Request for more space cooperation, us policy prevents any bilateral exchange


US-China Relations Advantage Relations Low Now



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US-China Relations Advantage

Relations Low Now

No Cooperation now

Despite strong international support for the PPWT, the US refuses to sign on, stifling cooperation with China on space


Brian Weeden and Xiao He in 2016, Technical Advisor at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C., Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space, the national bureau of asian research, http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf

China’s second major interest in space is to have a voice in the creation of international rules and institutions. There are many transnational governance problems in the space domain, including physical and electromagnetic congestion and the weaponization of outer space. China is a newcomer in many other domains where the United States has already created the institutions and set the rules, such as in the governance of global monetary issues through the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and of nuclear issues through the international nonproliferation regime. China does not have a strong voice in these organizations, and joining them largely means that it must accept rules that have been decided mainly by the United States. Thus, proactive participation in international governance of outer space could enhance China’s stance and help make future international regimes more beneficial to China’s interests. In recent years, China has devoted great financial, diplomatic, and intelligence resources to acquiring more institutional power on the international stage. It is therefore not surprising for China to assume a positive attitude toward the formation of international rules in space. Examples are the UN Group of Governmental Experts on TCBMs in outer space, the EU-led negotiations on an International Code of Conduct for Space Activities, and the Russian- and Chinese-proposed PPWT. China believes that engaging constructively in these treaties and other efforts may improve its international reputation, national prestige, and soft power. However, China has met considerable difficulties in achieving these goals. Despite strong support from the international community for the PPWT, the United States has refused to support the proposal on the grounds that it lacks effective verification mechanisms and is not equitable.49 This kind of “supervision stalemate” is not a new problem. China sees the further development of its space or counter-space systems as a way to gain more bargaining power and perhaps break the deadlock.

US-China relations low now – South China Sea disputes and conspicuous containment


Chengde 16 [Yin Chengde is a research fellow of China Foundation for International Studies writing for chinausfocus.com. Mar 07, 2016 “China-U.S. Relations: Cooperation or Confrontation?”. Accessed 06/29/26. http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/china-u-s-relations-cooperation-or-confrontation/]

For many years, United States military airplanes and ships have conducted close-in surveillance operations on China. Recently, with a more ostentatious move, a U.S. Navy vessel sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Zhongjian Island in China’s Xisha Archipelago in violation of Chinese sovereignty. The U.S. claimed that they will continue the practice in the future. The U.S. has created two excuses for its challenge against Chinese sovereignty. The first is “freedom of navigation”, which is a pseudo proposition. There has been no trouble regarding freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Each year more than 100,000 vessels of various types from various countries sailed through the South China Sea without any trouble. Not a single accident has occurred there because of China. Freedom of navigation refers to the free passage of vessels of all countries through international waters not the freedom for a country’s military vessels to conduct close-contact surveillance; much less in the territorial waters of another country. The U.S. moves have nothing to do with freedom of navigation. These actions are in contempt of and a challenge against the sovereignty of another country. They are the replica of the gunboat policy of days past. The other is China’s “excessive maritime claims.” A spokesperson of the U.S. Department of Defense employed such a pretext to justify its challenge against Chinese sovereignty, indicating China is expanding the scope of its own sovereignty in the South China Sea, taking islands and maritime rights and interests of other countries as its own. This pretext aims to deny China’s sovereignty, turning Chinese territorial waters into international waters, and finding “reasonable” ground for its military vessels’ is a willful disregard of Chinese sovereignty in Chinese waters. This reflects ignorance and distortion of history. The islands and adjacent waters in the South China Sea have always been China’s. This is both historical truth and commonsense. Even U.S. President Barack Obama once acknowledged it. The essence of the South China Sea issue is most Chinese islands and reefs have been illegally occupied by a number of countries. China is the victim in the South China Sea issue. By portraying China the victim and constructive stakeholder as a “provocateur” and challenging China with such an excuse, the U.S. has disregarded facts and exposed its own obsession with power politics. U.S. challenges against China are an integral part of its offensive strategy against China in the Asia-Pacific, which embodies the conspicuous escalation of its attempt to contain China. The background is China’s persistent, forceful rise, as well as the abrupt rise of its impacts on regional and global stages thanks to the implementation of its “one belt, one road” initiative. The U.S. has been bedeviled by the strategic anxiety that China will challenge or supplant its dominant position in the Asia-Pacific—and globally. That is undoubtedly a groundless supposition. China has demonstrated that no matter how strong it becomes it won’t change its initial goal of peaceful development, it will always be faithful to its promise of never pursuing hegemony. China-U.S. gaming in the South China Sea will be a long-term phenomenon.

