Because the programs kept changing and managers kept allowing the technologists to specify ever-more sophisticated programs for use, the end-user ended up losing access to much of their legacy data, and spending a great deal of time re-entering data to satisfy the changing formats and features of the new programs.
Now comes the "third wave", in which the Internet is touted by the most optimistic as well as the least principled (two different classes of advocate) as the be-all and end-all for meeting the information needs of the policymaker, with, again, two major negatives:
Because the Internet is such
an interesting environment, and new programs do indeed have a lot of power, analysts are disappearing into the void, either hopelessly lost or hopelessly addicted to wandering in cyberspace; and
Because the Internet does offer a superficial amount of information
on virtually any topic, albeit with no real source authentication or validation, it has become the "classic comics" of knowledge, and too many policymakers and their analysts are accepting the Internet as the first
and last stop in their quest for information.
As one reflects on the $300 billion dollars (roughly) that the U.S. Intelligence Community has spent primarily
on information technology, and the $3 trillion (roughly) that the rest of the U.S. Government has spent on information technology (including weapons and mobility systems information technology), four "costs" emerge which must be considered by policymakers as they plan future investments in information technology:
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