Millennial Speech & Debate Okinawa Withdrawal March pf

US can put the bases elsewhere in Japan

Mio Yamada, January 20, 2016, Foreign Affairs, The Battle for Okinawa, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2016-01-20/battle-okinawa DOA: 2-2-16 Mio Yamada was a Producer for NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation in Washington, DC.

Japan’s new defense policy and the revised U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation guidelines seek to make the alliance better at responding to potential crises in the region. Although it remains to be seen how Japan will implement this more robust, outward-looking strategy, it may consider building more joint-use bases on the main islands. In the south, Kyushu Island is closer than Okinawa to the Korean peninsula (and the Chinese mainland). In the north, Japan and the United States could explore placing bases in the Tohoku region, where pro-U.S. sentiment is high after Washington’s post-tsunami assistance. 

US could move forces to the Phillipines

To reduce the burden on Okinawa, the United States should also look beyond Japan. The Philippines, for example, has recently welcomed the return of U.S. forces to Subic Bay amid fears over Chinese land reclamation in the South China Sea. Subic Bay is also close to Taiwan, making it arguably a more strategic location than Okinawa. Although it may not be a simple case of reshuffling troops from one base to another, U.S. policymakers would be remiss not to reexamine all alternatives to Okinawa.

A2: Withdrawal Causes Japan to Go Nuclear

Extended deterrence failing now – small incursions outweigh large symbols

Jackson, visiting fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 5-18-15

(Van, is a and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow. “Raindrops Keep Falling On My Nuclear Umbrella,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/18/raindrops-keep-falling-on-my-nuclear-umbrella-us-japan-south-north-korea/)

But while U.S. extended deterrence commitments to Japan and South Korea are the ultimate promise, it is a promise for the least-likely situation. And meanwhile, whether because of political expediency or the low stakes involved, the United States has played a marginal role in dealing with the smaller threats these two countries face: for Japan, Chinese harassment in waters around contested islands in the East China Sea; and for South Korea, conventional attacks by North Korea. The result? By failing to adequately tackle small-scale challenges with or on behalf of Tokyo and Seoul, the United States has cast doubt about its nuclear umbrella for those two countries. This in turn reflects an unstated paradox: the strongest form of U.S. commitment doesn’t address the much weaker quotidian challenges actually facing its allies. Consequently, Seoul and Tokyo look to Washington and see its credibility eroding. Frank Sinatra once sang that if he could make it in New York, he “could make it anywhere.” This logic, dubbed the “Sinatra test,” suggests that those who can survive a hard test can survive an easy one. But when it comes U.S. extended deterrence, allies see the opposite: if the United States can’t handle the small threats, then how can it handle the big ones, like nuclear attacks? Consider what happened in 2010, when North Korea torpedoed the South Korean frigate Cheonan, killing 46 seamen, and then followed up that provocation in November of the same year by shelling the Yeonpyeong Islands, killing four South Koreans and injuring 19 others. Officials in Washington urged restraint, and prevented South Korean retaliation. The response was telling: Politicians in Seoul, in a move that signaled their doubt over the reliability of U.S. commitments, called for the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on Korean soil (all U.S. nuclear weapons had been removed from South Korea in 1991). And because the United States is not planning to redeploy its nuclear weapons, several senior South Korean politicians have called for the country to develop their own bomb — concluding that if the U.S. nuclear umbrella couldn’t protect their country, they would have to rely on their own nuclear capability. Consider also what’s happened over the last five years to Japan, a top U.S. ally. China has repeatedly confronted Japan over the Diaoyu islands Tokyo claims (and calls the Senkaku). Beijing has asserted its claims with novel and aggressive moves that fall just under the threshold for retaliation — using water cannons, fishing vessels, reconnaissance drones, and military ships nominally designated as Coast Guard vessels to harass Japanese vessels. And consider, for example, Japan’s response to the unarmed Chinese reconnaissance drones Beijing has frequently dispatched into contested airspace over the last few years. In each case, Japan alone has scrambled fighter aircraft or sent maritime vessels in response. The more Japan does alone, the more it doubts the strength of the partnership. The U.S. commitment to protect Japan against existential threats risks being eroded by its irrelevance in protecting Japan from the primary — though relatively small — danger it faces today. As Prime Minister Shinzo Abe bolsters Japan’s military, Japan’s departure from a long history of buck-passing its security burden to the United States only makes sense as a response to feeling more threatened and lacking confidence in U.S. reliability. Of course, in these cases Japan and South Korea (not to mention much of the rest of the world) would have been discomfited if the United States threatened nuclear retaliation — and that illustrates the problem. Extended deterrence is a blunt instrument: good for some things, like deterring nuclear attack, but not for others, like deterring provocations or low-intensity conflict. Extended deterrence is a blunt instrument: good for some things, like deterring nuclear attack, but not for others, like deterring provocations or low-intensity conflict.

