Planet Debate 2011 September/October l-d release Animal Rights
AT: “Animal Rights Threatens Interests of Humans”
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- AT: “Animal Rights Threatens Interests of Humans”
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AT: “Animal Rights Threatens Interests of Humans”MOST CONFLICTS BETWEEN HUMAN AND ANIMAL INTERESTS ARE CONSTRUCTED AND INVOLVE TRIVIAL HUMAN INTERESTS Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 132-3 Because animals are property, we treat every issue concerning their use or treatment as though it presented a genuine conflict of interests, and invariably we choose the human interest over the animal interest even when animal suffering can be justified only by human convenience, amusement, or pleasure. In the overwhelming number of instances in which we evaluate our moral obligations to animals, however, there is no true conflict. When we contemplate whether to eat a hamburger, buy a fur coat, or attend a rodeo, we do not confront any sort of conflict worthy of serious moral consideration. If we take animal interests seriously, we must desist from manufacturing such conflicts, which can only be construed in the first place by ignoring the principle of equal consideration and by making an arbitrary decision to use animals in ways in which we rightly decline to use any human. CHOOSING A HUMAN OVER A NON-HUMAN ANIMAL IN A TRUE EMERGENCY SITUATION DOES NOT JUSTIFY TREATING THEM AS PROPERTY Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 133 There may, of course be situations in which we are confronted with a true emergency, such as the burning house that contains an animal and a human, where we have time to save only one. Such emergency situations require what are, in the end, decisions that are arbitrary and not amenable to satisfying general principles of conduct. Yet even if we would always choose to save the human over the animal in such situations, it does not follow that animals are merely resources that we may use for our purposes. We would draw no such conclusion when making a choice between two humans. Imagine that two humans are in the burning house. One is a young child; the other is an old adult, who, barring the present conflagration, will soon die of natural causes anyway. If we decide to save the child for the simple reason that she has not yet lived her life, we would not conclude that it is morally acceptable to enslave old people, or to use them for target practice. Similarly, assume that a wild animal is just about to attack a friend. Our choice to kill the animal in order the save friend’s life does not mean that it is morally acceptable to kill animals for food, any more than our moral justification in killing a deranged human about to kill our friend would serve to justify our using deranged humans as forced organ donors. ANIMAL RIGHTS DON’T PRECLUDE SELF-DEFENSE AND PROTECTIVE ACTIONS Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 125 Except that humans shouldn’t interfere with predator-prey relationships among free-living nonhumans, I also think we’re morally entitled to kill someone (as always, human or nonhuman) who directly, immediately threatens our life or that of another. I’ve been asked, “If a lion attacked your child or our dog, wouldn’t you wish that you could intervene?” I would intervene. I’d do everything in my power to defend my (hypothetical) child or dog. If necessary, I’d kill the lion. But I’d just as readily kill a human attacker.
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 133-4 In sum, if we take animal interests seriously, we are not obliged to regard animals as the same as humans for all purposes any more than we regard all humans as being the same for all purposes; nor do we have to accord to animals all or most of the rights that we accord to humans. We may still choose the human over the animal in cases of genuine conflict—when it is truly necessary to do so – but that does not mean that we are justified in treating animals as resources for human use. And if the treatment of animals as resources cannot be justified, then we should abolish the institutionalized exploitation of animals. We should care for domestic animals presently alive, but we should bring no more into existence. The abolition of animal exploitation could not, as a realistic matter, be imposed legally unless and until a significant portion of us took animal interests seriously. Our moral compass will not find animals while they are lying on our plates. In other words, we have to put our vegetables where our mouths are and start acting on the moral principles that we profess to accept.
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line: science and the case for animal rights, p. 8 Based on the present state of scientific knowledge about the minds of these animals, I will argue that the case for legal rights for some of them is overwhelming; for others, currently not. But each determination will be saturated in the highest legal values and principles, free of the pervasive legal bias against nonhuman animals, and deeply anchored in scientific fact. To deny the most deserving amongst nonhuman animals basic rights is arbitrary, biased, and therefore unjust. It undermines, and finally destroys, every rationale for basic human rights as well. And states without justice, wrote St. Augustine, are nothing but robber bands.
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 17 Making sentience the sole criterion for legal rights not only would protect nonhumans; it also would affirm the rights of the most vulnerable humans. If mallards and butterflies had legal rights, the rights of autistic and senile humans would be more, not less, secure. Opponents often claim that nonhuman rights would diminish human rights. To the contrary, laws that protect the most vulnerable beings protect us all. ENSLAVEMENT OF ANIMALS SET THE STAGE FOR ENSLAVEMENT OF PEOPLE David Nibert, Professor of sociology, Wittenburg University, 2002, Animal Rights/Human Rights: entanglement of oppression and liberation, p. 198-9 Writing about this process, and providing yet another insight into the entanglements of the oppression of humans and other animals, Elizabeth Fisher notes:
Steven M. Wise, animal rights attorney and law professor, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 542-3 Courts recognize human dignity-rights in the complete absence of autonomy only by using an arbitrary legal fiction that controverts the empirical evidence that no such autonomy exists. Conversely, courts refuse to recognize dignity-rights of the great apes only by using a second arbitrary legal fiction in the teeth of empirical evidence that they possess it. But legal fictions can only be justified when they harmonize with, or least do not undermine, the overarching values and principles of a legal system. Thus the legal fiction that a human who actually lacks autonomy ha it is benign, for at worst it extends legal rights to those who might not need them. At best it protects the bodily integrity of the most helpless humans alive. But the legal fiction that great apes are not autonomous when they actually are undermines every important principle and value of Western justice: liberty, equality, fairness, and reasoned judicial decision making. It is pernicious. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 1.43 Mb. Share with your friends:
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