New and revised edition david-hillel ruben



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p. 20, pp. 107-8, pp. 122-23, p. 126, and pp. 191-93, I cannot understand why that argument is ascribed to me. Consequently, I find much of the review subsequent to that misascription simply irrelevant as a criticism of my position.

  1. Bhaskar, Roy, A Realist Theory of Science, 2nd edition, Harvester Press, Hassocks, 1978. A ‘Postscript’ to the 2nd edition appears on pp. 251-262.

  2. Although I overlooked, as Bhaskar says, the fact that one of the arguments established something about the objects of experience, rather than of. knowledge. Needless to say, 1 do not in general conflate these things any more than does Bhaskar, as my remarks in Chapter V about a theoretical rather than an experiential reflection theory, and my distinction in Chapter VI between a reflection theory of knowledge and of perception, should make abundantly clear.

  3. Bhaskar, op. cit., p. 31.

  4. See above, p. 100.

  5. Bhaskar, op. cit., p. 258.

  6. Ibid., p. 257.

  7. Ibid., p. 258.

s Ibid., p. 260.

  1. Ibid., p. 258.

  2. This would be especially contested by anyone of idealist sympathies. Quite a lot of room might be left for criticism, even if it fails at the most basic level. Consider for example R. G. Collingwood’s views on 'absolute presuppositions' in A n Essav In Metaphysics. Oxford, 1940.

  3. See above, p. 131.

17 See for example Donald Davidson, "Causal Relations’, Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967), pp. 691-703, and reprinted in Ernest Sosa, Causation and Conditionals, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1975; J. L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1974, especially Chapter 3, pp. 59-87.

  1. Bhaskar, op. cit., p. 256.

  2. Ibid., p. 140.

|s I have dealt at some greater length with the problem of tendencies in ‘Marxism and Dialectics’, in John Mepham and D.-H. Ruben (eds.), Issues In Marxist Philosophy, Harvester Press, Hassocks, 1979.

  1. Bhaskar, op. cit., p. 98.

  2. Ibid., p. 257

11 I am following the extremely plausible argument of Barry Stroud, in ‘Transcendental Arguments’, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXV No. 9, 2 May 1968, pp. 241-256.

i9 The discussion of Phillips’ occurs on pp. 158-162 above. A good introduction to, and bibliography for, criferiological theories occurs in W. Gregory Lycan, ‘Noninductive Evidence; Recent Work on Wittgenstein’s ‘Criteria’, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 2, April 1971, pp. 109-125.

w See above, pp. 102-103.


21 Unger, Peter, Ignorance, Oxford University Press, Oxford, i975.'

23 See p. 162 above.

  1. As is now customary. See for example Richard Swinburne, (ed.), The Justification of Induction, Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 5: 'There seem to be perfectly correct arguments to scientific theories which do not merely generalize the premisses’.

  2. Perhaps the first thing in this direction was Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge University Press, 1975, see pp. 85-92. Following C. S. Peirce, Hanson calls inferences from data to theory ‘abductive inferences’ 'retroductive inferences’, and seems to have conceived of them as distinct from inductive inferences. The way in which he characterised the distinction must be erroneous, for he says that ‘abduction merely suggests that something may he’. But one hardly needs an inference to establish a ‘might-be’; abduction, like induction, better shows us that something probably is.

On the contrary, 1 am convinced by Gilbert Harman’s article. ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’, in The Philosophical Review 74, 1965, pp. 88-95. Harman takesas the basic category 'inferences to the best explanation’, which would include theoretical or abductive inferences, and shows how enumerative induction itself is best viewed as a special case of inference to the best explanation.

Finally, for a careful and interesting discussion of the criteria scientists actually use in determining, on the data, which theory is the most plausible, see Paul R. Thagard, ‘The Best Explanation: Criteria For Theory Choice*, The Journal of Philosophy Vol. LXXV, No. 2, February 1978, pp. 76-92.

Discussions of simplicity are also relevant; see, for example, Elliot Sober, Simplicity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1975, since a likely inference rule for moving from data to theory will be something like, ‘Other things being equal, choose the simpler hypothesis or explanation’.

