Next gen affirmative 1ac advantage-Econ
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Air Power-China ScenarioUS air power is key to stabilize Asia Garretson, Lt. Col. In USAF and the Division Chief, Strategy, Plans & Policy for Irregular Warfare at HQ USAF, ’12 (Peter, “Air Power Key to U.S. Asia Goals”, May 22, 2012, http://oseafas.wordpress.com/2012/05/22/air-power-key-to-u-s-asia-goals/, accessed 7/17/12) To win the contest for influence in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. military must move beyond boots on the ground. Smart use of the Air Force is a cost effect tool that could fit the bill. The United States has refocused its strategic priorities in an oft-talked about “Pivot to Asia” and has made a deliberate decision in new defense strategic guidance not to size the military for large scale counter-insurgency operations, but instead to posture to deter conflict in Asia where there is a clear anti-access, area-denial threat. Such a shift has implications and raises questions about the appropriateness of retaining force structure and concepts developed for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan across all the military services. Since fiscal reality dictates that the United States must downsize its military and focus on a more limited set of priorities, is it appropriate for the United States Air Force to create and sustain an institutional irregular warfare capability? If the key strategic pre-occupation of the United States in the forthcoming decades is maintaining a force posture credible to defeating aggression on the high-end of the spectrum in Asia, what is the place of irregular warfare? And what are the changes required to make the fundamental components of Air Force irregular warfare – air advising, air diplomacy and aviation enterprise development – more aligned with larger U.S. strategies? An institutional Air Force irregular warfare capability directly supports U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Asia-Pacific and represents an asymmetric strength the envy of our competitors. Institutionalization of USAF irregular warfare capability is important, because it supplies exactly the sort of “low-cost, innovative” strategies called for in the defense strategic guidance and provides a tool to address the larger deeper problem: shaping the conditions for continued advantage. Air power is uniquely key Garretson, Lt. Col. In USAF and the Division Chief, Strategy, Plans & Policy for Irregular Warfare at HQ USAF, ’12 (Peter, “Air Power Key to U.S. Asia Goals”, May 22, 2012, http://oseafas.wordpress.com/2012/05/22/air-power-key-to-u-s-asia-goals/, accessed 7/17/12) America’s problem in Asia is more than just maintaining a favorable balance of military power. Such a balance is certainly critical to regional stability and global security. Asia is, after all, the heart of the global economic engine of growth, and it is U.S. military strength that ensures customary freedom of navigation in the global commons and deters newly powerful states from using force to settle conflicting claims. Asian states appreciate the positive historic role the United States has played over the past 50 years, but some hand wring about the ability of the U.S. to continue to play that role. While the importance of maintaining military balance is undeniable, the larger challenge is a competition for leadership, legitimacy and influence. Legitimacy is dependent on the actions available to the U.S. to continue to be perceived as present, committed and the security partner of choice. The great military theorist Carl von Clausewitz enjoined that “war is politics by other means.” But the strategic competition in Asia, if well managed, is likely to be one of posture and deterrence rather than war. Rather, the United States might instead consider the rejoinder of China’s first premier, Zhou Enlai, that “All diplomacy is a continuation of war by other means,” and realize that the strategic competition between great powers takes place against a backdrop where competing interests struggle for influence and legitimacy within their own states; the realm of irregular warfare. According to Joint Publication 1, Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States, irregular warfare is a “struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” And Asia – Southeast Asia, South Asia, North Asia, and Central Asia – all feature non-state actors who seek to erode the legitimacy of various states. Each of those should be considered dangers and opportunities to U.S. and global security. Any such conflict could flare into a crisis, triggering instability that undermines the global economic system or presenting the threat of a failed state with all its attendant costs to blood and treasure. Such internal conflicts can be used by one power against another to distract, entangle and undermine the stability of their partners. Each internal conflict creates an opportunity for a “preferred security partner” to fill a vacuum, and provide critical opportunities that build sympathy and lay the groundwork for access. All the great powers seem to understand that the game in Asia is about more than just deterrence, but influence. Take for example the recent piece by Yan Xuetong titled “How China Can Defeat America” where he the author states: “To shape a friendly international environment for its rise, Beijing needs to develop more high-quality diplomatic and military relationships than Washington. No leading power is able to have friendly relations with every country in the world, thus the core of competition between China and the United States will be to see who has more high-quality friends. And in order to achieve that goal, China has to provide higher-quality moral leadership than the United States. China must also recognize that it is a rising power and assume the responsibilities that come with that status. For example, when it comes to providing protection for weaker powers, as the United States has done in Europe and the Persian Gulf, China needs to create additional regional security arrangements.” Of course it isn’t a zero-sum game, and the U.S. welcomes a China that assumes the responsibilities with status. But the U.S. shouldn’t remove itself from the competition to remain the security partner of choice, and it doesn’t have to. This form of competition plays to America’s asymmetric strength, and Yan himself acknowledges: “America enjoys much better relations with the rest of the world than China in terms of both quantity and quality. America has more than 50 formal military allies, while China has none. North Korea and Pakistan are only quasi-allies of China. In the competition for security cooperation and building partnerships, the U.S. has another asymmetric advantage: It’s an air-faring nation with an Air Force than can bring constructive effects. While understood by few, “boots on the ground” is not the only opportunity to help friendly governments in irregular warfare. The last decade of sustained warfare has given the United States Air Force (USAF) a tremendous opportunity to collect important lessons on how Airpower – both military and civil – can enhance the legitimacy of partner states. What is required now is to take the lessons, processes, education, training and guidance learned in contingency operations, and institutionalize them as part of how the USAF interacts in the pre-conflict phase (“Phase 0”) of building partnership capabilities and capacities. This form of engagement doesn’t require large numbers of boots on the ground, armed and visible to the populace, but it does require a few “brains on the ground” who are properly prepared to interface with their host nation counterparts. Using air forces in this manner is a surprisingly effective strategy. The nation gains significant access and influence via its engagements abroad, yet the entire “building partnerships” portfolio amounts to less than half a percent of the USAF budget. USAF involvement in irregular warfare operations has long conjured up images of long-loitering drones firing missiles at insurgents among external audiences. But such an image betrays a deep lack of understanding of the breadth of how airpower contributes to influence and legitimacy, and even more so about how Airmen understand irregular warfare. Particularly under conditions where fiscal or political constraints limit the introduction of U.S. ground forces, USAF advice and assistance can empower a legitimate government to employ the benefits of airpower to control its skies, diagnose the situation on the ground and respond to situations on the ground with the unparalleled speed aircraft provide. That response could be the rapid movement of indigenous forces to protect a village or reinforce a town. But equally likely is the movement of government officials or aid workers or humanitarian assistance, extending the services and legitimacy of government. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 0.77 Mb. Share with your friends:
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