Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861–1871 (Cambridge, 1997), pp. The largest individual American field armies of previous wars were those under George Washington during the American Revolution, numbering 20,000, and under Winfield Scott during the Mexican War (1846–48), at about 14,000. See Allan R. Millett and Peter Maskowski, For the Common Defense (New York, 1993), pp. 64, Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War (New York, 1987), pp. As T. Harry Williams summarized The Civil War was a war of ideas and, inasmuch as neither side could compromise its political purposes, it was a war of unlimited objectives.” Williams, Military Leadership of North and South in David Donald, ed, Why the North Won the Civil War (Baton Rouge, LA, 1960), p. 35. See also Richard A. Preston, Alex Roland, and Sydney F. Wise, Men in Arms A History of Warfare and its Interrelationships with Western Society, 5th edn. (Fort Worth, TX, 1991), p. One of the best expositions delineating the gradual progression from a limited war toward total war is Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861–1865 (Cambridge, 1995), esp. pp. 4–5, 205, 221–2. See also Grimsley, “Conciliation and its Failure, 1861–1862,” Civil War History 39 (1993), pp. Joseph L. Harsh, Confederate Tide Rising Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 1861–1862 (Kent, OH, 1998), pp. 11–13. Thirteen states, including Kentucky and Missouri, held seats in the Confederate Congress and stars in the Confederate flag. A survey of economic disparities is T. Harry Williams, The American Civil War in JP. T. Bury, ed, The Zenith of European Power, 1830–1870, Vol. X of The New Cambridge Modern History (Cambridge, 1960), pp. Seethe discussion in R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History (New York, 1986), pp. 522–33. They single out the Thirty Years War (1618–48) as the first modern war. 8. Preston et al., Men in Arms, pp. 164–73, 185–6, 217–21, quote on p. 217. See also, for example, Robert M. Epstein, Napoleon’s Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War (Lawrence, KS Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (Bloomington, IN, 1978). 9. Jack Coggins, Arms and Equipment of the Civil War (New York, 1962). For debates over the effects of rifles see Paddy Griffith, Rally Once Again (London, 1987), pp. 73–90, and Grady McWhiney and Perry Jamieson, in Attack and Die Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage (Tuscaloosa, AL, 1982), pp. 48–9, James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom The Civil War Era, a volume in the Oxford History of the United States (New York, 1988), pp. 429–33, 600–1; E. B. Long, The Civil War Day by Day: an Almanac (New York, 1971), p. George E. Turner, Victory Rode the Rails (New York, 1953), pp. 45–8, 310–11; Edward Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare (Bloomington, IN, pp. xi, 41–4, 58, 82–7, 103–5, 277, Brian Holden Reid, The Origins of the American Civil War (London, 1996), pp. 19–29, 64–6, 78 • Joseph G. Dawson III
82–3, 172–3, 160–1, 304–5; James M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades Why Men Foughtin the Civil War (New York, Arguing the effectiveness of the Union blockade is Bern Anderson, By Sea and by River TheNaval History of the Civil War (New York, 1962), pp. 34–7, 65–6, 225–32. Arguing to the contrary are Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, 2nd edn. (Chicago, IL, 1959), and Stephen R. Wise, Lifeline of the Confederacy Blockade Running during the Civil War (Columbia, SC, 1988). Portraying the blockade’s effectiveness is McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, pp. 313–14, 378–9, 380–8. For the rivers, see John D. Milligan, Gunboats down the Mississippi(Annapolis, MD, 1965), and Anderson, By Sea and by River, passim. 14. Frank Freidel, General Orders 100 and Military Government Mississippi Valley HistoricalShare with your friends: |