Posted: 17-08-2009 by: Thomas Ruttig

Nevertheless, Fazal Saeed Haqqani’s rebellion against the TTP has immensely strengthened the Haqqani Network while weakening the TTP. According to one report, TTP commander Hakimullah Mehsud has become more and more isolated over the last year (Express Tribune [Karachi], July 5). On June 27, Hakimullah suffered a setback when unknown persons killed Shakirullah Shakir, a spokesman for the Fidayeen-e-Islam [suicide-bombing] wing of the TTP. Shakirullah was to replace Qari Hussain Mehsud, who was killed in an October 2010 drone strike and was known as Ustad-e-Fidayeen (master [or teacher] of the suicide bombers) (Daily Times [Lahore] June 28). Commander Tariq Afridi’s Taliban group in Darra Adamkhel and Khalid Omar’s Mohmand group are already operating independently of the TTP. Lashkar-e-Islam in Khyber Agency, led by Mangal Bagh, is pro-Army and does not accept TTP patronage. The TTP breakup is a great success for Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which has been working for some months to deliver Kurram Agency to the Haqqani Network so that it could operate more freely in view of the emerging regional scenario (see Terrorism Monitor, December 16, 2010). Distrust among the TTP militants seems to be growing. According to another report, Hakimullah Mehsud and his deputy Waliur Rehman rarely meet; when they do, they do not meet alone and only after making sure neither of them is carrying arms (Dawn, July 5).

Fazal Saeed rebelled against the TTP on the eve of the military operation that started on July 3. Army troops moved into the central Kurram agency from the town of Sadda and Tal area in Hangu District, backed by helicopters, tanks, and artillery. The aim of the operation was to destroy the militants still loyal to Hakimullah Mehsud (The News, July 4). Although this military operation was ostensibly initiated against the militants, Shi’a Muslim residents believe it is equally directed against them. A knowledgeable Pakistani columnist, Dr. Mohammad Taqi, says that the operation is aimed at opening the Thall-Parachinar road for the Haqqani Network and other pro-Army jihadi groups (Daily Times, July 7). More importantly, it is aimed at punishing those people in the Kurram Agency who have resisted the Haqqani Network and the Pakistan Army’s support for the Taliban. The balance of power has shifted in favor of the Haqqani Network for the first time with Fazal Saeed Haqqani openly on their side. Although several local Shi’a leaders in Upper Kurram vow to fight back, it is safe to say that they are losing the battle, at least for now. [3]

Notes:

www.frc.com.pk/linkc/articlecont/41.

2. For the strategic importance of this road for the Pakistan army and the Haqqani Network, see Dr. Mohammad Taqi, “Comment: The Sham operation in Kurram,” Daily Times, Lahore, July 7. Available at www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp.

3. Telephone interviews with some local leaders through research assistant, July 2011.

Pakistan’s Military Urges Tribal Uprising against Militants in North Waziristan

Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 34

September 9, 2011 12:49 PM Age: 37 days

By: Zia Ur Rehman

While U.S. pressure on Pakistan for a full-scale operation against the Haqqani Network and other militant groups in the North Waziristan Agency is growing, the Pakistani military is urging the local Wazir and Dawar tribes of the North Waziristan to initiate a “Wana-like uprising” to expel foreign militants from their area and minimize the chance of the government taking military action should the situation grow worse (Daily Times [Lahore] August 18).

With the help of militants led by South Waziristan’s Maulvi Nazir, the Ahmadzai Wazir tribes of South Waziristan successfully flushed out Uzbek militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) from Wana and other Wazir-dominated areas of South Waziristan in a spring 2007 popular uprising sparked by the brutality of the Uzbeks. [1] Many of the Uzbek militants who arrived in the area when their bases in Afghanistan were closed in late 2001 relocated to North Waziristan after their eviction from South Waziristan.

Elders of the Ahmadzai Wazir tribes said that they would not allow fleeing Uzbeks and militants of the Mahsud tribe in their areas who might attempt to sneak in from North Waziristan if the military goes on the offensive against the Haqqani Network and other local militant groups (Daily Times, June 1).

Located between the Khost Province of eastern Afghanistan and the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province of northwest Pakistan, North Waziristan is the second largest tribal region of Pakistan’s Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). It is considered today to be the epicenter not only of violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also a major source of international terrorism. Along with its geographic isolation, difficult terrain, and relatively stable coalition of tribal militants, the region has become the most important center of militancy in FATA because of the impunity with which militants in the area have operated. [2]

The most important militant group operating in the region is the Haqqani Network, an Afghan insurgent group led by Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani. Haqqani left his native Khost province and settled in North Waziristan as an exile during the republican Afghan government of Sardar Mohammed Daoud Khan in the early 1970s. His son Sirajuddin, who became a key insurgent leader in Afghanistan in mid 1980s, manages the network’s organization from the North Waziristan and carries out attacks on U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan (see Terrorism Monitor, March 24, 2008; August 4). [3]

