Insight, Sept. 20, 2016. John Cappello, Russian Information Operations in the Western Balkans Real Clear De- fense, Feb. 1, 2017. Observed during Committee Staff Visit to Banja Luka, July 2017. Russia Stirs up the Hornet’s Nest Stratfor Worldview, Mar. 28, 2017. Andrew Byrne, Kremlin Backed Media Adds to Western Fears in Balkans Financial Times, March 19, 2017. In conversations with US. officials and civil society groups during a visit to Belgrade in 2017, Committee staff were told Serbian outlets pickup content from Sputnik and other Russian outlets because it is free however, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty also provides free content that is objective and does not contain the same Russian propaganda messages. US. Department of State, Background Information on Belgrade provided to Committee Staff, June 30, 2017. 475 Ibid. 476 Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2017: Serbia (2017). ister Milorad Dodik, which could prove useful in hampering Bosnia s NATO bid. Though Dodik is not the head of Bosnia’s government, Vladimir Putin has met with him on multiple occasions, despite not meeting the central government in Sarajevo—a breach of diplomatic protocol that makes clear that he is Russia’s preferred interlocutor. 468 The Russian government has also publicly expressed its support fora independence referendum in RS, which the Constitutional Court found violated the rights of non- Serbs in the country. 469 If Bosnia were to make significant progress towards NATO, Russia could exert influence in RS to hamper forward progress. The media space is already prepared for that possibility, as RS media outlets rely on anti-NATO and anti-EU content from Sputnik’s Belgrade outlet. 470 Russian influence in Banja Luka, the de facto capital of RS, is pervasive—downtown kiosks are filled with t-shirts, coffee mugs, and other memorabilia praising the Russian Federation and Vladimir Putin. 471 As Serbia continues to work through chapters in its EU accession talks, Russia has employed several of the interference tools seen in this report, especially propaganda and disinformation. For example, according to Stratfor Worldview, the Russian state newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta prints Nedeljnik, a widely read weekly magazine, in Moscow before delivering it to Serbia. 472 According to the Financial Times, Sputnik provides online stories and news bulletins to 20 radio stations across Serbia free of charge. 473 More than 100 media outlets and NGOs in Serbia can be considered pro- Russian, a number that has spiked considerably in recent years. 474 The response from the West has been sparse, but there are signs of competition in the information space. The BBC has announced plans to reengage in Serbia in 2018, seven years after it closed its Serbian language service. The service will be funded at around £600,000 annually and will employ 20 local staff. 475 Press freedom has also declined sharply in recent years in Serbia. Freedom House reported in 2017 that press freedom has eroded under the SNS-led administration of Prime Minister now President Vucic. Independent and investigative journalists face frequent harassment, including by government officials and in pro- government media. Physical attacks against journalists take place each year, and death threats and other intimidation targeting media workers area serious concern.’’ 476 If Serbia’s journalists are notable to conduct investigations without threat of censorship, vio- VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
84 477 Janusz Bugajski and Margarita Assenova, Eurasian Disunion Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks The Jamestown Foundation, June 2016, at 242; ‘‘Gazprom to Increase by 33% Natgas Exports to Serbia in 2018,’’ SeeNews, Dec. 20, 2017. US. Department of State, Background Information on Belgrade provided to Committee Staff, June 30, 2017. Andrew Roth, In Diplomatic Defeat, Putin Diverts Pipeline to Turkey The New York