most of what is presented as evidence against rationalist inference, such as historical and cultural richness, individual variation, and theory-laden interpretation of evidence. We recommend a specific model of inference that, in our view, provides a plausible and powerful foundation for thinking about reputation and status while also having sufficient flexibility to account for most of the features invoked by critics of rationalist inference. To this foundation many psychological, cultural, and organizational complications could be appended. This foundation can be called “Bayesian inference in social equilibria” (elaborated by Dafoe 2014), which is simply the inferential procedure of an actor that (a) adopts probability theory as its model of plausibility (Bayesian inference) and (b) exists in a strategic setting with multiple equilibria (social equilibria). This model of inference is the same as that employed in standard game theoretic models that have multiple equilibria, although we tend to emphasize more the roles of history, culture, and psychology in equilibrium selection, and we encourage revision of the models of plausibility and utility with more realistic, but still parsimonious, models once sufficient evidence accumulates in favor of them. Bayesian inference is a useful foundation for modeling how agents change their beliefs. Bayesian inference is simply the use of probability theory to model the plausibility of beliefs, most well known for using “Bayes’ rule” to model the updating of beliefs from new information. Bayesian inference is the unique consistent model for reasoning about plausibility that corresponds with common sense ( Jaynes 2003, p. 3).7 To the extent that political actors desire to draw consistent sensible inferences, they should seek to approximate Bayesian inference. In addition, Bayesian inference serves as a good approximation for how humans actually learn about causal relationships (Holyoak & Cheng 2010). Many insights emerging from psychological and cultural approaches are also implications of Bayesian inference. Consider a recent example from Jonathan Mercer, who has offered political science some of the most explicit and serious psychological models of reputational inference. Mercer (2013, p. 226; see also 2010, p. 8) argues that “whereas rationalists imagine that people use evidence to revise their beliefs, political psychologists have long noted that people also assimilate evidence to fit their beliefs.” However, in Bayesian inference, evidence is also interpreted through the lens of one’s beliefs; the same piece of evidence could be read as evidence for or against a hypothesis depending on the observer’s beliefs about other features of the world (for an example, see Jaynes 2003, pp. 98–107; also see Smith & Stam 2004, Fey & Ramsay 2006). Other examples of psychological and cultural insights that are consistent with Bayesian inference include the confirmatory attribution pattern (Mercer 1996, p. 55), the central role of expectations and surprise in inference (Snyder 1961; Mercer 1996, p. 46; Huth 1997; Tomz 2007b), and, as discussed below, the fact that the logic of reputation and status depend on social norms (Morrow 2014) and cultural context. An actor’s expectations—beliefs about the probabilities of another’s behavior given the other’s reputation or status—depend on cultural norms and the current beliefs of the community. For example, deference by state A to state B is expected if A has lower status than B, but deference would be surprising and would therefore have a greater effect on reputation and status if A had higher status than B. Similarly, the logic of reputation for resolve depends crucially on others’ understanding of when resolve is at stake. If no one perceives the US security commitment to Japan to include defending Japan’s claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, then failing to do so will cause little harm to the United States’ reputation. If, however, others—be it China, Japan, or even countries in Europe or Latin America—perceive such a commitment, then failing to act would harm the United States’ reputation for resolve and other associated reputations. Formally, we can represent the international community’s expectations about how particular reputations and status “work” as a specific equilibrium of a game with multiple equilibria (see Morrow 2014), and we can represent the current reputations and social roles of actors by the state of the game. We call these “social equilibria” to emphasize that the pattern of expectations and strategies depends on social convention, culture, and history. We share the skepticism of some scholars about the assumption that policy elites are capable of perfectly rational inference. Against this skepticism, however, we echo the concern of Jervis that although it is not hard to find examples of all kinds of perceptual errors, it is not obvious which of these are systematic. The challenge is to identify those errors that are “most frequent” or “more common than [their] opposite,” and to identify their “antecedent conditions” ( Jervis 1976, p. 7). Research in behavioral economics has identified features of inference and decision making that appear to systematically deviate from “rational” models, such as time-inconsistent preferences, nonlinear probability weighting, reference-dependent utility, and concern for fairness. Rather than use these findings to justify disregarding standard models, behavioral economists integrate them with standard models of inference and decision making to construct models that are more descriptively accurate, but still parsimonious, formal, and rationalist in most respects (Kahneman & Tversky 1984). We think political science scholarship would do well to follow the example of behavioral economists in striving to explicitly specify the different kinds of deviations from rational inference, to systematically empirically evaluate those models, and to formally integrate these insights into general models of inference.