China – US tensions

Simulations indicate China-US war inevitable absent diplomatic engagement


COCIANI April 18th 2016 (Riccardo Cociani is a second year undergraduate student in war Studies at King's College London and Chair of the KCL Crisis Team; “Is war with China inevitable?” Published: 18 APRIL 2016 • 6:25PM; KING'S COLLEGE LONDON; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/18/is-war-with-china-inevitable/)

Fifth century Chinese military leader Sun Tzu said: “Know yourself and know your enemy and in a hundred battles you will always be victorious." Sun Tzu's The Art of War’s dictum could not be more right when thinking about the current status of the East and South China Seas and what it means for the future of world security. Since 2010, tensions between China and Japan have risen like dragons to fight against each other. The reason? Territory. The dragons have clashed repeatedly, diplomatically and politically, ever since a Chinese fishing trawler rammed two Japanese coast guard vessels near the disputed islands, known as ‘Diaoyu’ in China, and ‘Senkaku’ in Japan. Tensions remained cold. Even they never reached crisis levels, the dragons rose once again in late 2012 following Japan’s decision to privatise the islands. What seemed like dormant historical disputes, they are once again shaping Chinese and Japanese domestic and foreign policies, leading both countries to ‘warmer’ waters. Again in 2012, the Philippines contested Chinese activity near the Scarborough Shoal, in the South China Sea. Again, land disputes and land reclamation are at the core of the rising tensions, eventually evolving into a crisis. Soon, more and more countries, like Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei, have become involved against China’s land reclamation and island-building activities in the South China Sea. Tensions escalated even more following American involvement in the region, first over the East China Sea, and then over the South China Sea. The Council on Foreign Relations classifies both crisis as ‘critical’ for US interests, the same level as the crises in North Korea, Iraq and Syria. What if these crises escalated into a conflict? Are there any diplomatic solutions to these issues? This is what the King’s College London (KCL) crisis Team set to answer. A student-led and student-run Team of War Studies students from King’s war studies department, have spent months researching the current crises in the East and South China Seas. The KCL Crisis Team is responsible for organising and running King’s yearly Crisis Simulation, an event that sees more than 100 students involved, from various UK, US and European institutions. Students act as delegates from the various countries involved in the disputes, such as China, Taiwan, Japan, the US, South Korea and North Korea, and take action according to their nation’s interests, capabilities and according to the developing situations in both seas. The simulation serves as a learning tool where students can learn more about these current crises, as well as learning about the possible risks and scenarios that could develop in the future. Answering ‘What if…?’ is at the core of the KCL Crisis Team’s simulations. And the outcomes of this year’s simulation do not look promising for anyone. The nightmare come true War breaks out between North Korea and Japan, and between China and the US. While China continued the militarisation of their artificial islands in the South China Sea, the US responded by increasing their naval and military presence in the South China Sea, eventually leading to a direct military confrontation between the two countries. While the US was distracted and focused on Chinese military activity, North Korea took the opportunity to conduct false-flag operations in order to attack and destroy Japan. Diplomatic solutions did not even seem close to the horizon. While this was only a crisis simulation, it raises concerns over the current situation. Will war break out between China and the US, or between China and Japan? Will North Korea attack Japan? Our simulation suggests that if China continues to increase their military and naval activities in the South China Sea, without being transparent and communicating the purpose of their activities, misunderstandings and rising tensions could be the spark that starts a war. Over the East China Sea, on the other hand, while the US and China went at it against each other, North Korea took the opportunity to increase their military activities by launching attacks against an ‘abandoned’ Japan, as the US was too ‘distracted’ about China. South Korea found itself in between all this, and had to make difficult decisions over which side to be with. Chaos reigned the waters, and the perfect storm hit. Can war be prevented? Diplomacy unfortunately failed. After numerous discussions and cases made in the United Nations Security Council committee, no decision or action was made to prevent war, let alone decrease military activity in the South China Sea. Bilateral talks only helped to reach limited strategic goals, but not enough to prevent war from occurring. Mistrust and betrayal flowed and rose like waves as the simulation progressed. Therefore, the strongest lesson learnt and recommendation we could offer is to call for an increased diplomatic effort, most importantly, between China and Japan, and between China and the US. The waters and the dragons have risen, and only peaceful, diplomatic discussions can ease the tensions and bring these countries closer. However, the initial challenge is to reach a consensus to firstly meet. Once reached, only time will tell, but an increased diplomatic effort can only take us closer to such point. The Chinese word for ‘crisis’, 危机 (wēijī), includes the words ‘danger’ and ‘opportunity’: diplomacy’s goal is to make these current crises an opportunity to bring peace in the region. Only by communicating will we know and learn more in order to prevent war. Sun Tzu's said: “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”

