104 Teri Schultz, Why the Fake Rape Story Against German NATO
Forces Fell Flat in Lithuania Deutsche Welle, Feb. 23, 2017. Andrew Higgins, Foes of Russia Say Child Pornography Is Planted to Ruin Them
The New York Times, Dec. 9, 2016. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence,
Robotrolling 2017, Issue 2, at 2, 4 Nov. 8, 2017).
587
Ibid. at 2.
588
Ibid. at 6. Congressional Research Service, European Efforts to Counter Russian Influence Oper- ations,’’July 24, 2017. to affect the perception about the presence
of German troops as the [EFP] framework nation in Lithuania. It was supposed to affect morale it was supposed to affect everything—the operational func- tioning.’’
584
Before another NATO exercise, hackers infiltrated the Lithuanian military’s website and replaced the statement announcing the exercise with a fake one proclaiming that it was part of a plan for Lithuania to annex Kaliningrad, a small Russian exclave to the west. The head of Lithuania’s National Cyber Security Center noted that the announcement was obviously fake and quickly taken down, but still spread through online networks and colored discussions about NATO. He summarized the effectiveness of such disinformation operations when he told a reporter that I don’t believe in aliens, but if you see enough articles about aliens visiting Earth, you start to think Who knows, maybe the government is hiding something As
elsewhere in Europe and beyond, an extensive network of social media bots spread Kremlin disinformation narratives. According to a report by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, bot-generated messages are targeted at different audiences those aimed at the West emphasize how much smaller Russian exercises are than NATO ones, while those targeting domestic audiences rarely mention Russian military exercises.
586
In addition, approximately 70 percent of all Russian messages about NATO in the Baltics and Poland are created by Russian-language bots. NATO’s report also found that Twitter was less effective at removing Russian-language material generated by bots than messages in English, but did note improvement in the platform’s policing of content and urged continued pressure to ensure further im- provements.
587
NATO’s analysts also noted that increased interest by Twitter and other social media companies in tackling state- sponsored trolls and bots may offer an explanation for the low levels of activity in the current observation window.’’
588
That conclusion underscores the point that social media companies have not only great responsibility, but also strong potential to successfully counter Kremlin disinformation operations (and fake news in general. The Baltic states have all taken concerted actions against Russian state-sponsored propaganda outlets, with methods ranging from outright censorship to public disregard. Since 2014, Latvia and Lithuania have placed restrictions on several
Russian television channels, including three-to six-month bans on one station owned by a Russian state broadcaster, because of what government authorities deemed to be dangerous and unbalanced reporting on the situation in Ukraine, incitement of discord and unrest, and warmongering.
589
In March 2016, Latvia’s local domain registry
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105 Latvia Blocks Russian Sputnik Site as Kremlin Propaganda Tool Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, Mar. 30, 2016.
Alex Spence, Russia Accusses Latvia of Blatant Censorship After Sputnik News Site is Shut Down
Politico, Mar. 30, 2016. US Challenges Kremlin with New Russian TV Channel
Daily Mail, Feb. 27, 2017. Statement of Rolandas Krisciunas, Ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania,
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