Part IV: The Humanist/Post-Human Body: Understanding Corporealization and Gender Through A Theoretical Framework

Much research has been done in the realm of humanism and post-humanism to explain the structure of relations of power and mediated bodies in science fiction. The emphasis here is not to consider every bit of research to find an underlying truth, but rather to demonstrate how humanism’s approach to the body and human consciousness is inherently restrictive¹⁷. Consequently, this argument will illustrate the ways in which post-humanism can account for these newly produced cyborg bodies. The objective for this chapter is to explain how various voices have negotiated a mechanized half-human homo sapiens and evaluate to what extent this has created a comprehensive dialogue for the oppressed female cyborg subject.

Consequently, this argument will illustrate the ways in which post-humanism can account for these newly produced cyborg bodies. The objective for this chapter is to explain how various voices have negotiated a mechanized half-human homo sapiens and evaluate to what extent this has created a comprehensive dialogue for the oppressed female cyborg subject.

With the deconstruction of humanism accompanies a deconstruction of beliefs surrounding agency and identity that have been a part of literary canon for centuries. According to authors Patrick Fuery and Nick Mansfield, the study of humanism cannot be understood solely as a definition. Humanism is instead an exchange of ideas that leads to an understanding of a universal human essence (Fuery and Mansfield 5):

Humanism has been attacked for many reasons… The simplest way to understand this particular controversy is in the following terms. Humanism, in its broadest definition, sees the identification and fulfillment of a universal human nature as the purpose of cultural work. (5)

This conception of a human essence neglects not only various sub-categories of what constitutes humanness, such as gender and racialized minorities. It [humanism] also suppresses “cultural degeneracy” (5). The word degeneracy here is ambiguous. One is to assume then that this “degeneracy” (5) may arise from a created existence –cyborgs in this case because they are a sub-species, one that may have no contributing effort in the production of culture. Or, alternatively, any deviant culture, in the case of the cyborg Molly Millions or Gibson’s protagonist, Case, who are both considered social deviants. This theory is incredibly problematic because of its effort to

Produce a model of the individual that can both embody a continuity and commonality of human nature and identity over and above differences of time and place… the humanist individual is both idealist [author’s italics] (a framework of perceptions that refines and accumulates values and meanings as part of an eternal, transhistorical fulfillment of human talent… and empiricist)[author’s italics] (a concrete respondent and contributor to the material world). (Belsey qtd in Fuery and Mansfield 8)¹⁸

This continuity is fragmented once the idea of a reality or a cyberspace has entered into the equation. How can a universal self or individual exist within a space that has re-negotiated constructions of gender and notions of intelligence and agency? Humanist theory, more broadly, does not lend its meanings to a human agent that has in some ways transcended what we believe to be real or, in Baudrillard’s case, experienced the hyperreal.¹⁹

Louis Althusser’s meditation on “Marxism and Humanism” brings up a similar argument to Fuery and Mansfield’s, however, he dispels the notion that humanism, as a theoretical framework cannot in itself be eliminated. Despite that it can be implicated and critiqued. Althusser argues that Marx himself was a blatant anti-humanist. Although Althusser maintains that Marx’s determination to re-evaluate the essence of the human and the conscious human subject within humanist theory is present, he also claims that, “Marx never believed that an ideology might be dissipated by a knowledge of it… [his] theoretical anti-humanism [author’s italics] does not suppress anything in the historical existence [author’s italics] of humanism” (Althusser 32).

Despite our desires to eradicate humanism as a totalizing and orthodox theory, which in effect relinquishes any hope of understanding new modes for human beings and cyborgs. Althusser warns us that an omission of humanist theory’s contributions to previous historical contexts is misinformed. What is most critical to an understanding of humanism’s pitfalls is realizing, as Althusser notes, that it is merely an “ideology” (32), which, like post-humanism, acts as an intermediary for the production of various social relations within and outside the body.