The plan gives the US the reputation of capitulation – that emboldens aggression to reveal more information about US limitations – that reveals crisis bargaining ranges across a host of issues which proves issue spillover

Sechser, Poli Sci Prof @ Virginia, 16

(Todd, “Reputations, Resolve, and Coercive Bargaining,” http://faculty.virginia.edu/tsechser/Sechser-JCR-forthcoming.pdf)

In international politics, a state’s resolve is known only to itself: its willingness to fight for its interests is not directly observable to others. States therefore must infer the resolve of others from their responses to threats and challenges. The unobservable nature of resolve is what makes reputation-building possible: by refusing threats and risking war, states may be able to convince others that their resolve is high, even if it is not (Nalebuff 1991).5 Irresolute states therefore have incentives to resist threats that they would really prefer to accept. At the same time, however, aggressors have incentives to draw out the truth about others’ resolve so that irresolute states can be exploited and tough states can be avoided. Thus there is tension between those that want to hide their true resolve (to protect themselves) and observers that want to learn it (to exploit them). A state’s behavior in a crisis, of course, does not perfectly reveal its willingness to defend its other interests with military force. The issues at stake in international disputes generally vary from crisis to crisis, so there are limits to what one can infer from observing a state’s response to a coercive threat (Snyder and Diesing 1977; Press 2005). Acquiescing to a demand for trade concessions, for instance, does not necessarily imply that one is also willing to give away one’s capital city. But military crises do share one important similarity: war is always a possible outcome. A state’s response to a coercive threat thus may reveal important information about its general sensitivity to the human and financial costs of war – information that could be used against it in future crises, even if those crises are about different issues. In a world of private information, capitulating to a coercive threat therefore carries risks. Acquiescing to a threat could communicate to the challenger – and to other potential predators – valuable information about the limits of the target’s cost-tolerance. This information could, in turn, embolden aggressors to issue further challenges in the future.6 In other words, capitulation might mean more than simply giving up the issue at stake: there may be greater costs to pay down the road if today’s concessions invite additional demands. Target states must ask themselves: if I capitulate today, can the challenger credibly promise to stop, or will he be emboldened to demand more? The central implication of this logic is that target states may be more reluctant to capitulate to coercive threats, other things being equal, when the likelihood of a future crisis is high. Although states generally are more willing to defend high-value items in crisis situations, low-value items might also be worth defending if doing so would bolster one’s reputation and deter future threats. The immediate costs might be high, but the benefits from preventing future crises could make the gamble worthwhile. By contrast, if additional demands are seen to be improbable, then there will be little benefit to the target from investing in its reputation today. In this way, a target’s value for its reputation – and its willingness to capitulate to coercive challenges – is linked to its beliefs about the future.

A2: Engagement Moderates

Engagement won’t moderate China – their government uses it for asymmetric information warfare

Eisenmen, PhD, 16

(Joshua, assistant professor at the University of Texas at Austin's Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Affairs and senior fellow for China studies at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC, https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/756 1-21)