Withdraw from kickout is worse because its larger and unplanned

Turn – plan increases resolve AND our ability to respond to Korea/China crisis

Mochizuki, Associate Professor @ George Washington University, 13

(Mike, “Okinawa and the Future of U.S. Marines in the Pacific,” http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/chian/naha_port/documents/h24reporten-1.pdf)

Some would worry about the signals that could be sent to China and North Korea and possibly other parties by any reduction in U.S. forces in the western Pacific. We would offer several responses. First, the ongoing buildup of American capabilities in Guam, Australia, Singapore, and elsewhere is well designed and sensible. It has achieved many of its desired effects. If anything, it is now on the verge of going slightly too far in the signals it sends. Firming up commitment to allies is appropriate but it must be balanced against the need to avoid stoking up the rivalry with China. Second, and even more to the point, while leading to a modest U.S. numerical force drawdown in the western Pacific, our plan would actually increase rather than reduce American responsiveness for more plausible scenarios in the western Pacific—and also scenarios that would require a major U.S. role, such as another North Korean attack on South Korea.

The plan is helping Japan out of a political bind—they won’t turn around and prolif-if they cared that much about Marines—Iraq/Afghanitan deployment should have triggered the link.

Solves the DA – reassures better than extended deterrence

Jackson, visiting fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 5-18-15

(Van, is a and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow. “Raindrops Keep Falling On My Nuclear Umbrella,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/18/raindrops-keep-falling-on-my-nuclear-umbrella-us-japan-south-north-korea/)

Rather than drawing greater attention to the U.S. nuclear deterrent, the United States should devise long-term policies that help South Korea and Japan deal with North Korean provocations and Chinese coercion respectively — small-scale but significant problems. The United States should launch strategic consultations with South Korea and Japan to compare notes on global and regional trends (which includes small-scale coercion), and how they affect national threat perceptions, mission priorities, and military weapons investments. Though far less sexy than nukes, elevating cooperation with South Korea and Japan to strategy and policy planning consultations might go a long way toward shoring up their confidence.

No link – other presence defuses allied prolif

No prolif – technical and political hurdles

Holmes, former US Navy surface warfare officer, 12

(James, “Japan: Joining the Nuclear Weapons Club? It Could.,” http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/japan-joining-the-nuclear-weapons-club-it-could/)

Despite Japan's renown for high-tech wizardry and long experience operating nuclear power plants, it would take Tokyo far longer than a year to deploy a working nuclear arsenal. We're talking many years. As J. C. Wylie defines it, strategy is a plan for using available resources and assets to accomplish some goal. Strategy goes no farther than those implements can carry it — and strategists cannot simply conjure them into being. Toshi and I see a variety of impediments to a Japanese breakout. Let's catalogue just a few. Consider the politics. It is certainly true that nuclear weapons are no longer the third rail of Japanese politics — a topic officials and pundits dare not touch lest it strike them (politically) dead. But Japan's painful past experience as a target of atomic warfare, its ardent sponsorship of nonproliferation accords, and the fury with which pacifist-leaning citizens and Japan's Asian neighbors would greet evidence of a bombmaking program add up to a forbidding political barrier. That barrier is hardly unbreachable, but it would demand quite a feat of political persuasion on Tokyo's part. As the learned strategist Mike Tyson points out, "everyone has a strategy 'til they get punched in the mouth." Memo to nuclear-weapons advocates: duck! Nor are the strategic, operational, and technical challenges less daunting. A nuclear triad — land- and sea-based missiles combined with weapons delivered by manned bombers — holds little promise in light of Japan's lack of geographic depth and the vulnerability of surface ships and aircraft to enemy action. That means fielding an undersea deterrent would be Tokyo's best nuclear option. But doing so would be far from easy. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force operates an impressive fleet of diesel submarines but has no experience with naval nuclear propulsion. And that leaves aside the difficulty of developing sea-launched ballistic missiles and their nuclear payloads. Such engineering challenges are far from insoluble for Japan's scientific-technical complex but cannot be conquered overnight. A force of nuclear-powered ballistic-missile subs, or SSBNs, thus looks like a remote prospect for Japan. As an interim solution, the JMSDF might construct cruise missiles resembling the U.S. Navy's old TLAM-Ns, or nuclear-tipped Tomahawks. JMSDF boats could fire such missiles through torpedo tubes, the easiest method. Or, shipyards could backfit Japanese subs with vertical launchers — much as the U.S. Navy installed Tomahawk launchers in its fast attack boats starting in the late Cold War. The problem of constructing nuclear weapons small enough to fit on a missile would remain — but nuclear-armed diesel boats would represent a viable course of action should Japan decide to join the nuclear-weapons club. Years down the road, then — not overnight — a modest Japanese nuclear deterrent might put out to sea. Will Tokyo proceed down that road? I doubt It. But the prospect no longer appears unthinkable.