It cannot be discounted that humanism is outdated in respect to post-modern human bodies insofar as it places its emphasis on the importance of human rationality. Humanism’s foundation is one that is focused primarily on the rational human subject divorced from its animal counterpart and is prohibited from including newer and remodeled human bodies and sensibilities. The question of what it means to be human, and essentially, a gendered and mechanized female body has yet to be asked in a humanist framework or has been dismissed altogether.

Post-humanism, in contrast, can account for a number of the deficiencies humanist theory incurs. Are rationality and consciousness the sole determinants for humanness? If this is indeed the case, the cyborg/android, which is able to perfectly mimic or live like a biological human perfectly, could be considered human, especially if the android in question is Dick’s Nexus-6 model which is able to eventually evolve to produce its own emotions?²⁰

Post-humanism begins as a dialogue situated within the postmodern world. There is a reconstitution of the meaning of the natural body through the post-human. It allots various opportunities for the codification and re-codification of humans and technology. It is not static insofar as it helps to fill in the proverbial gaps created by a humanist philosophy. Bodies are constantly in flux while viewed through a post-humanist lens. With this in mind, it brings to question whether or not gendered cybernetic bodies can function without their ‘other?’²¹ Scott Bukatman argues that “the obsessive restaging of the refiguration of the body posits a constant redefinition of the subject through the multiple superimposition of bio-technological apparatuses” (Bukatman 98).

In turn, we see that post-humanism, not humanism, must account for the continual restructuring of human flesh. The constant shifting of bodily awareness to unite oneself with complex technologies requires an ideology that accounts for a new type of bio-technical consciousness, if this is indeed what defines the human, and a clarification as to whether or not these cyborgs can operate on the same level as a human. What becomes problematic for post-humanism is grounding the ideology in some sort of human activity. If post-humanism rejects humanism’s definition of human– that of rationality, and essential human nature, or consciousness –then what can we define as human?

What becomes an undeniably problematic question in the disciplines of post-humanism, and in this case trans-humanism, is determining the importance of human consciousness, morality, and agency. Cary Wolfe provides a slightly different account of post-humanism. These parts, consciousness and body, cannot always be the proving ground for an ideological post-human apparatus. Instead Wolfe states that:

Long before the historical onset of cyborg technologies that now so obviously inject the post- into the posthuman in ways that fascinate the transhumanists, functional differentiation itself determines the posthumanist form [author’s italics] of meaning, reason, and communication by untethering it from its moorings in the [individual], subjectivity, and consciousness. Meaning now becomes a specifically modern form of self-referential discursivity that is used by both psychic systems (consciousness) and social systems (communication) to handle overwhelming environmental complexity. (Wolfe xx)

This “untethering” (xx) that Wolfe speaks of calls for a distancing the human individual from the connectedness they have to meaning solely within the self. Alternatively, these human functions are then thought of contextually alongside particular “social systems” (xx).

Many opinions within post-humanist discourse are mixed and uncertain on the subject of consciousness and how the body is negotiated in terms of its human and mechanical parts. What is most clear is that most of these ideologies within post-humanism have not yet come to a reasonable conclusion on the subject of human and automata relations. These opinions recognize a blurring of the lines between subject, individual, and social constructs; however, what is still incredibly pivotal to this argument is that ideology, no matter what ideology it is, is still self-reflexive. As far as humanism is concerned, “Enlightenment rationality is not, as it were, rational enough, because it stops short of applying its own protocols and commitments to itself” (Wolfe xx), this still is the primary tenant of post-humanism.

If the crossing of boundaries is inherent as a part of post-humanist ideology, what does this mean for the female android/cyborg? There is no true answer, as far as post-humanist and post-feminists are concerned the most conflicting element of this question is whether or not the female body can actually be transcended, especially if we are attempting to explain the human in terms of his or her morality or his or her empathy. And, in terms of whether or not there can be a revolution for the hyper- sexualized cyborg female.