23 Mackie, J. L,, Problems from Locke, Oxford University Press, 1976. pp. 62-67.

56 Ibid., p 64.

21 Ibid., pp. 66-67.

21 Slote, Michael, Reason and Scepticism, Allen & Unwin, London, 1970.

35 See Ibid., Chapter 2, especially pp. 67-69.

  1. Ibid., p. 67.

  2. Thagard, Paul R., op. cit.,

33 A similar point was made in a review of Slote’s book by Fred Dretske in The Journal of Philosophy 60 (1972), pp. 47-53; '. . . what does. . . Slote show? That if we can describe what we do, in our attempts to be reasonable, in a general enough way (so as to earn for the description the label ‘Principle’) we can ignore sceptical quibbling about the validity of what we do?” (p. 52),

  1. Collier has sent me a copy of his article, ‘Truth and Practice' which appeared in Radical Philosophy 5. 1 have also had the opportunity to read two articles by him which will appear in John Mepham and D. H. Ruben (eds.), Issues In Marxist Philosophy, Second Volume, Harvester Press, Hassocks, 1979.

  2. Perhaps I should make clear that I take the difference between the sceptic and the immaterialist or idealist to be this. The sceptic denies that we can have knowledge of physical objects; the immaterialist or idealist says we can, but that physical objects are reducible to, or essentially dependent on, human experience,

  3. All collected in Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge; An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972.

  4. Ibid., p. 106.

  5. Ibid., p. 107.

33 Ibid., p. 108.

333 Ibid., p. 111.

4(1 Lukacs, G., ‘What Is Orthodox Marxism?', History and Class Consciousness, Merlin Press, London, 1968. Translated by Rodney Livingstone, p. 24, n, 6. Thanks to Tim O’Hagan for reminding me of this footnote.

41 Lukacs, G., ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, op. cit., p. 207.


  1. For the best Marxist discussion of this available, see 1.1, Rubin, Essays on Marx's Theory of Value, Black & Red, Detroit, 1972,

45 Using the current philosophical distinction, Marx in denying reductive materialism, is denying property-identity and hence denying a form of type-type identity between mental and physical events. He accepts only that, necessarily, every individual thing of which a mental property is true is a thing of which natural or physical properties are true.

  1. I am involved in stating Marx’s view here, not defending it against all possible objections. In particular, it would be important to extend this to universals, abstract objects such as numbers and propositions, etc. Does everything to which mathematical or linguistic properties can be attributed also have natural or physical properties attributable to it?

  2. The same philosophical fight is fought and refought. See for example, for a good, old- fashioned statement of a view similar to this, and a similarly motivated critical study of Kant, H. A. Prichard, Kant's Theory of Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Chapter VI. Prichard was part of the school of Oxford realism which was led by John Cook Wilson. Many of the issues and themes I have been arguing turn up, not unsurprisingly, in their writings.

  3. To appear in John Mepham and D. -H. Ruben (eds.), Issues in Marxist Philosophy, Harvester Press, Hassocks, 1979.

41 Marx, Karl, Capital I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p. 178,

43 Marx, Karl, Critique of the Gotha Programme, in The First International and After, David Fernbach (ed.), Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1974, p. 341.

w Marx, Karl, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1975, p. 273.

  1. Marx, Karl, ‘On the Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature' in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. I, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1975. See pp. 70-73.

  2. Hegel, The. Philosophy of Nature, trans. by A. V, Miller, Oxford, 1970, p. 9.

33 Avineri, Shlomo, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, Cambridge University Press, 1969. See especially pp. 68-72.

5J Naville, Pierre, Le Nouveau Leviathan, Editions Anthropos, Paris. See Vol. 4, Les Echanges Socialistes, 1974,pp. 122, 123, 128-130 for an extremely interesting discussion of the notion of reciprocity, Naville traces its lineage from Kant and Hegel through to Marx's use of it in a theory of exchange.

54 Cohen, Robert S., ’Ernest Mach: Physics, Perception, and the Philosophy of Science1, Synthese Vol. 18, 1968, pp. 132-191. The appendix is entitled ‘Appendix: Machistsand Marxists: Bogdanov and Lenin’, pp. 162-166.

ss Wartofsky, Marx, Feuerbach, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977. My review of Wartofsky’s book is forthcoming in Mind.




Names in footnotes are included in the index only if they are elsewhere mentioned in the text itself, or some discussion occurs in the footnote. Names merely cited in the footnotes alone have not been included.