The second most important North Waziristan-based militant group is led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a key militant leader known for hosting foreign fighters belonging to al-Qaeda and other Arab groups as well as the Haqqani Network (see Terrorism Monitor, April 10, 2009). Bahadur was announced as Naib Amir (deputy head) under the leadership of Baitullah Mahsud upon the formation of the 2007 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella organization of various militant groups operating in FATA (The News [Islamabad], December 15, 2007). However, Bahadur later formed an anti-TTP bloc by joining hands with Maulvi Nazir’s South Waziristan-based group because of tribal rivalries with the Mahsuds and disagreements over TTP attacks against Pakistan security forces, stating that the bloc had been formed to defend the Wazir tribes in North Waziristan and South Waziristan (Daily Times, July 2, 2008). Bahadur and Nazir belong to the Utmanzai and Ahmadzai sub-clans of the Wazir, respectively. [4] The Haqqani Network and Bahadur are considered “good Taliban” by the Pakistan military authorities as they don’t carry out attacks inside Pakistan and focus only on Afghanistan.

The United States considers the role of the Haqqani Network and other militant groups in North Waziristan in the insurgency in Afghanistan to be among the most difficult challenges NATO faces. Due to intense American pressure, the Pakistani military is thinking of carrying out a limited operation in North Waziristan primarily targeting al-Qaeda, foreign militants and the TTP rather than the Haqqani Network (Dawn [Karachi] June 1). Because of the reluctance of Pakistan authorities to act in the region, U.S. drones have targeted the Mir Ali, Dattakhel and Miramshah areas of North Waziristan extensively, with five out of six drone strikes in Pakistan now being recorded in North Waziristan. [6]

Though members of militant groups in tribal areas have almost the same anti-U.S. and pro-al-Qaeda worldview, they are not especially disciplined when it comes to tribal matters. Pakistan’s military is trying to exploit the tribal nature of Taliban militant groups operating in North Waziristan and South Waziristan. This characteristic has become apparent many times, especially when Bahadur-led militants warned the Mahsud-led Taliban in neighboring South Waziristan not to launch attacks against the Pakistan security forces and formed an anti-TTP coalition based on tribal rivalries with the Mahsuds. [8] Pakistan military officers in the region are encouraging the tribes of North Waziristan to follow the example of the Ahemdzai Wazir tribes and have announced their support of such actions. However, the situation is quite different from South Waziristan, where local Ahmadzai tribes stood united behind Maulvi Nazir. The North Waziristan situation is complicated by a lack of tribal unity. An offer of money from al-Qaeda or other sources can obstruct such uprisings in North Waziristan. As there is no consensus yet for the launch of a united front against the foreign militants as well as the TTP’s Mahsud militants, the Pakistani military is likely to assign the mission of uniting the Utmanzai Wazir and Dawar tribes to Bahadur (Daily Times, August 18).

A tribal uprising against foreign militants in North Waziristan at the behest of the Pakistani military will not only help in flushing out the foreign militants from the territory but will also maximize the disunity among the militants and put pressure on the Mahsud militants of the TTP. However, the Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda will obviously try to obstruct the government’s plan to incite tribal rebellion against foreign militants.

Notes:

2. Telephone interview with Ahmed Wali, a senior journalist and researcher, August 28, 2011.

3. Telephone interview with Bannu-based journalists who wished not to be named, August 26, 2011.

4. Telephone interview with an elder of the Utmanzai sub-tribe, August 26, 2011.

5. Telephone interview with Bannu-based journalists, August 26, 2011.

6. Telephone interview with Abdullah Khan, director of Conflict Monitoring Center, Islamabad, August 22, 2011.

7. Telephone interview with an elder of Utmanzai sub-tribe, August 26, 2011.

8. Telephone interview with Bannu-based journalists, August 26, 2011.

The Significance of Fazal Saeed’s Defection from the Pakistani Taliban

Jul 01, 2011

Daud Khattak

At the end of June 2011, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)[1] experienced a major blow when senior commander Fazal Saeed Zaimusht defected from the group and formed his own organization, Tehrik-i-Taliban Islami Pakistan (TTIP).[2] Fazal Saeed revolted against the TTP leadership less than two months after the killing of Usama bin Ladin, marking the first split in the TTP since its formation in 2007. The rift is widely perceived as part of an effort by the Pakistani security establishment and the Haqqani network to court an important faction of the TTP: Fazal Saeed’s militia in Kurram Agency. Although the split may weaken the TTP, many analysts believe that it will strengthen the Haqqani network and the militant factions that are focused solely on fighting in Afghanistan—activities in which the Pakistani security establishment appears to have some involvement.

This article explains the importance of Fazal Saeed, and places his defection from the TTP in context with the interests of both the Haqqani network and the Pakistani security establishment.

The Role of Fazal Saeed

Fazal Saeed, 39-years-old, is from Uchat village in Central Kurram district.[3] He enjoys the support of hundreds of local tribesmen in Kurram Agency, which is located in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the border with Afghanistan. Saeed joined the TTP when it was founded by Baitullah Mehsud in 2007.[4] Since then, he played an active role in the TTP on various levels, but he has been the group’s primary asset in Kurram.[5] He opposes Pakistan’s alliance with the United States, but is equally against attacks inside Pakistan. He supports fighting against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and shows allegiance to Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar.

