**Great Ape Project Neg** Apes Differ from Humans in Moral Codes

**Great Ape Project Neg**

Apes Differ from Humans in Moral Codes

Robert W. Mitchell, Professor of psychology, Eastern Kentucky University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 244

“those who desire to rule over others must give justifying reasons for their rule, which allows critics…to analyze the reasons and expose any flaws. For chimpanzees no such rhetorical deliberations is necessary, and thus there is no ground for moral criticism [of chimpanzees.]”

Unfortunately, any “moral vision” or sense of “justice” which is possible within the constraints of ape mentality is egocentric and pragmatic, and does not involve argumentation and deliberate debate. The fact that criticism of the behavior of chimpanzees and other apes on moral grounds is impossible has serious consequences in that apes cannot be held accountable for their actions.
GREAT APE PROJECT INTERNALLY CONTRADICTORY – HIGHLIGHTS THE DIFFERENCES IN MORAL CAPACITIES

Donald G. Lindburg, Zoology Society of San Diego, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 474-5

Regan’s “subject-of-a-life” criterion lies at the root of a recent proposal to bring the three great apes (orangutans, chimpanzees and gorillas) into the human community as moral equals (The Great Ape Project, 1993). In support of this proposal, a distinguished roster of scientists wrote of the strong similarities between humans and apes in social, emotional, rational and even incipiently moral capabilities, and used these to argue for an end to human dominion over the great apes, particularly those held in captive situations. Despite the obviously high level of sentience in these taxa and deeply felt concern for their welfare, this case aptly demonstrates the difficulties encountered in finding a neat formula for action in moral philosophies that are based on arguments that “likes” ought to be treated alike (see discussion of “moral monism” by Norton, 1995). By wanting to do for the apes what they cannot do for themselves, it must be asked if we can logically stress their continuity with humans in making the case for preferential treatment without at the same time highlighting their differential standing as moral patients. Put another way, it is a discontinuity between humans and apes that enables us to respect them for their continuities. In striving to increase respect for the apes, care must be taken not to draw oversimplistic depictions such as their having elements of a social system that is socially transmitted across the generations, a “finding” that will come as no shock to any reputable zoologist. There are many welfare advocates on the other side of this issue who worry that such well-intentioned eagerness leaves us but a short step removed from the Disney-esque world of talking animals coming together to discuss the rules of the jungle. As Zak (1989) stressed, it is the unlikes between humans and animals and an infinite combination of likes and unlikes among non-human creatures that often leaves us on uncertain moral ground.

Recognizing Moral Agency of Apes Excludes Other Animals

Ted Benton, Professor of Sociology, University of Essex, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed. Robert Garner, p. 23

Regan solves this problem by way of a crucial distinction between moral agents and moral patients. Something like Kant’s account of autonomy would be needed to characterize full moral agency. Only moral agents in that sense are bearers of moral responsibility for their actions. Since there are close conceptual ties between the necessary rational capacities, language use, and full moral agency, it seems reasonable to accept that only individuals of the human species are moral agents. Of course, there may have been other hominids with such capabilities and, indeed, it may yet be discovered that other living species share them. Certainly research on other primates and some marine mammals has already produced results which have challenged the ingenuity of the stalwarts of human uniqueness. But for the immediate purpose of Regan’s argument these questions are not central. Even if it could be shown that moral agency was possessed by one or two nonhuman species, to base the argument for animal rights on those grounds would be to abandon concern for the vast majority of individual species.
DRAWING THE LINE AT APES CAN’T BE JUSTIFIED IF SENTIENCE OF CAPACITY IS THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE FOR RIGHTS

Richard A. Epstein, Professor of Law, University of Chicago, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 155

The subject provokes still deeper ironies. In part, Steven Wise undertook his new venture because in his earlier work, Rattling the Cage, he sought to establish limited legal rights for chimpanzees, only to face the same boundary question among species as everyone else. What about lions, tigers, alley cats, and jellyfish? None of these can be excluded if the capacity for suffering is decisive. Nor ironically can any be excluded on the grounds of a (more) limited cognitive capacity under Wise’s new tests. In the end, even the proponents of animal rights must adopt an explicit speciesist approach, complete with arbitrary distinctions. The line between humans and chimps is no longer decisive, but then some other line has to be. Perhaps it is the line between chimps and great apes, or between both horses and cows, or between horses and cows and snails and fish. Which of these lines are decisive and why? The continuum problem continues to plague any response to the universalistic claim that the suffering of (some) animals counts as much as the suffering of a human being—at least to the human beings who are calling the shots. It turns out that Lovejoy’s idea of a great chain of being influences not only the traditional attitude toward animals but also the revisionist beliefs of Steven Wise.
MANY OTHER NONHUMANS MEET THE SAME CRITERIA AS THE GREAT APES

Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 270

But the capacity for complex mental representations may not be limited to primates or even to species evolutionarily close to humans. Bottlenose dolphins have passed the mirror self-recognition test. ¹⁴ The songs of humpback whales may be constructed from a complicated syntax. ¹⁵ Both elephants and African gray parrots use mirrors to help them search for objects. ¹⁶ Dogs have demonstrated Stage 6 object task permanence. ¹⁷ ( Daniel Dennett, for one, would not be surprised if thousands of generations of human enculturation have not caused the canine brain to reorganize and produce a more advanced state of consciousness.) ¹⁸ New Caledonia crows regularly use hooks and tools that they manufacture to a high degree of standardization to aid in the capture of prey. ¹⁹ Common ravens size up a complex problem of thirty steps or more and solve it with no training and on the first try. ²⁰ Scrub jays display "episodic recall." They remember where they stored food, what they stored, and when they stored it. If enough time has elapsed for the food they stored to spoil, they will ignore it. This ability in humans has been said to involve "the conscious experience of self." ²¹ Alex, an enculturated African gray parrot, not only understands shapes, colors, and materials, but can tell you--in English--how objects that he has never seen differ in shape, color, or material and whether they are made of cork, wood, paper, or rawhide. ²²