Conflict is inevitable absent cooperation; multiple flash points with SCS


Ryall in 2015 (Julian Ryall is senior reporter for the telegraph covering Asian affairs; “US-China war 'inevitable' unless Washington drops demands over South China Sea” Tokyo3:35PM BST 26 May 2015; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11630185/US-China-war-inevitable-unless-Washington-drops-demands-over-South-China-Sea.html)

China’s armed forces are to extend their operations and its air force will become an offensive as well as defensive force for the first time, in a major shift in policy that will strengthen fears of accidental conflict. A policy document by the state council, or cabinet, said China faced a “grave and complex array of security threats”, justifying the change. The People’s Liberation Army, including its navy and air force, will be allowed to “project power” further beyond its borders at sea and more assertively in the air in order to safeguard its maritime possessions, the white paper stated. The navy will add “open seas protection” to a traditional remit of “offshore waters defence”, it said. The posture risks escalating the tension over disputed islands in the South China Sea and elsewhere in the Pacific, where the United States is determined to protect the interests of allies like Taiwan and the Philippines. Only last week, a US aircraft ignored repeated warnings from the Chinese military to fly a reconnaissance mission over the islands. Global Times, a tabloid newspaper run by the Communist Party, said that China might have to “accept” there would be conflict with the United States. “If the United States’ bottom line is that China has to halt its activities, then a US-China war is inevitable in the South China Sea”, said the paper, which is often seen as a mouth-piece of hardline nationalists in the government in Beijing. State media reported on Tuesday that Beijing had begun building two lighthouses on reefs in the Spratly Islands, a smattering of outcrops that are claimed by an array of countries including not only China but also Vietnam and the Philippines. Last month, satellite imagery revealed the Chinese had almost completed an air strip on another reef - Fiery Cross - while they are turning another rock, Mischief Reef, into a full island through land reclamation. The Global Times article described the construction of runways, harbour facilities and buildings on the disputed Spratly Islands as the nation’s “most important bottom line”. Speaking at a press conference in Beijing, Yang Yujun, a spokesman for the Defence Ministry, dismissed international criticism of China’s policies in the South China Sea, claiming the work was the same as building roads and homes on mainland China and that it would benefit “the whole of international society”. “From the perspective of sovereignty, there is absolutely no difference”, he said, adding that “some external countries are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs”. Analysts say neither Washington nor Beijing appear to be in the mood to back down and that there is a serious risk of a minor incident in airspace around the islands escalating rapidly. “I think the concern has to be that China misjudges the situation”, said Robert Dujarric, director of the Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies at the Japan campus of Temple University. “Neither party wants a war if it can be avoided, but there are red lines for both sides”, he said. “I worry whether Beijing considers the US to be a declining power and assumes that Washington will back down if it shoots down a US observation aircraft”. Washington chose to “de-escalate” a major crisis that blew up after a Chinese fighter collided with a US Navy intelligence-gathering aircraft off Hainan Island in April 2001. However, Prof. Dujarric said there would be a different response if a similar incident were to occur in what Washington insists is international air space over the South China Sea. Recent developments have provoked new concerns in the region, with Ma Ying-jeou, the president of Taiwan, calling for the different nations laying claim to the South China Sea to put their differences aside and carry out joint development of natural resources.

