Respect for Animals Rights is a Deontological Moral Consideration
THE RIGHTS OF NONHUMANS TO MORAL CONSIDERATION ARE DEONTOLOGICAL – THAT IS THEY ARE JUSTIFIED REGARDLESS OF POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES.
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 14]
Although Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation had an unquestionable impact on traditional animal welfarists, it was American philosopher Tom Regan who, in his book The Case for Animal Rights, presented an argument in favor of animal rights. For Regan, if a person or animal has a right, then that right may not be sacrificed or violated simply because the consequences of doing so are thought to be more desirable than the consequences of respecting the right. Regan’s theory is deontological, which means simply that the morality of conduct is not dependent on consequences but, instead, is dependent on something else--in this case, an appeal to a moral right.
WEIGHING FUNDAMENTAL CLAIMS TO MORAL CONSIDERATION AGAINST POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES IS INHERENTLY SUSPECT.
Daar, Professor of Law, Whittier Law School, 03,
The problem with measuring the benefits of a certain action is that the notion of benefit is highly imprecise. Utilitarians share the conviction that human actions should be assessed morally in terms of their production of maximal value, but they disagree over which values are most important. n104 For some utilitarians, the value of happiness should be the sole measure of utility, n105 while others argue that values other than happiness have intrinsic worth. n106 Among these other values are knowledge, health, and personal autonomy. n107 In the case of cloning, if happiness is the sole measure of utility, then the [*536] happiness of the parents derived from rearing a cloned child would outweigh the difficulties experienced by the child because of physical or psychological infirmities. n108 The two parents' happiness would also likely outweigh any generalized concerns over the impact of cloning on society, because individual happiness trumps speculative societal harms.
In addition to imprecision in the measure of utility, an objection to utilitarianism is the subjective nature of benefit. An individual can express a preference that would be viewed as morally unacceptable under prevailing social norms, yet that individual will derive happiness by exercising that preference. Here, the theory of utilitarianism must struggle with determining whether individual preferences should be the measure of utility, or whether preferences must fit within prevailing norms. For example, if a parent cloned a child solely to serve as a solid organ donor for an ill sibling, we might condemn that action and seek to prevent it. n110 In our society, we value parents who embrace each of their children for his or her individual self-worth. A parental preference that would involve killing a child to save another should cause us to question the soundness of a utility equation where three people are benefitted and only one is harmed, when that harm involves unacceptable moral (and legal) consequences.
As noted above, utilitarianism is problematic in its relative and absolute assessment of benefit. Perhaps even more troubling, however, is its dismissal of harm and tendency toward a tyranny of the majority. Since the principles of utilitarianism dictate that the interests of the majority are to override the rights of the minority, the harms suffered by a few would be dismissed as unimportant in the overall utilitarian calculus. In a cloning scenario, the harms may be profoundly damaging to a few individuals, so much so that their objections should not be disregarded. If cloning produces children who are severely impaired and who suffer greatly during their shortened lifetimes, their conception could be morally justified using utilitarian logic if their parents, and the physicians and researchers who helped develop the technology for their birth, derive great happiness from the accomplishment of creating a cloned human being. In thinking about whether a ban on human cloning can be morally justified, it is difficult to dismiss the potential harm to the cloned individuals, even if the vast majority of those affected incur tremendous benefit. n111 Conversely, if only a few members of society fear the repercussions of cloning, and the vast majority, including the cloned individuals themselves, are greatly benefited, overriding the harms anticipated by those who are not directly affected by the technology may be morally justified under utilitarian theory.
In the end, assessing the morality of a ban on human cloning is difficult to accomplish using utilitarian principles because the science has yet to reveal any actual benefits or harms to human beings. The danger with proceeding to develop the science is, of course, that the harms to cloned individuals will overwhelm any benefits. For this reason alone, many have supported a total ban on human reproductive cloning. n112 But as noted in Part II.C., whether or not a ban is enacted in the United States or abroad, cloning researchers will continue to pursue the holy grail that human cloning has become. Perhaps the better approach is to minimize the harms by dedicating the most talented and highly organized scientific teams to unravel the cloning mysteries, rather than allowing underground and sporadic efforts to cause unnecessary pain and suffering.
Respect for Animals Rights is a Deontological Moral Consideration
UTILITARIANISM—ADDING UP THE COSTS AND BENEFITS—JUSTIFIES IMMORAL OUTCOMES SUCH AS FORCED ORGAN DONATION.
Mark Bernstein, Professor of Philosophy @ the University of Texas, San Antonio, 2004, Terrorists of Freedom Fighters: reflections on the liberation of animals, eds. Best & Nocella, p. 98
Animal liberationists may, as have many others, question the utilitarian presumption. There seems to be more to determining right and wrong behavior than merely subtracting bad from good. Suppose that an unsuspecting innocent walks into a hospital to visit a sick friend. Several very ill patients are waiting for life-saving organ transplants. If our visitor donated his kidneys and heart, he would save the lives of three deserving human beings. Understandably, our visitor, although feeling sympathy for the dying patients, does not want his organs extracted. Surely, we believe that by refusing donation he acts permissibly, and we just as certainly believe that if the doctors compelled him to involuntarily undergo the fatal operation to get his organs, they would be doing something horribly wrong. Yet, on utilitarian grounds, our innocent visitor ought to give up his organs and the doctors, if need be, ought to force him to yield his life. After all, although we are killing one, we are saving three.
There are limits on what others can do to us without our voluntary consent. Although the general good may be served by our discomfort and death, our lives have a certain value that allows us not to sacrifice ourselves to this end. Cases vary, of course, but to deny animal liberationists the use, in general, of non-utilitarian considerations will also impoverish our moral interactions among humans.
EVEN IF PEOPLE DON’T ACCEPT ANIMAL LIBERATION OUR DEMAND IS NECESSARY TO END EXPLOITATION
Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed. Robert Garner, p. 7
Whether or not these people, as individuals, would all agree that they are launching a liberation movement for animals, the book as a whole amounts to no less. It is a demand for a complete change in our attitudes to nonhumans. It is a demand that we cease to regard the exploitation of other species as natural and inevitable, and that instead, we see it as a continuing moral outrage. Patrick Corbett, Professor of Philosophy at Sussex University, captures the spirit of the book in his closing words:
“…we require now to extend the great principles of liberty, equality and fraternity over the lives of animals. Let animal slavery join human slavery in the graveyard of the past.”
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