Increased Tensions & THADD Ineffective

Increased Tensions & THADD Ineffective

1. 
   Increased Tensions
   
2. 
   Alternatives
   

THAAD deployment may be the beginning of further militarization of the Korean peninsula, and could lead to broader instability in East Asia and a renewed confrontation between a US-South Korea alignment and a China-Russia-North Korea alignment, reminiscent of Cold War-era factions. China’s strong reaction against THAAD deployment sparked stronger nationalistic demands for nuclear armament within the Saenuri Party, South Korea’s conservative ruling party, highlighting THAAD’s risk of regional tension and greater militarization. The Saenuri Party argues that in order for South Korea to be independent of foreign powers for its protection, it has to establish a well-organized nationwide missile defense (MD) system. However, it is impossible for South Korea to immediately deploy an extensive missile defense system throughout its territory because of a lack of technology and available weapons. South Korea would have to buy more weapons from the United States, resulting in increased dependence on the United States for national defense. For China and Russia, which have openly expressed discomfort with the presence of the US military in nearby countries, an increased US military presence in South Korea could be the perfect reason to unite against the United States and South Korea. This not only would create acute tension between two separate alignments, but would also prevent South Korea from achieving peaceful reunification of the two Koreas under democratic rule.

When I read that South Korea has agreed to deploy the THAAD missile defense system, I was swept over with a profound sense of sadness. For all the misunderstandings that have emerged, many in the United States and Korean military have worked together over the years for a common purpose of establishing stability in the face of a perceived North Korean threat. But this time all logic and science has fallen out of the debate. In fact, it seems as if the decision to deploy was made at the highest level with minimal consultation with the wide range of experts on security who have harbored doubts about the effectiveness of missile defense. The project seems to be driven more by the potential for profit, and recalls the tragic consequences of the political machinations of multinational arms dealers one hundred years ago that drew the world into World War One. To start with, THAAD is an outdated technology whose ability to stop missiles is doubtful. To the degree that THAAD might work, it does so for missiles flying at high altitudes. North Korea does not need to send missiles at high altitudes to attack South Korea, if such an unlikely scenario unfolded. After all, if North Korea wanted to kill tens of thousands or more South Korean civilians, it does not need to use any missiles at all, but rather can use its substantial artillery units for which Seoul is fully within range. THAAD is entirely useless against artillery.

First, the most common, peaceful option in dealing with a nuclear threat is to persuade a nuclear–armed country to give up the development of nuclear weapons or already–developed nuclear weapons through diplomatic negotiations. The United States and the Soviet Union came to an agreement in their Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I and II in the 1970s, as well as agreeing on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) reduction in Europe in the 1980s and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (SART) in the 1990s. International society persuaded the Republic of South Africa to abandon the nuclear weapons it had developed in 1989. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany succeeded in striking a deal with Iran to reduce Iran’s potential capability of developing nuclear weapons in 2015. These diplomatic approaches can garner great international and domestic support.