Philippine court case causes China to position Nuclear Submarines in SCS escalating tensions


Broder June 22nd 2016 (Jonathan Broder writes about defense and foreign policy for Newsweek from Washington. He's been covering national security issues for more than two decades, including 12 years as a writer and senior editor at Congressional Quarterly “THE ‘INEVITABLE WAR’ BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA” Published: 6/22/16 AT 2:28 PM; http://www.newsweek.com/south-china-sea-war-nuclear-submarines-china-united-states-barack-obama-xi-473428)

Updated | Roughly 15 years ago, a Chinese fighter jet pilot was killed when he collided with an American spy plane over the South China Sea. The episode marked the start of tensions between Beijing and Washington over China’s claim to the strategic waterway. So in May, when two Chinese warplanes nearly crashed into an American spy plane over the same area, many in China felt a familiar sense of nationalist outrage. “Most Chinese people hope China’s fighter jets will shoot down the next spy plane,” wrote the Global Times, China’s official nationalist mouthpiece. Though little talked about in the West, many Chinese officials have long felt that war between Washington and Beijing is inevitable. A rising power, the thinking goes, will always challenge a dominant one. Of course, some analysts dismiss this idea; the costs of such a conflict would be too high, and the U.S., which is far stronger militarily, would almost certainly win. Yet history is riddled with wars that appeared to make no sense. Today, the maritime dispute between the U.S. and China has become the most contentious issue in their complex relationship, and conditions seem ripe for a military clash between the two countries: This summer, an international court will rule on a Philippine challenge to China's claim to the disputed waterway, and for the first time, Beijing appears poised to send nuclear-armed submarines into the South China Sea. On one level, the dispute is about territory. Beijing insists that nearly the entire sea—from its islands, reefs and submerged rocks to its fish and underwater energy reserves—historically belongs to China. The U.S., however, regards the South China Sea as international waters—at least until rival claims by several neighboring countries can be resolved. Until then, Washington contends, only the U.S Navy can be trusted to ensure freedom of navigation in those waters, which include some of the world’s most important shipping lanes. The larger conflict, however, revolves around China’s emergence as a major regional power and America’s insistence on policing the Pacific. It also involves the system of international rules and institutions that Washington and its allies crafted after World War II. Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly complained this system favors America and prevents Beijing from taking its rightful place as the dominant power in Asia. And at a time when China’s economy is slowing, Xi is under increased pressure at home to find other ways to demonstrate China’s advances under his leadership. A clear reassertion of Beijing’s control over the South China Sea after more than a century of foreign domination would do just that. Failure to do so, however, analysts say, could threaten Xi’s grip on power. China says its claim to the South China Sea dates back thousands of years. But historians date the modern dispute back to about 130 years ago, when various European countries took over the waterway. Over the next century, the sea formed part of French Indochina, then Japan’s Pacific empire, and after World War II, the U.S. Navy acted as its caretaker. But in the 1970s, oil and gas deposits were discovered under the sea bed, prompting the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan to stake their own claims to the region. Those countries have since seized 45 islands. Since 2012, China has occupied seven shoals and, through land reclamation operations, turned them into man-made islands with landing strips and missile defenses. “History matters,” says Fu Ying, a former ambassador to Britain and now spokeswoman for the National People’s Congress, China’s parliament. In recounting China’s litany of foreign invasions, beginning in the 1840s with Britain’s seizure of Hong Kong and ending with Japan’s brutal occupation of China before and during World War II, she notes that the Chinese remain acutely aware of the country’s past humiliation. “The people won’t tolerate it if we lose territory yet again,” says Fu. “We’ve lost enough.” Wary of an armed conflict, U.S. President Barack Obama has responded by quietly permitting Beijing to operate in the South China Sea while building up military and economic relations with China’s neighbors in hopes of weakening its influence. And despite the administration’s repeated vows to sail continuously through the disputed waters, it has mostly avoided them. “We’ve done a lot sailing in the South China Sea but in areas that aren’t claimed by anybody,” says Bryan Clark, a retired Navy veteran who last served as a special assistant to the chief of naval operations. Critics of Obama, including Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona, say such nonintrusive voyages easily could be construed as acknowledgement that China has a valid claim. McCain and others have called on Obama to get tougher with Beijing and conduct more aggressive operations in the disputed waters. China’s neighbors, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, have also urged Obama to be more aggressive, and they’ve offered U.S. forces the use of their bases. But there’s a limit to how far they want Washington to go. While they may resent Beijing’s bullying, China is their largest trading partner and a major source of funding for infrastructure projects such as roads, railways and ports. Bilahari Kausikan, a senior Singaporean diplomat, notes that small Southeast Asian countries must navigate a path between China and the United States by constantly playing one against the other, hedging their bets and sometimes deferring to Washington or Beijing. “We see nothing contradictory in pursuing all...[of these] courses of action simultaneously,” he says. The Obama administration is bracing for trouble this summer when an international court in the Hague rules on the Philippine challenge to China’s claim to the South China Sea. The ruling is expected to go against Beijing, which has declared it won’t accept any decision from the court. China says it’s willing to talk one-on-one with the Philippines, as well as with the other countries with rival claims—a position that would give Beijing a clear advantage over its smaller neighbors. The U.S. wants China to negotiate with these claimants collectively, and Beijing has told Washington to butt out. “Our view is the U.S. is stoking the dispute and using it to bring its forces back the Pacific,” said Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin during a meeting with a small group of visiting American and British reporters in May. For U.S. officials, the big question is how China will react to an unfavorable ruling. Some fear Beijing will step up its land reclamation operations. Others worry it will restrict the air space over the South China Sea and begin intercepting unidentified aircraft—a policy that would force it to confront the U.S.’s spy flights. Or they could do something even more provocative. “The [Chinese] military is urging the leadership to put it in fifth gear, step on the gas and give the finger to the world,” says a U.S. official, asking for anonymity under diplomatic protocol. Obama has warned Xi that such measures would prompt a substantial American response, including military action. Some regional experts say Beijing may counter an unfavorable ruling with tough rhetoric to mollify people at home, but take no actions before September, when China hosts the G-20 summit. But once that gathering is over, the dispute could become much more volatile. U.S. officials are particularly worried about a Chinese plan to send submarines armed with nuclear missiles into the South China Sea for the first time. Chinese military officials argue the submarine patrols are needed to respond to two major U.S. military moves: plans to station a defense system in South Korea that can intercept missiles fired from both North Korea and China, and the Pentagon’s development of ballistic missiles with new hypersonic warheads that can strike targets anywhere in the world in less than an hour. Taken together, Chinese military officials say, these American weapons threaten to neutralize China’s land-based nuclear arsenal, leaving Beijing no choice but to turn to its submarines to retaliate for any nuclear attack. The implications would be enormous. Until now, China’s nuclear deterrent has centered on its land-based missiles, which are kept without fuel and remain separate from their nuclear warheads. That means the country’s political leadership must give several orders before the missiles are fueled, armed and ready to launch, giving everyone time to reconsider. Nuclear missiles on a submarine are always armed and ready. U.S. and Chinese warships operate in uncomfortably close proximity in the South China Sea. Add submarine operations to the mix, and the chances of an accident multiply despite protocols meant to minimize the risk of collisions. Submarines are stealthy vessels, and China is unlikely to provide their locations to the Americans. That means the U.S. Navy will send more spy ships into the South China Sea in an effort to track the subs. “With the U.S. Navy sailing more and more in the area, there’s a high possibility there will be an accident,” says a high-ranking Chinese officer, who spoke anonymously to address sensitive security issues. War between a rising China and a ruling U.S. isn’t inevitable—provided each side is prepared to make painful adjustments. Xi said as much during his visit to the United States last fall. But in a warning to Americans (which could apply to China’s fighter pilots as well), he added: “Should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they could create such traps for themselves."

