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Mechanisms: The OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism, invoked by a group of OSCE participating States or requested by the state in question itself, can enable a mission of experts to investigate and facilitate resolution to questions related to human rights in a particular OSCE participating State. Since it was agreed to in 1991, the Moscow Mechanism has been used seven times—both with and without the cooperation of the state in question. This mechanism should be activated more frequently and used to the fullest extent possible, and with respect to Russia, to respond to demands from within that country for scrutiny of the Kremlin’s domestic human rights record and providing specific recommendations for remedying abuses.
3. Expose and Freeze Kremlin-Linked Dirty Money Corruption provides the motivation and the means for many of the Kremlin’s malign influence operations. Under President Putin, the Kremlin has nationalized organized crime and cybercrime, and now uses
Russia-based organized crime groups and cybercriminals for operational purposes abroad. The United States remains a prime destination for illicit financial flows from Russia, especially through the purchase of real estate and luxury goods by anonymous shell companies. The US. capability to constructively assist countries in the region remains weak due to an inadequate number of US. embassy personnel focused on these issues. a. Expose High-Level Individual Corruption The Treasury Department should make public any intelligence related to
Putin’s personal corruption and wealth stored abroad, and take steps with European allies to cutoff Putin and his inner circle from the international financial system.
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158 bi Expose Energy Sector Corruption
The US. government should also expose corrupt and criminal activities associated with Russia s state-owned energy sector. c. Impose Sanctions The US. government should implement the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA) provisions, which allow for sanctions against corrupt actors in Russia and abroad. d. Russia Financial Task Force The US. Treasury Department should form a high-level unit within its Office of Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen) that is tasked solely with investigating and prosecuting Russian-linked illicit financial flows. The unit should also place liaison officers in select US. embassies throughout Europe, and the US. government should encourage our European partners to setup similar units. e. Corruption Reporting The US. government should issue yearly reports that assign tiered classifications based on objective third-party corruption indicators, as well as governmental efforts to combat corruption.
4. Subject State Hybrid Threat Actors to an Escalatory Sanctions
Regime: The Kremlin and other regimes hostile to democracy must know that there will be consequences for their actions. a. Create a New Designation The US. government should designate countries that employ malign influence operations to assault democracies as State Hybrid Threat Actors. bi Establish an Escalatory Sanctions Regime
Countries that are designated as such would fall under a preemptive and escalatory sanctions regime that would be applied whenever the state uses asymmetric weapons like cyberattacks to interfere with a democratic election or disrupt a country’s vital infrastructure. Existing sanctions included within the CAATSA legislation can be used to target those involved with cyberattacks. c. Coordinate sanctions with the EU The US. government should work with the EU to ensure that these sanctions are coordinated and effective.
5. Publicize the Kremlin’s Global Malign Influence Efforts Expos- ing and publicizing the nature of the threat of Russian malign influence activities, as the Baltic states regularly do and the US. intelligence community did in January 2017, can bean action-forcing event that not only boosts public awareness, but also drives effective responses from the private sector, especially social media platforms, as well as civil society and independent media, who can use the information to pursue their own investigations. a. Issue Public Malign Influence Reporting The Director of National Intelligence should produce yearly public reports that detail the Russian government’s malign influence operations in the United States. The Department of State should similarly produce annual reports on those operations around the world.
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159 bi Declassify Assassination Intelligence The Director of National Intelligence should also update and consider declassifying its report to Congress on the use of political assassinations as a form of statecraft by the Russian government. c. Establish Independent Commissions to Investigate Election
Meddling: The US. Congress should pass pending legislation to create an independent, nonpartisan commission to comprehensively investigate Russian government interference in the 2016 US. election. Countries across Europe that have held elections over the past two years should also consider comprehensive governmental or independent investigations into the nature and scope of Russian government interference.
6. Build an International Coalition to Counter Hybrid Threats
The United States is stronger and more effective when we work with our partners and allies abroad. a. Build the Coalition The US. government should lead an international effort of like-minded democracies to build awareness of and resilience to the Kremlin’s malign influence operations. Specifically, the President should convene an annual global summit on hybrid threats, modeled on the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL or the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) summits that have taken place since 2015. Civil society and the private sector should participate in the summits and fol- low-on activities. bi Harness the OSCE: The OSCE should be a central forum for exposing Russian government attacks on democracy and directly challenging its actions. As part of her Senate confirmation hearing, the nominee for US. Ambassador to the OSCE should commit to using every tool and forum to advance this goal, working with like-minded countries in the organization. The US. should also expand its extra-budgetary support to
OSCE projects aimed at building resilience to external threats to democratic institutions and processes in OSCE participating states. c. Share Successful Techniques The State Department and
USAID should conduct a comprehensive assessment of the most successful efforts to counter Russian government interference in all of its forms and partner with relevant governments, aid agencies, and NGOs to ensure that these lessons are shared with the most vulnerable countries in Europe and Eurasia. For example, based on constructive measures taken during the recent French and German election periods, the United States could work closely with their Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the French Agence Francaise de Developpement
(AFD) and the German Gesellschaft fur Internationale
Zusammenarbeit (GiZ) to implement specific joint programs invulnerable democracies on cyber defense, media training, and other areas. d.
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