53 In the Kremlin’s Pocket
The Economist, Feb. 12,, 2015; Cynthia Kroet,
The New Putin Coalition Politico, Nov. 21, 2016. Sam Jones et al., NATO Claims Moscow Funding Anti-Fracking Groups
Financial Times, June 19, 2014.
309
Vladislava Vojtiskova et al.,
The Bear in Sheep’s Clothing, at 31. Andrew Higgins, In Expanding Russian Influence, Faith Combines with Firepower
The New York Times, Sept. 13, 2016. Letter from Patriarch Kirill, Patriarch
of Moscow and All Russia, Russian Orthodox Church, to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Mar. 22, 2010. Robert Blitt,
Russia’s Orthodox Foreign Policy the Growing Influence of the Russian Ortho-dox Church in Shaping Russia’s Policies Abroad, 33 U. PA. J. I
NT
’
L
L., at 379 (2011).
313
Ibid. parties have also adopted more friendly views toward Russia, including Spain’s Podemos party, Greece’s Syriza Party (which has led the government since 2015), Bulgaria’s
Socialist Party, and
Moldova’s Socialist Party, with candidates from the latter two winning presidential elections in November According to NATO officials, Russian intelligence agencies also reportedly provide covert support to European environmental groups to campaign against fracking for natural gas, thereby keeping the EU more dependent on Russian supplies.
309
A study by the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies reports that the Russian government has invested $95 million in NGOs that seek to persuade EU governments to end shale gas exploration.
309
THE USE OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
Just as the Kremlin has strengthened its relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church and used it to bolster its standing at home, the Russian Orthodox Church also serves as its proxy abroad, and the two institutions have several overlapping foreign policy objectives. According to the former editor of the official journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, the church has become an instrument of the Russian state. It is used to extend and legitimize the interests of the Kremlin.’’
310
In a letter to Russian
foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Orthodox Church’s Patriarch, Kirill, wrote During your service as foreign minister, the cooperation between the Russian foreign policy department and the Moscow Patriarchate has considerably broadened. Through joint efforts we have managed to make a contribution to the gathering and consolidation of the Russian World.’’
311
Scholar Robert Blitt notes that the Russian government, in an effort to restore its lost role as a global superpower, has recruited the Church as a primary instrument for rallying together a dubious assortment of states and religious representatives to support anew international order. This new order is premised on the rejection of universal human rights and the revival of relativism, two principles that serve the Church well.’’
312
Blitt also notes that the Russian government has linked national security with spiritual security and that abroad, the government benefits from the Russian Orthodox Church]’s efforts as a willing partner in reinforcing Russia’s spiritual security which in turn boosts the channels available to it for the projection of Russian power abroad.’’
313
In 2003, the Russian Orthodox Church and Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a working group that has, in the words
of Foreign Minister Lavrov, allowed them to work together realizing a whole array of foreign policy and international activity
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54 314
Ibid. at 381. Metropolitan Kirill, Chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate DECR, Address on the Panel Discussion on Human Rights and Intercultural Dialogue at the 7th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, Mar. 22, 2008.
316
Orysia Lutsevych,
Agents of the Russian World Proxy Groups in the Contested Share with your friends: