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Arctic Conflict Reps Bad – Russia Specific Link
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Arctic Conflict Reps Bad – Russia Specific LinkTheir framing of the Arctic presents Russia as uncivilized and aggressive other that must be treated only as a threat Van Efferink, 10 – Leonhardt, MSc in Financial Economics, MA in 'Geopolitics, Territory and Security,' working on a PhD at University of London, editor of ExploringGeopolitics (“Polar Partner or Poles Apart? How two US think tanks represent Russia,” PSA Graduate Network Conference, December 2010, http://www.psa.ac.uk/spgrp/51/2010/Ppr/PGC2_Van%20EfferinkLeonhardt_Polar_Partners_or_Poles_Apart_PSA_2010.pdf)RK Cohen (2007, p. 2) is not specific about the rationale behind his advice to the US government to take action. He simply states that “[t]here is too much at stake to leave the Arctic to [Russia].” This line seems to depict the Arctic as the reward of a zero-sum game by speaking of “leave the Arctic to”, assuming there is no room for shared sovereignty or joint resource exploration. Alternatively, the Arctic is assumed to be one indivisible space where a co-existence of different countries is impossible. It also suggests that without a US response, Russia would “conquer” the Arctic completely. Finally, the line seems to suggest that the US and Russia are struggling for territorial control of particular areas to support their military potential and secure natural resources. Such a struggle was a popular theme during the Cold War, when many in the US foreign policy establishment held the view that more territory would bring more power (Dalby 1990b). To act in the Arctic, Cohen (2007, p. 1) recommends that the US government formulate “a strong response” to Russia’s policies. This advice is in line with the claim of the US government in the late 1970s that the Soviet Union would only understand force (Dalby 1990a). Despite his representation of Russia as threat to regional security, if left unchecked, Cohen does not suggest a military response. Instead, he recommends that the US and its “allies” use diplomacy and international law to address Russia’s territorial claim. He also mentions the possibility of cooperating with Russia. In doing so, Cohen (2007, p. 2) implicitly states that the US and its “allies” are civilised countries for which cooperation with other countries is “natural”: “[a] crisis over Russian claims in the Arctic is avoidable if Russia is prepared to behave in a more civilized manner. If Moscow suggests exploring the Arctic’s wealth in a cooperative fashion…” Cohen implicitly states that the planting of the flag is not “civilized”. Moreover, he says that only Russia can reduce the tensions in the Arctic by changing its policies in the Arctic. Interestingly, Cohen suggests that Russia may be interested in changing its Arctic policies, acknowledging that the current government does not hold exactly the same foreign policies as those held in the years of totalitarianism and the Cold War. Alliances play a role in another recommendation (ibid, p. 2) and requires our attention as well: ”[Russia] has left has left the U.S., Canada, and the Nordic countries little choice but to forge a cooperative High North strategy and invite other friendly countries, such as Great Britain, to help build a Western presence in the Arctic.” This line constitutes the identity of Russia implicitly as an ‘unfriendly’ and ‘uncooperative’ country. Heritage’s representations of Russia To start with a depiction of the Arctic region, Cohen (2007, p. 2) claims that “[t]he U.S. and its allies are not interested in the new Cold War in the Arctic.” He suggests that Russia singlehandedly started a Cold War in the region. Cohen also implicitly states that Russia is indeed interested in “the new Cold War”, but he does not explain what he means exactly by this. Using the analogy of a period when Russia (actually the Soviet Union) was considered a danger gives the impression that contemporary Russia is a threat to the US as well. Regarding the flag planting ceremony in August 2007, Cohen (2007, p. 1) contends that with this statement and its territorial claims in the Arctic, “[Russia] has created a new source of international tension, seemingly out of the blue.” He forgets to mention that the Arctic has known territorial disputes between all circumpolar countries for decades (see chapter 3). Moreover, Cohen (2007, p. 1) argues that “[g]eopolitics and geo-economics are driving Moscow’s latest moves.” He does not speak of the US and the other Arctic countries having a geopolitical and geo-economical agenda as well. This line is an example of narrative closure. In addition, Cohen (2007, p. 1) calls the ceremony “a chilling throwback to the attempts during the 1930s to conquer the Arctic.” Paraphrasing Campbell (1998, p. 22), he seems to grant “Russian imperialism” almost an ontological status. Cohen attempts to put the current government of Russia on par with past governments of the Soviet Union by stating that “[t]oday’s Russian rhetoric is reminiscent of the triumphant totalitarianism of the 1930s and the mindset of the Cold War.” He applies the same representational practice when writing that “[t]o the regime’s critics, today’s expedition is a chilling reminder of the brutal era when millions of Gulag prisoners were sent to [the Arctic] to build senseless mega-projects for the power-mad dictator.” Cohen seeks to create a dualism in which a representation of Russia (totalitarianism) means that the opposite is true for the US (democracy). He implicitly suggests that the two countries have an entirely different set of values, with one being positive (US) and the other negative (Russia). This representational practice has earlier been used by the neo-conservative think tank Committee on the Present Danger (Dalby 1990a) and the magazine Reader’s Digest (Sharp 1993). This claim also contains representational practices (Cohen 2007, p. 2): “However, Moscow’s current rush to dominate the Arctic Ocean and everything under it indicates that greed and aggression motivate the new Russian polar bear.” Cohen exaggerates by claiming that Russia wants to control the Arctic Ocean completely. He suggests that other Arctic countries are not motivated by greed, in contrast to Russia. The country’s aggression is mentioned in another line of this two-page document as well (Cohen 2007, p. 2) where he writes “Russia’s decision to take an aggressive stand…” ‘Aggressiveness’ was a label that was frequently assigned to the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). Finally, this line also contains the metaphor “bear” which was used in US discourse on the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This representation of Russia is reminiscent of the Soviet Union in official US discourse in the late 1970s: “The USSR was...portrayed as an implacable foe, an untrustworthy rival…” (Dalby, 1990, p. ix). Conclusion So how do think tanks use representations of Russia to justify their policy advice on the Arctic? Table 1 shows the key findings of this study. [Table 1 omitted] As we had assumed, Brookings recommends that the US government supports international cooperation in the Arctic, in line with its liberal background. Conditioned by its neoconservative ideology, Heritage argues that cooperation is only possible if Russia changes its attitude. If this does not happen, the think tank favours a strong response against Russia from the US and its “allies”. The representations of Russia’s territorial claim in the Arctic link the institutional context of both think tanks to their policy recommendations. Brookings’ emphasis on international cooperation as the best foreign policy approach for the US manifested through a representation of Russia as a “normal” Arctic country (i.e. non-exotic). The think tank downplays the risk of Russian militarization of the region. Heritage however represents Russia as a threat owing to its perceived aggressiveness and greed, depicting the country as ‘non-Western’. Regarding its emphasis on Russia’s motives, Heritage upholds an American foreign policy tradition (Kissinger 1994, p. 813): “[w]ith respect to no other country [than the USSR/Russia] has American policy been geared as consistently to an assessment of its intentions rather than to its potential or even its policies.” Regarding representational practices, Heritage uses many representational practices to depict Russia as a threat, including analogies (references to the Cold War and the totalitarian regime of Stalin), labels (“aggressive”) and metaphors (“Russian bear”). Its discourse further contains ‘geopolitical othering,’ which implies that Russia is a non-Western, semi-civilised and unfriendly country. Moreover, the authors employ the practice of narrative closure. For example, only Russia’s interest in the natural resources of the Arctic is mentioned, and in a disapproving way. Nonetheless, the other circumpolar countries would also like to benefit, if possible, from resource exploration in the Arctic. The use of all these representational practices tends to depict Russia as a threat to the US. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.86 Mb. Share with your friends:
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