A2: Withdrawal Causes Conventional Rearmament

Japan’s offensive militarization has already begun

JOHN HAYWARD, Writer for Breitbart News, Sept 1 2015, "CHINESE EXPANSION PUSHES JAPAN TO SEEK RECORD MILITARY BUDGET", Breitbart, www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/09/01/chinese-expansion-pushes-japan-to-seek-record-military-budget/

The Japanese Defense Ministry has requested its largest budget ever, with a 2.2 percent raise following three years of steady increases that are powered by fear of U.S. passivity as China invades other countries’ territory in the South China Sea. The UK Guardian cites China’s island-building in the South China Sea — near the Philippines and Vietnam — and its claims on the Japanese-held Senkaku Islands as the primary reason for Japan’s military buildup. The U.S. has only feebly protested China’s expansion, partly because President Barack Obama is cutting U.S. defense spending while he tries to expand progressives’ power and influence over the lives of U.S. citizens. While Japan’s military reform is supported by the United States, it has met strong resistance from isolationist members of the Japanese public who wish their country to remain pacifist, after its disastrous decision to invade China and to attack the U.K., France, Holland and the United States during World War II. A demonstration against Abe’s military reforms drew some 120,000 protesters over the weekend. The international disgust over jihadi expansion, such as the Islamic State, is also a factor in the Japanese policy. That disgust lets Prime Minister Shinzo Abe push for greater deployment of Japanese troops. Abe has cited the murder of two Japanese hostages by ISIS as a reason for changing the rules governing Japanese military deployments. Abe has long maintained that Japan must shift its military posture to deal with new threats in a changing world, and to put its World War II imperial past behind it. From the 1930s until the U.S. dropped two nuclear weapons on Japan, Japan’s long imperial war in China killed roughly 20 million Chinese. China, well aware that many on the Pacific Rim are worried by any discussion of Japanese troops fighting on foreign soil again, poured salt in those wounds by announcing a blanket amnesty for elderly criminals who also fought in what the state-run Xinhua news agency describes as World War II “the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.” “The mercy shown to [criminal] veterans is an apt recognition of their contributions in the wars, and it shows China’s attitude to history and commitment to peace,” said the Chinese government’s news agency. “While China remembers the fallen, jailed allies can not be forgotten despite their post-war missteps.” China plans to hammer home its message about Japanese militarism by holding huge parades to commemorate the 70th anniversary of Japanese surrender on September 3, and drawing renewed attention to a ruined Japanese prison camp described as “China’s Auschwitz.” In a similar vein, China expects everyone to view its construction of artificial islands festooned with artillery emplacements and military airfields as a commitment to “peace” in the South China Sea. Much of Japan’s increased defense spending is earmarked for defensive radar systems, drones, and surveillance aircraft designed to keep an eye on what China does in the waters between Japan and Taiwan. The Japanese are also interested in putting more long-range weapons within reach of disputed islands, and beefing up a flexible, fast-response amphibious assault force. Presumably much of this buildup is meant to signals to the Chinese that Japan is serious about protecting its interests in the region. Japan hardly needs any new equipment to watch Chinese naval vessels putter around the nearby Senkaku Islands – as the Guardian notes, the Chinese did that for the 23rd time this year over the weekend, and the Japanese had no difficulty watching the show with their existing surveillance systems. But better detection systems and a rapid amphibious response force could project Japan’s sphere of concern farther out to sea.