American policymakers' beliefs about China are rooted in their own preconceived views and experiences in China. Since Americans began visiting the PRC in the early 1970s, rosy assessments have become commonplace. As the Sinologist Robert Scalapino observed after his 1973 visit: There is serious risk that one may be badly misled by what one sees, hears, and instinctively feels [in China]. This is partly due to the tendency within all of us to superimpose our own values and cultural perspectives on another environment. Such tendency surely exists, and for some, it represents an ever-present bias. Their writings consequently reveal far more about their own views of their own social order than about China. Each individual, in any case, carries his prejudices with him in some measure, and he may well reinforce them as he goes.21 "Because China is so vast," James Palmer recently observed in the Washington Post, "its successes can be attributed to whatever your pet cause is.22 In short, Americans see what we want to see in China, and what we want to see most, argues Michael Pillsbury, is ourselves: "In our hubris, Americans love to believe that the aspirations of every other country is to be just like the United States. In recent years, this has governed our approach to Iraq and Afghanistan. We cling to the same mentality with China."23 American misunderstanding has been facilitated by Beijing's courting of influential Americans. China has done a better job at using engagement to improve American perceptions of China than America has done in changing Chinese perceptions of U.S. intentions. The Communist Party of China (CPC) uses bilateral engagement to assess U.S. capabilities, collect intelligence, and manipulate their American counterparts. Extensive economic, educational, scientific, cultural, and personal ties allow the CPC to build a large, loose coalition of Americans to carry the message that Beijing is Washington's indispensable partner.24 U.S. officials, however, are generally ignorant of CPC objectives and tactics toward them, collectively known as the United Front Doctrine. Americans interact with only a "thin outer crust" of Chinese policymakers.25 Each institution has an office that deals specifically with foreign visitors, and the party maintains dozens of front groups that conduct hundreds of interactions and conferences every year with Americans. The CPC's International Department's front organization is the China Center for Contemporary World Studies; the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs and the China Institute of International Relations are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' front groups; the Ministry of State Security's is the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, and so on. The CPC has also created entities specifically to conduct "host diplomacy" with Americans, including the Hong Kong–based China–United States Exchange Foundation, which "promotes the positions of the Chinese government through the research grants it gives to American institutions.26 These groups both observe Americans and work to influence their views through dialogues and the distribution of English-language propaganda with titles such as The Strength of Democracy: How Will the CPC March Ahead.27 Information asymmetry is a longstanding aspect of U.S.-China relations, but has become increasingly problematic since President Xi Jinping took power in 2011. In July 2015, China enacted new laws regulating all aspects of Chinese interaction with foreigners, including a national security law that covers every domain of public life in China—politics, military, education, finance, religion, cyberspace, ideology and religion. These initiatives are "aimed at exhorting all Chinese citizens and agencies to be vigilant about threats to the party.28 They help explain why Washington's engagement strategy has been unable to change party leaders' perceptions or successfully support moderates over hawks. The consequence of Americans knowing so little about the CPC and its strategies and tactics towards them is that many Americans continue to be badly misled by what they hear and see in China. The extensive U.S.-China engagement architecture has produced analytical limitations, or blind spots, within the U.S. policy community that if remain unaddressed are likely to produce the same types of intelligence failures that have occurred repeatedly in U.S.-China relations since 1911. The only way to redress these systemic deficiencies is to move beyond engagement and containment and adopt a nuanced strategy that prioritizes high quality human intelligence about Chinese leaders and policymaking and incorporates them effectively into U.S. policymaking towards China.

A2: Strategic Trust

Impossible to trust China-past engagement proves.

Auslin, AEI resident scholar, 2015

(Michael, “Sino-U.S. Cyber Pact Reveals Failure of U.S.-China Policy”, 9-22, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2015/09/22/sino-us_cyber_pact_reveals_failure_of_us-china_policy.html)

The only answer is the failure of America’s China policy. For a full generation, since Nixon’s opening to China in the 1970s (and some would argue long before that), the United States has held a remarkably steady position vis-à-vis China: We have done everything in our power to help it become a great power and to integrate it into the global economy and political world. As generations of Westerners have done, Americans have viewed China as a market of dreams and a potential geopolitical partner equal to none. Be it through trade policy (which has benefitted the American consumer as much as the Chinese exporter and skilled worker) or political initiatives such as China’s entry into the United Nations and World Trade Organization, or the more recent Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Repeated Chinese transgressions of global rules in both economics and the security realms have been consistently ignored by successive U.S. administrations in the name of amity and commerce. The result? A China that feels no compunctions about rampant spying on American private business and citizens. A China that increases its military budget every year for a quarter-century, building weapons designed specifically to attack U.S. forces. A China that bullies and coerces neighbors over disputed maritime territory and builds islands to extend its power projection capabilities. And yet the U.S. president continues to act as though it is business as usual with a China whose troubling behavior grows commensurate with its objective strength. No sane observer wants conflict to break out between China and the United States. Yet, surely historians in decades to come will wonder how Washington so consistently misread Chinese leaders and their goals. One might think that by the time the need for a cyberspace peace treaty was recognized, that U.S. policy toward China would also be seen as having failed. The recognition of such a failure does not automatically point the way forward. Yet it should warn us not to continue along our current path. Not only will our cybersecurity pact with China not be worth the paper it is written on, it may go down in history as the Kellogg-Briand Pact of the 21st century: a noble gesture that optimistically ignored reality and trusted in the goodwill of those whose actions undermined the security we sought to protect in the first place.

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