Saeed’s support in Kurram extends beyond his involvement with the Taliban. Kurram is geographically separated between Sunni and Shi`a Muslims, and there have been historic hostilities between the two sects in Kurram. Tribesmen in Kurram rallied behind Saeed to create a united militia against rival Shi`a militias. The ongoing conflict between Sunni and Shi`a has displaced thousands of families from Upper and Lower Kurram. Leaders of both sides finally negotiated, and they signed the Murree Agreement in November 2008.[6] As part of the agreement, both sides agreed that the Pakistani government should remove armed outsiders and conduct an operation against militant forces in the agency. The agreement, however, was never implemented, exacerbating the conflict.

Although the Peshawar-Tal-Parachinar roadway—a key route that Shi`a in Upper Kurram use to travel—was opened in February 2011 after more than three years of closure, the first violation of the peace agreement came on March 5 when militants killed four Shi`a traveling on the road. On March 13, armed militants killed 11 passengers in the Mamo Khwar area of Tal tehsil. On March 25, armed men attacked a convoy of passengers, killing 13 and abducting more than 25 Shi`a in Bhaggan village. These violations crippled the peace agreement only weeks after it went into effect.[9]

The violations are reportedly one reason why Fazal Saeed separated from the TTP. According to sources in the region, Fazal Saeed believed that the TTP had no interest in supporting the Sunni-Shi`a peace agreement in Kurram—a position to which he disagreed.[10] When explaining his reasons behind leaving the TTP, he said, “We abhor killing innocent people through suicide attacks and bomb blasts, attacks on our own army and destruction of social infrastructure.”[11] Fazal Saeed also apparently no longer wanted to pay the TTP a percentage of the funds he earns from imposing taxes on Kurram traders.

Saeed’s defection should have a positive effect for stability in Kurram, an outcome wanted by both the Haqqani network and the Pakistani security establishment. The Haqqani network seeks stability in Kurram so that it can increase its presence in the tribal agency. Kurram is viewed as a strategic territory for executing attacks inside Afghanistan. In addition to bordering Afghanistan, it also borders Pakistan’s North Waziristan Agency, Orakzai Agency, Khyber Agency, and Hangu District. Due to its location, it is considered coveted territory for militants in Waziristan to cross into Afghanistan to conduct attacks against U.S. and NATO troops. By providing the Shi`a with peace and stability in Kurram, the Haqqani network and other Afghanistan-focused militants will expect the Shi`a to allow Sunni militants to traverse their territory in Upper Kurram to access the agency’s northern border with Afghanistan.

The Role of the Pakistani State

The Pakistani security establishment has played an important role in developments in Kurram as well. Elements in Pakistan’s security establishment largely distinguish militants operating in the country between so-called “good Taliban” and “bad Taliban.” The “good Taliban” are those fighters solely focused on attacking targets in neighboring Afghanistan. These militants use Pakistan as a safe haven where they are largely free from attacks by U.S. and NATO forces—although they remain the target of repeated drone strikes. Moreover, there are allegations by Western governments, journalists, and analysts that Pakistan’s security establishment provides some support to these fighters to maintain political influence in Afghanistan. The best example of the so-called “good Taliban” is the Haqqani network.

The “bad Taliban,” on the other hand, are those fighters that see the Pakistani state as an enemy, and regularly target Pakistani forces and interests. These fighters may be involved in executing attacks in Afghanistan, but they also seek to destabilize the Pakistani government due to its counterterrorism support to the United States, among other motives. The best example of the “bad Taliban” are those fighters associated with the TTP.

As evidence of this strategy, Pakistan recently launched a counterterrorism operation in Kurram Agency. Yet the operation has not targeted Fazal Saeed or his militia in Kurram. Additionally, many Pakistani analysts believe that one of the motives behind the Kurram operation is to help provide cover to Haqqani assets. As stated by Mohammad Taqi in the Daily Times,

A number of displaced families who are living in the newly-established IDP camp in New Durrani area of Sadda town complained that the same militants who used to terrorize them are now living with them inside the camp.[14] “The terrorists who used to impose taxes on us are living among us in the camp and getting more facilities than us,” said one of the IDPs.[15] Moreover, due to the IDPs, it would be difficult for the United States to avoid collateral damage if it were to escalate drone strikes over Kurram.

Conclusion

Fazal Saeed’s declaration on June 27 of establishing the TTIP is a serious blow to the TTP. The rift could encourage rebellion among other TTP factions.[16] This becomes especially relevant considering that Hakimullah Mehsud has not been seen on the ground or in the media during the past several months. Therefore, while Saeed’s decision may increase stability in Pakistan, it could have the opposite effect in Afghanistan. Stability in Kurram may allow the Haqqani network and other Afghanistan-focused fighters more territory to recruit and train, as well as provide them with more territory to access Afghanistan. It will also make it more difficult to convince the Pakistani security establishment to focus its resources on defeating militias that have no interest in attacking Pakistani interests—but only targets in neighboring Afghanistan.