A2: Proposal Politically Unpopular

Winners Win on foreign policy – the plan allows Obama to use a divide and conquer strategy

Morey and Trantham 2015 Daniel Morey – professor of political science at the University of Kentucky, Austin Trantham – Polisci PhD candidate at UK (go cats), Talking But Not Doing: Congressional Opposition Cohesion and Presidential Foreign Policy Involvement, Paper presented at the 2015 Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Las Vegas, NV http://www.austintrantham.com/uploads/5/9/9/2/5992747/talking_not_doing_-_morey_and_trantham_-_wpsa_2015.pdf

This paper seeks to expand our understanding of the role of domestic politics in determining the level of presidential foreign policy involvement. However, unlike past studies we do not see foreign policy as a safe harbor for a president who is weak at home. Instead, we see foreign policy as a tool presidents can use to divide domestic opponents. Wielded skillfully, foreign policy could increase a president’s domestic power. Almost every president, sooner or later, faces strong domestic opposition. Periods of unified party control still appear but they are the exception more than the rule. Facing divided government and a strong and vocal opposition past theory would indicate that a president would retreat to foreign affairs and ride out the rest of their time in office. This past work assumes that the opposition is a unified body that will stand against the president on most issues. This, often unstated, assumption is the core of most theories of domestic politics and foreign affairs. Here we take the stand that the opposition is not a single unified bloc and the internal differences within the opposition party create room for the president to create wedges that can divide the opposition. In line with past research we see the opposition party mainly united against a president’s domestic agenda. Domestic politics continues to dominate voting decisions and the party out of power uses discontent among the general public on domestic issues to build electoral support. What is missing in most studies is the level of cohesion regarding foreign affairs. While the opposition rallies around certain domestic issues, foreign affairs is more open. Pulled by different constituent considerations the opposition party usually does not form a united foreign policy, especially not to the degree seen on domestic issues. This process can be seen today within the Republican Party. There is strong cohesion against most of President Obama’s domestic policies, especially regarding health care and taxes. This same unity does not exist in foreign affairs. Republicans have been divided on issues such as Libya, Syria, Iraq, and immigration. It is this lack of foreign policy cohesion that we think is important. Facing an opposition party united both on domestic and foreign policy there is little a president can do. In the face of strong opposition on all issues gridlock sets in and the president loses the power to implement anything but modest changes. However, if the president faces an opposition that is diverse in the area of foreign affairs it creates an opportunity for the president to take action. A skillful president can use the opposition’s internal divisions on foreign affairs to regain the ability to meaningfully direct policy. In the end, the president may be able to use foreign affairs as an avenue to gain increased domestic power Seeing that the opposition is divided on foreign affairs allows the president to achieve major policy successes. The president can introduce issues to the agenda that play into the internal divisions of the opposition and allow the president to successfully implement their favored policy. This can allow the president to have major foreign policy victories and fits past work arguing that presidents use foreign affairs to build their historical legacy. Beyond victories in foreign affairs, a president might even be able to use foreign policy as a wedge to break cohesion on domestic opposition. Carefully selecting foreign issues could allow the president to exploit divisions within the opposition and weaken the ability of members of the opposition to work together. Making the opposition appear divided, disorganized, and weak could also benefit a president in later elections.

A fight is coming over moving Marines to Guam-the plan resolves this.

