Posted: 17-08-2009 by: Thomas Ruttig

After the 1990s civil war, Haqqani threw in his lot with the Taliban and their Saudi Arabian guest - bin Laden. He went from being Washington's well-funded mujahideen darling to sworn enemy.

Haqqani, one of the most powerful American-backed mujahideen warlords against the Soviets, was undefeated in the subsequent mujahideen civil war. With the mid-1990s emergence of the Taliban, he signed up with the fundamentalists, reportedly making available his plentiful stocks of US-supplied Stinger missiles. His reward was to be the first non-Talib in the Kabul ministry and later commander of Taliban forces and governor of Paktia. There, he formed a personal and organisational bond with bin Laden, who had his al-Qaeda training camps near Khost.

Shortly after the Taliban fell, Haqqani was courted by the US and Kabul. He was reportedly offered the post of Karzai's prime minister. Later his brother Ibrahim and son Ishaq were arrested and used unsuccessfully as bargaining chips to turn Haqqani. Haqqani told reporters in Islamabad late in 2001: "We will retreat to the mountains and begin a long guerrilla war to reclaim our pure land from infidels and free our country like we did against the Soviets … We'll deal with [the Americans] in our own way."

Haqqani is believed to be a member of the Taliban leadership council and to have embraced the fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Omar as his spiritual leader. But Haqqani operates his own command, a semi-independent warlord with autonomy from the Taliban.

"Haqqani's strength is intimidation," says the analyst Ruttig. "He is ruthless, so he intimidates people."

Colonel Campbell is disarmingly frank about his circumstances. With 19 years of conventional military service behind him, he is also a model spokesman for Washington as American forces in Afghanistan attempt to switch to the counterinsurgency objective of protecting people and growing communities, instead of relentlessly pursuing the enemy in the gaps between communities. "What I have changed in the lives of the people will be the indicator of my success,'' says Campbell. "Beating my chest on rounds fired and enemy kills is one thing … I can kill 150 fighters, but next year another 150 will come over the mountains. What I have to do is create an environment in which they can't come back."

While remaining ''on the offensive'' and looking for the enemy, ''we look for sources of discontent that can be exploited by the Taliban and we try to fix them. We have to be the anchor that pulls the people towards the Kabul government. If they are afraid, we have to separate them physically and psychologically. The people are the centre of gravity."

As the Afghanistan crisis enters its ninth year, there is a growing sense that the number of Americans in central Asia is insufficient, and that the ''more'' that Barack Obama might provide won't be sufficient enough to make a real difference.

"The first eight years have been wasted," says Thomas Ruttig. "And it is very difficult to answer what do we do now. We've been talking up a rosy picture for the last five years - and now we have awakened to a nightmare."

Insurgency leaders are wont to claim time is on their side; that the Americans will be ground down and will leave. But at COP Dyesai, Sergeant Brent Koegler has seized the sentiment as his own. "We can wait out the Taliban … we just have to keep doing what we are doing."

Koegler seems to embrace the local inshallah principle of deferring to a higher authority - God willing, things will happen. His boss, Neal Erickson, doesn't buy it. "I hope it's not inshallah," he says. ''Inshallah is nice - but it doesn't get shit done."

2010 Elections 4: Gardez déjà vu

posted: 17-09-2010 by: Thomas Ruttig

In 2009, author Thomas Ruttig witnessed the presidential elections – and some of its irregularities - in Gardez, the provincial capital of Paktia in South-Eastern Afghanistan and tried to get a remote-view idea about what happened around it. So, it made sense to go here for the parliamentary elections, too, to check see what has changed and what not. Some first impressions from the dusty town a not-possible-any-more three hours’ drive south-southeast of Kabul and Paktia province.

All in all, everything in Gardez looks relaxed – if it weren’t for the first bullet-proof vested soldiers and policemen that took up vigilance in the bazaar on Wednesday. But that was practically (although not officially) the first day after Eid and everyone came out of the holidays extremely slowly, probably a bit late to prevent insurgents with suicide vests from infiltrating the town - about which the whole world here is concerned but practically easy-going. Although the insurgency has steadily increased since summer of 2009, reflecting the ineffectiveness of military countermeasures, over Eid the number of incidents went down. It looks as if Paktia’s local insurgents – Mansur’s Taleban in the West, Haqqani’s Taleban in the central parts and Hezb-e Islami in the northeast - also have been busy visiting families.

