Table of contents exchange of letters with the minister executive summary



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Report of the COI into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth 10 Jan 2019

COI Report – Part VII
Page 237 of 425

findings are properly remediated, help to bridge any gaps between policy and practice. To this end, it is important that the ongoing discussions between IHiS and the GIA on the three lines of defence are properly reviewed and that an appropriate decision is taken soon. IHiS acknowledges that the three lines of defence model is a good target model. The key benefit of implementing an effective three lines of defence model is that it improves coverage of risks and controls by identifying and refining the population of risks and controls, and it appropriately allocates the ownership and performance of these risks and controls across the lines of defence. As a result, any unintended risks and gaps in controls can be avoided, and unnecessary duplication of work should be avoided by removing layers of redundant controls. An effective model of three lines of defence will, therefore, better address the gaps between policy and practice.
36.2
IHiS must adopt a “defence-in-depth” approach
688. The adoption of a “defence-in-depth” approach was recommended by CE,
CSA,
Gen. Alexander and Dr Lim.
Defence-in-depth is not anew strategy. The basic idea behind the strategy is to hinder an attacker as much as possible with multiple layers of defence, even though each layer might be surmountable.
47
As
Vivek Chudgar (“Vivek”) has pointed out, “the enterprise must have full
visibility of their internal network, their controls, strengths and weaknesses, their
exceptions, it is all about having visibility of your backyard”.
In particular, more valuable assets are protected behind more layers of defence 47
Network and System Security at p.
48
Ibid.



COI Report – Part VII
Page 238 of 425

689. To properly implement defence-in-depth, active steps must betaken to identify and secure vulnerabilities that are out there, particularly in legacy systems, to protect against future exploitation. Defence-in-depth also involves people, technology and operations a) People. Trained security personnel should be responsible for securing the network and systems b) Technology. A variety of technological measures should be used for layers of protection and c) Operations. Preventative activities (e.g. penetration testing, software patching, access controls, etc.) and reactive activities monitoring, detection, blocking isolation, etc.) required to maintain security should be put in place. Several measures for this purpose will beset out below.
690. In the context of cybersecurity, one cannot protect against vulnerabilities
that one is unaware of. IHiS should study and adopt the measures discussed in this report, and consciously layer them to adequately protect its systems. The following measures contain a particular emphasis on the review of systems, assets and networks.
36.2.1
Reviewing legacy systems
691. CE, CSA explained that legacy systems (such as the SCM) are not unique to the public healthcare sector and many system owners across the board (e.g. public transport, banking and finance and the Government) have re-looked their legacy systems through anew lens of potential vulnerabilities which did not exist at the point when the systems were put in place.
49
Network and System Security at p.



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