36 187
Ibid. at 3.
188
Ibid. at 2. Statement of Thomas Rid, Professor,
Department of War Studies, King’s College London,
Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns, Hearing before the US. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Marat (citing Gunther Bohnsack, Herbert Brehmer, Auftrag Irrefuhrung, Carlsen, at 16 (1992)).
190
Schoen & Lamb, Deception, Disinformation,
and Strategic Communications, at 104. Statement of Thomas Rid,
Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influ-ence Campaigns, at 2. The Fog Of Wars Adventures Abroad Boost Public Support at Home
The Economist, Oct.
22, 2016. Soviet Active Measures in the United States, 1986-87; Prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation reprinted in the Congressional Record, 133 Cong. Rec. H (Dec. 9, 1987) statement of Rep. CW. Bill Young.
Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Strategy to Derail US INF Deployment Feb. 1983. national front organizations.
187
And they were intently focused on their target audience as one Soviet disinformation practitioner put it, every disinformation message must at least partially correspond to reality or generally accepted views.’’
188
Active measures also sought to take advantage of preexisting fissures to further polarize the West. As Colonel Rolf Wagenbreth, longtime head of active measures operations for the East German Stasi, reportedly said, A powerful adversary can only be defeated through . . . . sophisticated, methodical, careful, and shrewd effort to exploit even the smallest cracks between our enemies . . . and within their elites.’’
189
Opinions on the effectiveness of Soviet active measures varied among US. national security experts. During
the Reagan Administration, Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Deputy CIA Director Robert Gates argued that the operations were deleterious but generally not decisive although, according to Gates, who cited the Dutch decision on deployment of intermediate range nuclear weapons and Spain’s referendum on NATO participation, in a close election or legislative battle, they can make the difference.’’
190
Soviet bloc disinformation operations were not a rare occurrence more than 10,000 were carried out over the course of the Cold
War.
191
In the s, Yuri Andropov, then head of the KGB, created active measures
courses for operatives, and the KGB had up to 15,000 officers working on psychological and disinformation warfare at the height of the Cold War.
192
The CIA estimated that the Soviet Union spent more than $4 billion a year on active measures operations in the s (approximately $8.5 billion in 2017 dollars. And then, as now with the Kremlin, the highest level of the Soviet government approved the themes of active measures operations.
193
Active measures campaigns in the s focused on influencing the arms control and disarmament movements, for example, by promoting the European peace movement in countries that were scheduled to base US. intermediate-range nuclear forces. That campaign made use of the West German Communist Party, the Dutch Communist Party, the Belgian National Action Committee for Peace and Development,
the World Peace Council, and the International Union of Students, among others.
194
In addition to political parties and peace organizations, the Soviet Union also used the Russian Orthodox Church and an affiliate of the Soviet-
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37 Soviet Active Measures in the United States, 1986-87; Prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation reprinted in the Congressional Record, 133 Cong. Rec. H. Andrew Weiss, Vladimir Putin’s Political Meddling
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