13NFL1-Compulsory Voting Page 63 of 163 www.victorybriefs.com DEMOCRACY DOESN’T ITSELF REDUCE INCOME INEQUALITY. Alberto Chong and Mauricio Olivera – 2008 Research Department, Inter-American Development Bank. Does Compulsory Voting Help Equalize Incomes Economics & Politics . Volume 20, No. 3. The crucial issue is that regardless of its theoretical validity, in practice, democracies may not necessarily improve the distribution of income in the short run, or not at all, and if so, not to the extent that policymakers expect or desire. In fact, the ultimate objective of fair representation is for governments to provide their constituencies with their wants and needs. This should be reflected in the welfare of the corresponding groups. According to conventional wisdom, the poor are less likely to go to the urns, which may result in the election of so leaders who do not cater to their needs and may end up skewing the distribution of income against them. In fact, the voters who would benefit the most by voting tend not to vote, as because of high transaction costs tend to be extremely high. Furthermore, the marginal impact of the vote of one single voter, especially in non-urban areas, is perceived, true or not, as inconsequential, which ends up biasing the cost –benefit calculation of individuals against voting. Individuals do not adequately assess the positive externalities of voting outcomes because they are typically not internalized in the utility functions of the voter In this context, compulsory-voting mechanisms have been encouraged to make voter turnout more representative of the democratic process
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