Table of contents exchange of letters with the minister executive summary


Ascertaining the queries run and data exfiltrated



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Report of the COI into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth 10 Jan 2019
32.2 Ascertaining the queries run and data exfiltrated
605. From 11 July 2018, CSA and IHiS also worked on a) Recreating the SQL queries run on the SCM database between 27 June and 4 July 2018 to find out what data had been extracted b) Monitoring for fresh SQL queries made on the SCM database using the AA. account and c) Checking whether there were any queries prior to 27 June 2018 that were similar to those run from 27 June to 4 July 2018.
606. On 11 July 2018, Sze Chun found that the Prime Minister’s data had been accessed. Henry reported this to the War Room, where Benedict, Clarence and Irene Kwek (an IHiS employee in-charge of providing updates to MOH) were present.
607. IHiS and CSA found that there were altogether more than 200 queries that had been run. Sze Chun also found that there were queries run on 26 June 2018 which involved the attacker looking at the schema of the SCM database, and that no other queries were made before 26 June 2018 or after 4 July 2018. They also tabulated the exact number of records extracted by each query, determined which tables in the SCM database were queried, and ascertained whether the data of



COI Report – Part V
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VVIPs had been queried. It was also confirmed that the records in the SCM database were not amended, deleted, or otherwise tampered with, and no other patient records such as diagnosis, test results, or doctors notes, were accessed.
608. IHiS also simulated the queries that were made by the attacker and compared this against the data traffic patterns going to the C servers. Based on the similarities between the two, IHiS confirmed on 13 July 2018 that data had been exfiltrated.
32.3 Containment measures implemented
609. During the joint investigation, IHiS and CSA put in place several containment measures that were aimed at containing the existing threat, eliminating the attacker’s footholds, and preventing recurrence of the attack. The measures implemented were meant to contain the immediate threat of the attack, and were not intended to provide a permanent solution for SingHealth and IHiS.
32.3.1
Resetting the Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket account
610. IHiS’ investigations revealed that the attacker had gained administrative privileges and moved across the network to access the Citrix servers. This was an indication that the KRBTGT account
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could have been compromised.
611. The KRBTGT account is a service account in the active directory, and by obtaining the password hash to this account, the attacker would have been able to compromise every account within the active directory, possibly to the extent
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KRBTGT stands for the “Kerberos Ticket Generating Ticket Account. Kerberos is a network authentication protocol that works on the basis of tickets to allow computers and devices communicating over a non-secure network to prove their identity to one another in a secure manner. The KRBTGT account is a special hidden account that encrypts all other authentication tokens in the Kerberos authentication protocol used by Windows. An attacker who has compromised the KRBTGT account can create a Kerberos Golden Ticket to gain complete access to the entire domain.



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