Few incidents were reported: nightletters, Taleban showing up in mosques just outside Gardez, in Seyyed Karam and Ahmadabad districts, warning everyone against participating, or setting up ‘check posts’. Even the areas just outside town that were still accessible last year, are not recommended for visits: the stretch of road between Gardez’ northern limits and the Tera pass, barely a 20-minutes’ drive away, which had a Elysian polling centre last year with no voters all day except the young staff; Chawni where the Taleban staged a ‘search operation’ a few days ago or Bala Deh on the road to Khost. The biggest incident today was reported from neighbouring Ghazni, a bazooka shot taken at the helicopter of the incoming IEC District Field Coordinator in Rashidan district which did not hit him fortunately.

The question is: Is this the lull before the storm on E-Day or will there be more rumours than actual violence, like in 2009? No one is really in the mood to find out personally, so everybody - Afghans and foreign security people - recommend to take it easy on E-Day morning and wait for incoming reports. That’s also what most Paktiawals did last year; the turnout started very sleepily in the morning. Some Afghan interlocutors also express their belief that the rumours might be spread by non-Taleban to prevent even a superficial observation.

In any case, the convoys with elections material went out heavily escorted by ANP, border police and other Afghan forces in Humvees, armed with machine guns and bundles of PRGs, this morning. On E-Day, private car traffic will be prohibited like last year (we still have to get a permit.)

When it comes to the election, the dominant reaction by Afghans not directly participating in its organisation is a lack of interest. So, many here in Gardez won’t bother to vote and Afghan observers believe that the turn-out will be even lower than 2009. But there is also concern about the democratic quality of the election. As one Afghan interlocutor states:

‘There are not the candidates running that should be running. There are warlords, commanders, some who have killed a lot of people. There is even one who fired rockets into town who now puts up his photos all over town and is a candidate.’

(I am not sure whom he is talking about because there are two who are accused of this; one was brought to Guantanamo, the other was elected in 2005.)

Another Afghan interlocutor says:

‘The people even don’t trust their candidates of their own area.’

And a third one adds, pointing at a poster of a candidate that had run in another province in 2005:

‘He did not do anything for his people in the past five years. That’s why he tries it here now.’

Also one candidate sounds sceptical about the quality of elections:

‘These are not the kind of elections we wanted. They are just a formality.’

And another one, linked to an Islamist party, makes the tribal system responsible for ‘the blockade of democracy’ because there is ‘no independence of the vote’ and that people ‘doubt that their vote remains secret’. He demands that education is made the priority in the coming years so that ‘after two, three more elections, the spirit of democracy starts to influence the young ones of today’. Finally, somewhat surprisingly, he states that:

‘There should be no weapons.’

Although naturally none of the candidates admits it one gets the feeling that counter measures are prepared by some. Why should they lose while being honest while the cheaters get the prize? That is likely to lead to more although smaller scale fraud instead then less than last year – just to be on the safe side. I have been shown a few examples of the false documents in the local FEFA office and the officials there say that they cannot easily be distinguished from the real ones, in particular when laminated.

The election institutions, meanwhile, give an ambivalent picture. The IEC and Provincial ECC staff present themselves as alert and able. The ECC, however, resides in a compound in the side street of a side street not known to many people – where it had moved to just three weeks ago from the AIHRC office which provided it with shelter. (According to the ECC executive director, the candidates have rented all available space.) Maybe therefore they only received 24 complaints yet – 12 of which they said they have processed. Most came from candidates, they say, some from voters and two from the provincial administration – about posters posted at wrong places. Apparently, also former provincial police chief Hai Gul Suleimankhel’s disqualification as a candidate for still holding a police officer’s post was caused by a leak in the welayat. He is a former Khalqi and many pro-mujahedin people dislike him.

The IEC seems to be technically and organisationally stronger than last year – confirming a trend in the whole country. But that is relative, as even regional chief Najibullah Ahmadzai admits. ‘There is no law and order in the region’, he says, ‘so there will be fraud – this is 100 per cent sure.’ And he points to the drastically reduced number of polling stations himself (Paktia down from 207 to 127; Khost 175/104; Paktika 265/190; Ghazni 379/272; this is not fully compensated by an increase of polling stations). On a whiteboard outside his office it is written that ‘1,288,800 people can use their right to vote in this region’(**). This also means, on the basis of IEC-estimated 2.4 million voters (or voter cards distributed, who knows), that half of the people remain deprived of this right, mainly in areas outside the immediate population centres.

