Impacts
Meade and Molander, 2006 (Charles, senior physical scientist at the RAND Corporation, and Roger C., Ph.D. in engineering science and nuclear engineering, University of California, Berkeley; B.S. in mechanical engineering, University of Wisconsin, “Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack”, RAND.org, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR391.pdf, SZ)
Within the first 72 hours, the attack would devastate a vast portion of the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Because ground-burst explosions generate particularly large amounts of highly radioactive debris, fallout from the blast would cause much of the destruction. In some of the most dramatic possible outcomes: Sixty thousand people might die instantly from the blast itself or quickly thereafter from radiation poisoning. One-hundred-fifty thousand more might be exposed to hazardous levels of radioactive water and sediment from the port, requiring emergency medical treatment. The blast and subsequent fires might completely destroy the entire infrastructure and all ships in the Port of Long Beach and the adjoining Port of Los Angeles. Six million people might try to evacuate the Los Angeles region. Two to three million people might need relocation because fallout will have contaminated a 500-km2 area. Gasoline supplies might run critically short across the entire region because of the loss of Long Beach’s refineries—responsible for one-third of the gas west of the Rockies.
Econ downturn after attack
Meade and Molander, 2006 (Charles, senior physical scientist at the RAND Corporation, and Roger C., Ph.D. in engineering science and nuclear engineering, University of California, Berkeley; B.S. in mechanical engineering, University of Wisconsin, “Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack”, RAND.org, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR391.pdf, SZ)
The early costs of the Long Beach scenario could exceed $1 trillion, driven by outlay for medical care, insurance claims, workers’ compensation, evacuation, and construction. The $50 billion to $100 billion for 9/11 puts this figure into perspective. In general, consequences would far outstrip the resources available to cope with them. In addition, over time, the economic effects of the catastrophe are likely to spread far beyond the initial attack, reaching a national and even international scale. Decisionmakers would face two particularly difficult challenges: keeping the global shipping supply chain operating and restoring orderly economic relationships.
Funding is needed to get rid of the terrorist threat
Rugy 05
(Veronique de, Senior Research Fellow at George Mason University, Is Port Security Spending Make Us Safer?, American Enterprise Institute, 9-7-2005, http://cip.management.dal.ca/publications/Is%20Port%20Security%20Spending%20Making%20Us%20Safer.pdf ME)
Many terrorism experts believe that maritime container shipping may be an ideal platform to deliver weapons of mass destruction to the United States. If they are correct, intelligence and port security directed at keeping bad things from happening in our ports, along with nuclear detection, should be DHS’s priorities within port security spending. Unfortunately, they are not. Through FY2005, Congress has provided over $650 million in direct grants to ports to improve their physical and operational security and roughly $1.2 billion to nuclear nonproliferation programs, of which only a small portion is directed to protect stockpiles of fissile materials. 120 More worrisome, much of the money spent on ports goes to projects that should be receiving lower priority. For instance, a large portion of our port security dollars goes to nuclear detection on site, mainly through the implementation and use of radiation portal monitors. Not only has the effectiveness of the monitors often been challenged by experts, but direct detection on site is also by far the least cost effective measure to protect us against the admission of WMD materials into the country. To protect us against WMD attacks in our ports or in our cities, it would be more cost effective to concentrate our resources in foreign ports and in protecting stockpiles of fissile material. Furthermore, a significant portion of the port security money goes to projects whose contribution to maritime security is unclear. By way of this allocation, many private concerns are using taxpayer funds to secure infrastructure that they should be 31 securing themselves. Federal dollars should not be used to subsidize ports around the nation. Instead, Congress and the President should ensure that our intelligence community is effectively engaged in the investigation, interdiction, and elimination of terrorist threats in our ports. In addition, because the Coast Guard supports many missions aimed at keeping terrorists out of our ports, Congress and the President should make sure that its modernization and recapitalization program is appropriately funded.
A terrorist attack on a US port would collapse the economy.
Flynn, 6 (Stephen, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Chair in National Security Studies at the Council on foreign Relations, “The Continued Vulnerability of the Global Maritime Transportation system,” Testimony before a hearing of the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, US House of Representatives, March 9, http://www.cfr.org/port-security/continued-vulnerability-global-maritime-transportation-system/p10074)
But the most serious consequence of a major terrorist attack on America’s waterfront is if it involved a weapon of mass destruction smuggled into one of the over nine million 40’ cargo containers that entered US seaports in 2005. The September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, the March 11, 2004 attacks on Madrid, and the July 7, 2005 attacks on London highlight that transport systems have become among the most favored targets for terrorist organizations. Cargo containers have long been exploited to smuggle narcotics, migrants, and stolen property including luxury automobiles. Their vulnerability is highlighted by the billions of dollars in cargo losses derived from theft each year. A typical cargo container that is shipped from Asia will pass through over a dozen transportation waypoints before it is loaded on a ship destined for the United States. Most are “secured” only with a fifty-cent lead seal passed through the pad-eyes on the container doors. It is just a question of time before terrorists with potentially more destructive weapons breach the superficial security measures that have been put in place to protect the ports, the ships, and the millions of intermodal containers that link global producers to consumers. Should that breach involve a “dirty bomb,” the United States and other states will likely raise the port security alert system to its highest level while investigators sort out what happened and establish whether or not a follow-on attack is likely. Multiple port closures in the United States and elsewhere would quickly throw this system into chaos. Container ships already destined for the United States would be stuck in anchorages unable to unload their cargo. Ships would be delayed in overseas loading ports as the maritime industry and their customers try to sort out how to redirect cargo. Marine terminals would have to close their gates to all incoming containers since they would have no place to store them. Trucks and trains would be stuck outside the terminal with no place to go. If they are carrying perishable goods, the cargo would perish. Also, the trucks and trains would not be able to re-circulate to pick up new shipments until they could get rid of the old ones. Goods for export would pile at factory loading docks with no place to go. Imports to support “just-in-time” deliveries would be no shows and soon factories would be idled and retailers’ shelves would go bare. In short, a catastrophic terrorist event involving the intermodal transportation system could well lead to unprecedented disruption to the global trade system. In economic terms, the costs associated with managing the attack’s aftermath will substantially dwarf the actual destruction from the terrorist event itself. Those costs will be borne internationally which is why transportation and trade security must be not only a U.S. Homeland Security priority, but an urgent global priority.
Share with your friends: |