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US-Japan relations Good- Japanese Defense



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US-Japan relations Good- Japanese Defense

Relations Key to Japanese Defense and stabilizing Asia

Narushige 10


[Narushige Michishita, National Institute of Defense Studies, “Conflicting Currents” 2010, Ed by Williamson Murray pp.138]
Japanese defense policy rests on the principle of "exclusively defensive defense {senshu boitei)," which forbids Japan from using punishment as a means of exercising deterrence and armed attacks against enemy territories as a means of self-defense. Deterrence and defense based on denial capabilities, therefore, are Japan's primary defense strategies. The BDFC contained two separate discus­sions as to how deterrence and defense would work with regard lo situations up to limited and small-scale aggression, and in situations larger than limited and small-scale aggression.32 First, with regard to the situations up to limited and small-scale aggression, the Basic Defense Force would provide effective defense capabilities, which by extension would generate deterrence by denial. In other words, the Basic Defense Force aimed at effectively deterring and defending against situations up to lim­ited and small-scale aggression. Second, with regard to the situations larger than limited and small-scale aggression, the BDFC contended that such situations were strongly deterred from arising by a combination of defense efforts and the international environment including: (a) the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance; (b) the expectation that the United States and the Soviet Union would try lo avoid large-scale armed conflict that could escalate into a nuclear war; (c) the expectation that the Sino-Sovict rift would not open to a successful resolution; (d) the expectation that the Sino-U.S. rapprochement would continue; (c) (he expectation that there would be no major armed conflict on the Korean peninsula.3'1 In other words, "general deterrence" or balance of power would prevent the situations larger than limited and small-scale aggression from arising.M In case one or more of these key factors ceased to exist, the BDFC would demand Japan expand and strengthen its defense capabilities. If deterrence still failed, the United States was expected to augment its defense forces in Japan. In short, the Basic Defense Force was to provide deterrence by denial to situa­tions up to limited and small-scale aggression, while it relied on general deter­rence and balance of power generated by the U.S.-Japan alliance and other international factors in addressing situations larger than limited and smalt-scale aggression. However, if the presumed environmental factors changed substan­tially, Japan would have to expand its defense force to fill the gap. There were three major situations under which the U.S.-Japan alliance would come into play within the BDFC framework. First, as mentioned above, the U.S.-Japan alliance was one of the five key factors upon which the BDFC rested. The U.S.-Japan alliance, together with four other factors, could prevent situations larger than limited and small-scale aggression from emerging. In other words, the U.S.-Japan alliance worked as a deterrent. Second, the U.S.-Japan alliance would help Japan deal with situations larger than limited and small-scale aggression, such as a full-scale invasion. On this point, the Defense of,Japan 1977 stated that the Basic Defense Force should be capable of resisting such an assault effectively until reinforcements from the United States arrived. In this case, the U.S.-Japan alliance would play a central role in defending Japan by providing effective defense capabilities. Finally, even in situations up to limited and small-scale aggression, the U.S. -Japan alliance would work to help Japan deal with an enemy's aggression. This is because the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty would be invoked when any attack against Japan took place. In this case, the U.S.-Japan alliance would provide a secondary but important support in defense of Japan." The BDFC has incorporated, intentionally or unintentionally, elements of international relations theories. Three characteristics stand out. First, the BDFC embraced a Hobbcsian view of international politics. The Defense of Japan 1992 asserted for the first time that the BDFC was "an idea that rather than directly countering military threat, Japan, as an independent state, must possess the minimum necessary basic defense force in order not to become a destabilizing factor in this region by creating a power vacuum," In other words, if Japan failed to develop sufficient military capabilities a power vacuum would develop, which external forces would, as a natural consequence, try to fill, destabilizing the region. This logic rested on a view of the world in which anarchy prevails, no authority above nation-states exists, and stales seek to maximize their power. The BDFC had more to do with realism than liberalism, which espouses peace as a result of interdependence, democracy, and liberal institutions. Second, as a logical consequence of the first point, the BDFC regarded the bal­ance of power as an important tool for keeping peace. For this reason, Japan had to play a role as a balancer by maintaining a "minimum necessary basic defense force." Japan, as one of the major powers in the current international system, was obliged to contribute to international alliance would play a central role in defending Japan by providing effective defense capabilities. Finally, even in situations up to limited and small-scale aggression, the U.S. -Japan alliance would work to help Japan deal with an enemy's aggression. This is because the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty would be invoked when any attack against Japan took place. In this case, the U.S.-Japan alliance would provide a secondary but important support in defense of Japan."


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