Fuentes, Military Times, 9-5-15

(Gidget, “Navy signs off on plan to move 5,000 Marines to Guam”, http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2015/09/05/navy-signs-off-plan-move-5000-marines-guam/71657614/)

The Navy Department released its Record of Decision Aug. 29 for relocating the Marines and their family members to the U.S. territory in the western Pacific. It's a smaller force than what the Marine Corps first proposed in 2009 when it wanted to send 8,600 Marines, 9,000 dependents and 1,900 government workers to Guam by 2020. That would have put a full brigade-size force on the island. That idea prompted public outcry in Guam and congressional criticism over the cost for new bases and infrastructure on the modestly populated island. In 2010, Rep. Hank Johnson, D-Ga., even went so far as to ask the head of U.S. Pacific Command at the time whether adding that many troops to the small territory would cause the island to tip over. After additional studies and reviews, the plans were scaled back and Japan's government pledged to shoulder part of the cost. The moves are part of a larger rebalancing of forces in the Western Pacific that will bolster air defenses and aviation capacity and add a wharf for visiting Navy aircraft carriers on Guam. The Marine Corps plans to base infantry headquarters, aviation squadrons and logistics support units on Guam. Marines train there routinely now, and the move will reduce the military presence on Okinawa, which some Japanese view as burdensome. “The Marine Corps has a historic friendship with the people of Guam,” Lt. Gen. Ronald Bailey, the Corps' deputy commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations, said in an Aug. 29 announcement. “We look forward to continuing that partnership.” What you need to know about the future force in Guam. Who's going and when. Of the 5,000 Marines to live and train in Guam, only one-third of them will be there on permanent orders. That will mostly consist of three-year, family-accompanied tours starting in 2020. The other 3,300 or so Marines who head to Guam each year will arrive on six-month unit deployment rotations and use equipment and vehicles already in Guam. Those units will stagger so they don't all show up at the same time, similar to the way Marines currently rotate through Japan on the unit deployment program. The number of Marines and dependents based in Guam will increase each year through 2026, when the Corps reaches its goal of basing 5,000 Marines and 1,300 family members there. The biggest spike will occur between 2019 and 2020, when the total number of Marines based in Guam will jump from 387 to 2,990. Over the next several years, the Corps will boost the number of Marines based there by 300 to 900 annually. Slowed growth. That 13-year buildup is far slower than the original call to move thousands of Marines and their families from Okinawa to Guam in just five years. The Navy's new plan also curbs plans for more land acquisition and construction projects. Now Marines will live and train on land already controlled by the military. "This decision adopts all of the mitigation measures that were identified ... to avoid or minimize adverse environmental impacts," the Navy decision states. Housing. Marine families will be able to live in housing at Andersen Air Force Base, where about 510 acres will be set aside for construction of as many as 553 housing units. Other construction will include housing for bachelors and other facilities in the nearby planned cantonment area covering 1,751 acres at the Naval Computer and Telecommunications site in the Finegayan area on the north side of Guam. Overall, the Marine Corps will have a smaller footprint than the 2,500-acre base first envisioned for the island. Training grounds. Marines will access the 338-acre live-fire training range complex that will be built at Andersen's Northwest Field. They'll also have access to a hand-grenade range planned for Andersen South. Additional studies will sort out access to historic sites within the range complex, which will include 3,701 acres for surface danger zones. Another 5,324 acres of federal land in the north will be protected for wildlife habitat. Next steps. Defense Department officials will now draft construction plans for military facilities and to expand road networks and local infrastructure. But not much will happen without Congress coughing up money, something members have been hesitant to do without more concrete plans.

Plan saves money—Guam/FRF is expensive

Sugawa, special researcher at the Office of Prime Minister, 13

(Kiyoshi, “What to Do About U.S. Marines in Japan,” Real Clear Defense, 12-6-13, DOA: 7-23-15, http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/12/06/what_to_do_about_us_marines_in_japan_106992.html)