US China tension inevitable because US position forces tension


Hewitt in 2015 (Duncan Hewitt is Shanghai correspondent for Newsweek/IBT Media. He was previously a BBC correspondent in Beijing and Shanghai, and also worked for the BBC World Service in London, focusing on East and Southeast Asia. He studied Chinese at Edinburgh University; “Chinese Media Say Military Confrontation over South China Sea 'Inevitable' If US Tries To Stop Island Reclamations” Published: 05/25/15 AT 5:29 AM; http://www.ibtimes.com/chinese-media-say-military-confrontation-over-south-china-sea-inevitable-if-us-tries-1936512)

SHANGHAI -- Chinese state media have sent another sharply worded message to the United States, amid continuing tensions over China’s reclamation of land around islands it says are part of its territory in disputed waters in the South China Sea -- as China's foreign ministry said it had lodged a formal complaint with Washington over U.S. surveillance flights over the islands. Last week China's military issued warnings to a U.S. surveillance plane to leave the area, and following reports of continuing U.S. ship, air and submarine patrols in the area, the official Global Times newspaper said on Monday that one of China's “bottom lines” was that “the reclamation of these islands must be finished 'no matter what.'” In a commentary published in its Chinese-language edition, the paper said that if the U.S. set its own bottom line on stopping the reclamation, then "a battle between China and the US in the South China Sea is inevitable – and the intensity of the clashes will be higher than what people normally understand by ‘friction.’” Chinese dredging vessels are purportedly seen in the waters around Fiery Cross Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea in this still image from video taken by a P-8A Poseidon surveillance aircraft provided by the United States Navy on May 21, 2015. Also on Monday, China's foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said Beijing had now issued a formal complaint to the U.S. about flights over the islands, adding, "We urge the U.S. to correct its error, remain rational and stop all irresponsible words and deeds," according to Reuters. The English edition of the Global Times also quoted an expert from China’s People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Science as saying that “China will very likely strike back if the US comes within 12 miles of the islands.” Peng Guangqian told the paper that the U.S. was forcing China to defend its “territorial sovereignty and maritime interests” by travelling “thousands of miles to China’s doorstep.” Another academic analyst told the Global Times that if both sides were flying air missions in the area, clashes were quite likely: "Once China dispatches aircraft to drive away the US fighters, both sides are likely to exchange fire due to high flight speed,” Zhu Feng of Nanjing University said. These comments do not necessarily add up to statements of official policy, observers noted. The Global Times, published by the official People’s Daily, is known for its hawkish commentary on foreign policy issues. However its views often represent those of at least part of the Chinese establishment. And there is no question that tensions between Beijing and Washington have heightened sharply in the past two weeks, since the U.S. said it was planning to send vessels to the region, to ensure that international shipping lanes are kept open. During a visit to Beijing in mid-May, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry asked Beijing “to take actions … to reduce tensions and increase the prospect of a diplomatic solution." However, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at the time that Beijing’s determination to protect what it says are its economic and territorial interests in the area was as “hard as a rock.” The latest comments follows reports in the U.S. that China electronically jammed U.S. drones flying over the area last week. In an apparent reference to the incident, the Global Times quoted Tao Wenzhao, a U.S. expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, as saying “China’s response were justified acts of self-defense when the US flights approached China’s territory and were in accordance with international practice.” The paper quoted Chinese academics as saying the U.S. should accept China was now becoming a maritime power. Its commentary suggested the U.S. was “still vague about its real purpose in the South China Sea”: it said if the U.S.’s main interest was freedom of navigation, then the two sides “still have leeway to maneuver” – adding that if the U.S. was simply “saber rattling” then China would generally “exercise self-restraint.” However, it said, if the U.S. seeks to “teach China a lesson by provoking and humiliating… China will have no choice but to engage.” Some observers noted that during Kerry’s recent visit to Beijing, President Xi Jinping said relations between the two countries had “remained stable,” and officials reiterated there were many areas where the two countries could work together. The Global Times also added that if the U.S. gave “enough space to China's peaceful rise, and China “share[d] US concerns about the rise” then risks would remain “under control.” However the paper’s commentary is clearly designed to reiterate the message that China is serious about going ahead with the island projects -- and fits in with what some analysts see as an increasingly assertive mood among the leadership in Beijing. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel said last week that the U.S. navy and air force would "continue to fully exercise" the right to operate in international waters and airspace, in order to preserve freedom of access for all countries. He added, “Nobody in their right mind is going to try to stop the U.S. Navy from operating - that would not be a good bet," according to Reuters.