Ahmadzai insists that the ANSF are solely responsible for ‘the closure and opening’ of polling centres and that the IEC ‘has nothing to do with it’. This already seems to be part of the prophylactic blame-game, passing on responsibility for eventual glitches on E-Day and after from one to another. (In this vicious cycle, many of the expected complaints might get stuck.)

Another Afghan interlocutor summarises the dilemma facing the organisers: ‘From the point of security, the decrease in polling centres was justified in most cases. But we are concerned that it will influence the legitimacy of the elections.’ And he adds another big problem these elections will face:

‘We will not be able really find out what will happen in the districts.’

See the first of the author's 2009 Paktia blogs here and follow the serial numbers.

(*) Observer figures: FEFA has 100 observers for Paktia, including 3 women, which will travel to the centres of four districts close by or considered to be more stable. The AIHRC has 17 for the four Southeastern provinces, including 4 women. 30 (with some women) come from IRI for the three provinces of Loya Paktia, each with a car available – they must have excellent funding. The 7 ECC people also observe on E-Day. (These figures might still change.) NDI has an office in Khost and might cover Paktia etc from there. And there is one observer from AAN.

(**) This figure is the result of the following mathematical operation scribbled by the IEC regional head into my notebook: 2,184 polling stations to be opened x 600 ballot papers.

Splitting the Haqqanis with NATO Reconciliation Air?

posted: 01-11-2010 by: Thomas Ruttig

The initial big wave of reports about talks with the Taleban gathering speed and of a possible short-term ‘reconciliation’ have given way for a slower but steady trickle of spicy detail. A detail dropped here, some names there, mixed with half-denials like Richard Holbrooke’s ‘There is less than meets the eye' line keep the shurwa(*) boiling. The focus seems to be on the Haqqani network for the moment. AAN’s Senior Analyst Thomas Ruttig looks back at how the ‘talk about talks’ developed, what the prospects are and who is flying which ‘airline’ to the talks.

In late September, General David H. Petraeus’ remark that ‘[t]here are very high-level Taliban leaders who have sought to reach out to the highest levels of the Afghan government and, indeed, have done that’ struck like a bomb (Alissa J. Rubin, ‘Petraeus Says Taliban Have Reached Out to Karzai’, New York Times 28. September 2010, read this article here).

On 6 October, AP’s Kathy Gannon reported that ‘several Pakistanis and Afghans insist that CIA officials have held clandestine meetings with top Taliban leaders, some at the level of the Taliban's shadow Cabinet ministers. At least two rounds of meetings were held in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province bordering Afghanistan, according to a former Taliban member who spoke on condition of anonymity because of fears for his own safety. He said the talks were held in the area between the towns of Peshawar and Mardan and included Qudratullah Jamal, the former Taliban information minister.’ The report did not say when these talks had happened. (‘Taliban set preconditions for formal peace talks’, AP 6 October 2010, see it here).

A day later, the British Independent revealed referring to ‘diplomatic sources’ that ‘[s]ecret high-level negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban leadership aimed at ending the war have begun [...]. Meetings which included delegates of the Quetta Shura, the Taliban's Pakistan-based governing body which is overseen by Mullah Mohammed Omar, are believed to have taken place in Dubai. [...]. Talks have also taken place in Kabul with "indirect representatives" of the insurgency.’ (Kim Sengupta and Julius Cavendish, ‘Taliban’s high command in secret talks to end war in Afghanistan’,full article here).

On 10 October, the New York Times quoted an Afghan official ‘with knowledge of the talks’ that ‘[i]n at least one case, Taliban leaders crossed the border and boarded a NATO aircraft bound for Kabul […]. In other cases, NATO troops have secured roads to allow Taliban officials to reach Afghan- and NATO-controlled areas so they can take part in discussions. Most of the discussions have taken place outside of Kabul’ (Dexter Filkins, ‘Taliban Elite, Aided by NATO, Join Talks for Afghan Peace’, 19 October 2010, read article here). On 13 October, a NATO official confirmed that ‘personnel from NATO nations in Afghanistan “have indeed facilitated to various degrees the contacts” by allowing Taliban leaders to travel to the Afghan capital’ (Thom Shanker, David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, ‘U.S. Aids Taliban to Attend Talks on Making Peace’, New York Times, see this one here).

One day earlier, the Independent reported it had ‘learned that there are six sets of negotiations, some more viable then others, taking place with the aim of arriving at a cease-fire and paving the way for Western forces to pull out of the conflict’ (‘Nato launches major offensive to clear Taliban heartland’, read full piece here).