To summarize, embodiment is an incredibly contested subject within both post- and humanism. What is ironic is that once embodiment is eliminated within the confines of cyberspace, all language and meanings are thought to have disappeared. What is erroneous about this idea however is that self-awareness is in many ways defined by the limits and capacity of our consciousness. For feminist critics of humanism and of male science fiction discourse, the female cyborg offers a paradoxical dual purpose: one, for the transcendence and rebellion of regularly scripted gender assignments, and two, presents the position that this female human/cyborg marriage still demonstrates how subjectivities are linked to power relations operating outside of the body.

It is nearly impossible to imagine a conclusion to the subject of mediated female cyborg bodies and replicant bodies. According to many post and trans humanists, cyberspace provides a locus for the problematizing of particular gender norms and identities. Many deem that this particular spatiality proves redeeming to the female cyborg character because she is vindicated in her search for identity. For Pris, Rachael, and Molly it seems uniformly true that their vindication is not necessarily possible as their identities are intensely mediated by a phallocentric science fiction discourse. In addition, any understandings of self, at least in Scott’s Blade Runner or Dick’s Do Androids is mediated through a humanist lens. The question of what constitutes a human being poses a number of other problems for mechanized humans. The most critical of those problems is empathy. Many trans-humanists will argue, especially in regards to the Rosen Association’s building of the Nexus-6 models in Dick’s novel, that this constructed human, with real human emotions, engages in a dialogue that forces readers to imagine bodies moving and mediating between us that are barely distinguishable from our supposed true human counterparts. Another inquiry for this particular area for mediating cyborg bodies is the dichotomy of the human/animal body. The references throughout Dick’s novel undoubtedly force a reader to inquire into which framework humans can be placed if in fact humanoid robots or automata are becoming even “more human than human” (Blade Runner).

Authors like Donna Haraway have paved a path for a discourse in female cyborg bodies and the interplay of these bodies with socio-politico ideologies such as Marxism and Capitalism. One central issue, at least for most radical feminist science fiction scholars (like Haraway and Vint) is determining the place of the female cyborg/android body in a futuristic setting.

In cyberspace, no discursive reality necessarily exists, and there is contention between many theorists as to whether or not this space is inherently liberating for a cyborg character or if it indeed continues to subject to her to particular hegemonies that are inherently located within the space of the body.

Much research has been done into the study of data and movement of data within discursive science fiction realities, but there has been little agreement on whether or not the movement of data constitutes a proper allocation of identities or if it continues to subdue. It can be noted that Pris and Rachael are both cyborgs that are intimately tied or are slaves to their fabrication as Frankensteinian creations. Their construction as made beings prevents them in many ways from identifying with humans. If in fact we are filtering humanness based on biological origins, this theory would work to suppress these characters even more so.

Unfortunately, the most contentious issue for this subject is in uncovering a framework that determines what it really and truly means to be human? Surely consciousness and empathy cannot be the sole factors for determining such things. For the female cyborg body, she remains in limbo until an eloquent framework for defining selfhood and identity within the field of trans-humanism is born. This question of humanness cannot be answered directly by looking to either humanism or post-humanism as both of the central texts (Do Androids and Neuromancer) suggest.

Omnipresent in these narratives is the notion that the female body continues to suggest that it is the locus or debating ground for various questions surrounding identity, codification and gender hegemonies. In a post-human world, what then will provide humans with a proper knowledge of self? Humanism has only proven that rationality is useful, but now that computers and cyborgs can rationalize, what is left to categorize the human? Humans within cyberspace have begun to look outward from the periphery: they are no longer the rule; they are becoming the exception.

Although it is evident that many female science fiction scholars have attempted to relieve some of the gendered assumptions and inscriptions built into the cyborg/android body, it is difficult whether or not our theories will be able to address these different stages of subjectification or cyborg choice without a completely extensive and revived description of what it means to be human? Perhaps the question is, does being human really and truly matter?

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Blade Runner The Final Cut. Dir. Ridley Scott. Perf. Harrison Ford, Sean Young, Joe Turkell, Darryl Hannah and Rutger Hauer. Warner Brothers, 1982. Film.

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