Akselrod, Lyubov (Ortodox). 169, 182 86 Althusser. Louis. 170,213 Avenarius, Richard, 154, 165, 171, 174, 191, 192

Avineri, Shiomo, 218

Bachelard, Gaston, J41 n.21 Bazarov, Vladimir, 165, 191. 192. 195 Berkeley, George, 4, 22-23. 66, 87, 97, 171, 180, 183, 191 Bernstein, Eduard, 5

Bhaskar, Roy, 100-2, .103, 128-33, 134-35, 146, 157, 201-7 .Binns, Peter, 94n.70 Bloch, J., 125

Bogdanov, Alexander, 154, 165, 172,

174-76, 191, 192, 195, 218 Buchner, Ludwig, 5

Calvez, Jean-Yves. 84, 85 Cohen, Hermann, 195 Cohen, Robert S., 218 Colletti, Lucio, 21-22, I40n.20, 147-54, 162n,7, 177 Collier, Andrew, 212 Copleston, Frederick, S. J., 51-53 Craib, Ian, 37n.35

Davidson, Donald, 204-6 Descartes, Rene, 73, 74, 75, 100, 109-11 Duhem, Pierre. 187-88, 195 Dummett. Michael, 36n.4, 159

Engels, Frederick, 5, 6, 8n.4, 67, 106, 118, 123-25. 171, 179, 180

Feuerbach, Ludwig, 38.48, 56-60,66,77-78.

115, 139n .13. 171, 181,217, 219 Fichte, Johann, 7, 38. 45-46, 55, 171 Findlay, j. N„ 49-51, 53 Fisk, Milton, 160-62

Geymonat. Ludovico, 1 13 Godelier, Maurice, 153 -54 Goodman, Nelson. 16, 141 n.25, 148

Hartmann, Eduard von. 95 Hegel, G. W. F., 22-23, 38-56,100,109. Ill, 115, 119-20. 152, 165, 168. 171, 191, 217-18

Helmholtz, Hermann Ludwig von. 182-83 Hindess, Barry, 163n.!6 Hirst, Paul Q., 163n. 16 Hooker, C. A., 7n.S, 103, 139n. 13 Hume, David, 4, 13, 20, 21, 22-23, 66, 97, 105, 1 18-19, 162, 171, 180, 191 Jakubowski, Franz, 5-6, 112, 125 Jones, Gareth Stedman, 31

Kant, Immanuel, 3, 4, 6, 9 -35, 38, 105-6, 109. 147-49, 152-54, 167-68, 171-74, 180, 191

Kolakowski. Leszek, 16, 86-92, 113, 145,175 Korner, Stefan, 29-31, 141 n.23 Korsch, Karl, 75, 77, 144 Kuhn, Thomas, 111, 134, 187

Lange, F. A., 195 Lecourt, Dominique, 141 n.21 Lenin. V. L, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8n.5, 35, 66, 67, 113-14, 144, 154, 165-97 Le Roy, Edouard, 195 Lowcnberg, J., 16 Lowy, Michel, 166, I97n.3 Lukacs, Georg, 80-83, 103, 215 Lunacharsky, Anatoli. 165. 195

Mach, Ernst, 154, 165, 171, 174, 188, 191 Mackie, J. L., 204-6, 209-10 Maier, Josef, 35, 61n.33 Mandel, Ernest, 142n.51 Mattick, Paul, 169

Marx, Karl, 5, 6-7. 48, 63-92, 99, 102, 114, 125. 127-29, 132, 151-53, 216 -9 Maxwell, Grover, 137 Mehring, Franz, 125 Moleschott, Jacob, 5

Naville, Pierre, 218 Neurath, Otto, 98 Newton-Smith, W., I64n.23


Norman, Richard, 41, 53-54 Oilman, Bertell, 63-64, 123-24

Pannekoek, Anton, I63n.20, 169, 193-97

Paul, G. A., 170

Pearson, Karl, 195

Pettit, Phillip, 8n,8

Petzoldt, Josef, 192

Phillips, Colin, 159-62, 206, 208 , 212

Plekhanov. Georgii, I, 67, 78, 174, 182-86

Poincare, Jules Henri, 195

Popper, Karl, 213-15

Putnam, Hilary, 7n.l, 103, 133-39, 139n.10, I39n.l 1, !40n. 17, f4fn.25, I42n,60, 21 I

Quine, W. V. O., 98, I39n.10, I39n. 12

Righi, Augusto, 188 Rorty, Richard, 160 Ruben, Eira, 199n.37

Schmidt, Alfred, 83-85, 146, 147 Sellars, Wilfred, 36n.l3, I98n.22 Siote, Michael, 210 Stebbing, Susan, 105-6, 188 Strawson, Peter, 10-12 Stroud, Barry, 207

Taylor, Charles, 6In,30 Timpanaro, Sebastiano, 8n.8, 151, 158

Unger, Peter, 207 Valentinov, N, 166-68, 169 Vico, Giambattista, 146-47 Vogt, Karl, 5

Walsh, W, H„ 31-32, 34 , 41-42 Ward, James, 195 Wartofsky, Marx, 219 Watkins, J. W. N„ 201 Weiss, Donald, 8n.4 Willy, R., 192 WoltT, Robert Paul, 17 19




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