Legislation to implement what is commonly called PARMEC law was enacted in Togo in July 1995 (law no 95-014). Under the PARMEC law, only independent financial cooperatives, their regional unions and their networks federation can be granted a full-fledged license. Other MFIs are permitted to operate within the realms of rules defined by a convention-cadre signed with the Ministry of Finance for five years and renewable by mutual consent. The PARMEC law excludes groupements, i.e., small and informal microfinance organizations, from the application of the law, and provides for their voluntary formalization and registration called reconnaissance. However, this provision applies only to groups organized as credit and savings cooperatives.
Just like its equivalents in other WAMU countries, the microfinance supervision unit at the Ministry of Finance in Togo has been unable to take charge of all its prerogatives and to supervise all licensed and registered MFIs in the country effectively due to a lack of human, technical and material capacities. As a result, many licenses were delivered over the years without CAS-IMEC verifying applicants’ ability to perform the activities they were requesting a license for. CAS-IMEC which was created in June 1996 did not inspect any MFI applying for a license between 1996 and 2000.
In addition to off-site supervisions based on the examination of financial statements received from MFIs, CAS-IMEC is supposed to inspect all licensed MFIs once a year. During the year 2000, CAS-IMEC performed seven inspections, 14 in 2001, seven in 2002 and 2003 and 9 inspections 2004. These results indicate that in 2004, CAS-IMEC was able to inspect 6 percent of the 145 licensed retail MFIs. As part of its mission, CAS-IMEC can impose fines on MFIs that are late in complying with the submission of financial statements. However, only 25 percent of all required financial statements were submitted by licensed MFIs and no fine was applied, thus implying a lack of enforcement of the rules.
It is worth noting that, according to the PARMEC Law, CAS-IMEC can inspect licensed MFIs through their apex organizations for those organized in networks. However, since CAS-IMEC has delivered 145 licenses when it could have delivered only 25, it feel obliged to inspect all of them. The inability of CAS-IMEC to properly supervise the microfinance sector is, thus, not only due to a lack of human and financial resources but to internal organization as well. CAS-IMEC currently has a total of 11 staff members, of whom eight were responsible for on-site inspection of all licensed MFIs. Since its creation CAS-IMEC has relied on the donor community, mainly IFAD and BCEAO, to finance its activities. However, in the absence of any government budget support, these donor resources remain inadequate to provide proper coverage of CAS-IMEC material and equipment needs as well as personnel expenses.
To undertake a decent job of supervising the growing microfinance in Togo, CAS-IMEC estimates that, for the next five years (2007-2011), it will need a total of 33 staff members including 15 high-level staff and five support-staff. The total budget for the five-year strategic plan of CAS-IMEC is estimated at CFAF 3.3 billion (US$5.9 million) of which 28.6 percent representing CFAF 924 million (US$1.7 million) would be provided by the Government and the remaining 71.4 percent i.e. CFAF 2.3 billion or US$4.2 million would be financed by donors.
The reliance of CAS-IMEC on donors funding its activities is not a sustainable strategy, given its uncertainty. CAS-IMEC needs to reorganize itself to be a more efficient and cost effective organization. First, CAS-IMEC should only supervise licensed MFIs through their apex organizations and encourage smaller independent MFIs to form networks. Second, the supervision of larger MFIs such as FUCEC and four others should be assumed entirely by BCEAO at soon as possible as proposed by the regional monetary authorities.
At the end of December 2004, the postal system provided financial services to 9318 current account clients with an outstanding total amount of CFAF 3.3 billion and 4773 savings accounts with an amount outstanding of CFAF 560 million. Serving clients with an average of savings of CFAF 117,300 (about US$235) would qualify financial services rendered by the postal system as microfinance.
To leverage its microfinance services even more, on July 1, 2004, the post office signed a partnership agreement with FUCEC whereby the largest microfinance network in Togo would extend short term credits to clients having domiciled their salary or pension at the post office.
A difficult issue still to be resolved is the lack of separation of financial accounting between the general postal services and the operations related to the delivery of financial services (checking and savings deposit facilities). There are no assets to back up deposits received from clients, and deposits have been used to fund salaries and other expenses. The post office registered successive net losses of CFAF 194 million in 2003, and CFAF 166 million in 2004, thus putting at continuing risk the deposits of low income clients.
To preserve the integrity of clients’ deposits, several alternatives could be considered: (i) Split the postal financial services from the general postal system to create an autonomous entity for the delivery of financial services which would remain a subsidiary of the post office38 (ii) Transfer the financial services of the postal system to CET, and have CET sign a contract for service delivery with the postal system; (iii) launch a call for bids to choose a private sector firm to deliver financial services in rural/remote areas at the lowest possible subsidy and (iv) Eliminate the financial services altogether and reimburse the depositors. A successful split would result in the creation of a financial institution which could continue to offer microfinance and other financial services. A cost/benefit analysis of the various options is recommended to guide the choice of an option.