Drawbacks of the Current Plan The current FRF plan has serious flaws. The most obvious problem is political feasibility. Okinawans' opposition to a new base is stronger than ever. Even if Prime Minister Abe Shinzo succeeds in gaining approval for a landfill permit from the Okinawa governor, the FRF will still not win the support of the majority of Okinawans. Lack of support from the local community would eventually weaken the basis of the alliance. The financial costs of the realignment plan for the US bases in Japan also weigh heavily on Japan and the United States. The General Accounting Office reported that the costs for military construction in Guam will be more than $23.9 billion. The estimated price for the landfill and construction of the FRF is almost $4 billion, although the real figure would be easily doubled as is often the case for this kind of public works project. In addition to the FRF, the Japanese government will have to pay another $20 billion or so in total. From a strategic point of view, the present US base realignment initiative fails to meet today's most important security challenge in East Asia - the rise of China. The shift of Marines from Okinawa would presumably weaken the deterrent capability of the alliance. Under current plans, approximately 9,000 III Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) personnel are to deploy to Guam and other places. The new airfield at Henoko, which is to be shortened from the current 2,740 meters at MCAS Futenma to 1,800 meters, will not be able to accommodate the same range of aircraft. Ironically, the costs of the FRF and other replacement facilities are likely to undermine the ability of the Japanese government to fund much more vital defense spending, including new forces to deal with China's maritime buildup in the region. Basic Principles of a New Initiative To overcome these drawbacks, Japan and the United States need to reset the current plan and work on a new initiative that is acceptable, affordable, and strategically effective. Four basic principles should be kept in mind. First and foremost, Japan and the United States must fulfill their promise to return MCAS Futenma to the Okinawan people. Withdrawing the promise or postponing the return indefinitely will make them feel betrayed and their confidence in the alliance will be lost. Furthermore, the present situation where the MCAS Futenma has potentially endangered the lives of Okinawans can never be justified. Second, the present realignment plan for US bases in Okinawa other than MCAS Futenma should be downsized. Although the FRF has attracted a great deal of attention, even bigger projects such as the relocation of Naha military port remain to be carried out under the current agreement. Unlike Futenma, however, these bases do not pose immediate danger to the residents of Okinawa. The less ambitious plan will enable the Japanese government to use the saved money for the modernization of SDF weaponry. Additional funds could also be allocated to share the costs of rotational training by the US Marine Corps on Okinawa. Third, most of the Marines need to be relocated outside Japan, not just Okinawa. The viability of the large-scale Marine infantry deployment depends on access to air fields, along with vast training space, to accommodate the helicopters and transport aircraft they need to fulfill their missions. Without a replacement for Futenma, large numbers of Marines cannot remain on Okinawa. And the reality is no other area of mainland Japan is prepared to house such a presence and the Okinawa public refuses to accept any other site for the FRF in the prefecture. While smaller crisis response elements of the III MEF can remain on the island, the entire division needs to relocate. Due to financial difficulties, the US government may want to bring them back to Hawaii and California rather than relying so much on Guam.

Congress defers to the military on strategy

Nunez, Active Duty & Veterans Services fellow, 2013

(Emily, “Closing the Civil-Military Disconnection Gap”, November, http://www.classyawards.org/exchange/closing-the-civil-military-disconnection-gap/)

In many cases, civilian leaders lack detailed knowledge of how the military operates, of military strategy, or of the higher plane of grand strategy. As a result, government officials often defer to military personnel resulting in problems of disconnection in budget discrepancies and a lack of military knowledge. The military budget is affected as presidents and Congress defer to those who wish to increase it. For example, although President Obama sought to reduce forces in Afghanistan, he ultimately decided to increase forces, beginning a reduction only in the summer of 2011. The President’s decision to send 30,000 troops granted the military, “almost everything it wanted.” Lacking expertise about this military operation, civilian leaders wound up making concessions on strategy and policy. Whether one agrees with the troop increase or not, more knowledge of the military would allow the White House to make more informed decisions in such situations.

No backlash to foreign base closure

Dodge, Heritage senior policy analyst, 2013

(Michaela, “Beyond BRAC: Global Defense Infrastructure for the 21st Century”, 5-3, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/05/beyond-brac-global-defense-infrastructure-for-the-21st-century)

There is no review commission and no significant domestic constituency. As a result, closing military installations abroad is politically easier than closing them at home. The Pentagon has been taking advantage of these factors in the recent years. In Europe, the U.S. Army has downsized from 245 installations to 145 installations between 2003 and 2010. By 2015, it plans on retaining 98 locations total.[11] It has reduced its end strength and force structure by over 45 percent.[12] The Air Force has reduced aircraft and forces stationed in Europe by 75 percent since 1990.[13] The Navy limited its presence in Europe and is further examining options for downsizing.[14] In March 2013, the Army sent its 22 remaining battle tanks in Germany back to the U.S.—the first time in 69 years that there is no U.S. tank stationed on German soil.[15] As Mackenzie Eaglen of the American Enterprise Institute notes, it is important to keep these ongoing initiatives in mind because “many members of Congress want to divest excess overseas capacity before shrinking domestic bases” without being aware of reductions under way.[16]

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