Militarization now

China wants to use space for peaceful purposes- US militarization is the root of Chinese expansion in space


Brian Weeden and Xiao He in 2016, Technical Advisor at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C., Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space, the national bureau of asian research, http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf

China perceives the goal of the United States’ space policy as to maintain U.S. dominance in outer space and enlarge the power disparity between the United States and other states.53 The United States desires as much “freedom of action in space” as possible so that it can use space for military aims such as maintaining and developing space-based assets to support strategic planning and military operations. Improving national security is a natural and inevitable goal, but China does not acknowledge that the militarization and weaponization of outer space is a legitimate part of that freedom. China fully supports the principle of the peaceful use of space. However, as it perceives other states, especially the United States, moving toward the militarization and weaponization of space, China feels obligated to develop its military capabilities in this domain to bolster its own national security. Lack of agreement over what is included under the principle of the peaceful use of space could increase tensions in the U.S.-China relationship. In general, Beijing advocates that all states should follow the principle of peaceful use in space activities, but it also believes that U.S. advancements surpass the requirements for national security. Given that the United States already possesses far more military capabilities than China, the upgrading and further developing of U.S. space assets is easily interpreted as a potential threat. In particular, the U.S. national security community’s recent emphasis on greater “space protection” appears to China to be ultimately offensive in nature, as it would enlarge the power gap and ensure U.S. hegemony in space.54 China sees the United States’ pursuit of space protection in a similar light as the development of missile defense. Although the United States and its East Asian allies say that the purpose of such systems is merely to protect themselves from a possible North Korean missile attack, China is concerned that they will inevitably undermine the credibility of its nuclear and conventional deterrent.

China – Taiwan Relations

China-Taiwan relations tense now – lacking dialogue leads to further problems


Jennings 16 [Ralph Jennings, writer for Forbes magazines. JUN 27, 2016 @ 10:30 PM “China Tightening Noose Around Taiwan Over Refusal To Talk” accessed 06/30/16. http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2016/06/27/china-squeezes-taiwan-over-its-refusal-to-talk-and-whats-next/#265adad73c3f]

China doesn’t call it retaliation but it smells that way. After President Tsai Ing-wen took office in Taiwan about a month ago, China first warned her to hold talks on conditions that each side considers itself part of the same country. Her predecessor of eight years agreed and relations peaked after decades of political tension, as did trade between Taiwan and the world’s No. 2 economy. Tsai says no thanks to the one-country thing. Voters put Tsai into office partly because she had promised to protect Taiwan’s autonomy from China rather than co-mingle it. China ultimately wants to govern Taiwan despite the island’s proud democratic self-rule. The warning did little good. Then in mid-June China cancelled a show in Guangzhou organized for a choir of indigenous Taiwanese children. The Puzangalan Choir had sung a version of the Taiwan national anthem for Tsai’s May 20 inauguration, hardly impressing China. Arrivals of mainland Chinese tourists to Taiwan fell 15% in May year-on-year as Beijing evidently slowed permits allowing them passage. A decline in tourism threatens Taiwan’s airlines, hotels and travel agencies. Six China routes from the chief central Taiwan airport have been called off as a result, local media said in early June, and China is eyeing further cuts in the number of travel passes to Taiwan. Last week Beijing declared dead the long-standing communication between government-backed foundations that handle anything from sundry consular-style matters to putting final signatures on deals, such as the suite of agreements that brought a record 3.4 million tourists to Taiwan last year. China will keep dialing down relations with Taiwan like this until Tsai finds a dialogue mechanism that the Communist leadership likes, political analysts say. But leaders in Beijing won’t scrap the 23 agreements reached with Taiwan over the past eight years or take other measures that would all out enrage the Taiwanese public. That outrage would hurt China’s goal of long-term peaceful relations leading to unification, especially if Tsai comes around with a dialogue proposal Beijing likes. China’s actions since Tsai’s inauguration come as “a warning or an intimidation, but there won’t be anything spectacular that happens,” says Alex Chiang, international relations professor at National Chengchi University in Taipei. “It’s a cooling off period, just wait and see.”


Relations low now – Chinese gov’t will take action, squo risks miscalc


Zurong 16 [Wu Zurong is a research fellow at the China Foundation for International Studies. Jun 29, 2016 Potential Dangers Posed by the US Military’s Close-in Reconnaissance. Accessed 06/29/16. http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/potential-dangers-posed-by-the-us-militarys-close-in-reconnaissance/]

The United States military’s close-in reconnaissance of China is an old problem in Sino-US relations, but new developments surrounding it are permeated with worrisome dangers, which merit close attention by both sides. Since last October, there have been more news reports and comments about what the US military says are “normal operations” by reconnaissance planes or naval vessels including aircraft carriers in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, followed or tracked by Chinese warships and jet fighters. US military planes and naval vessels are often given warnings or warned off. What worries the US military is the claimed short distance between the ships or planes of both sides when they have encounters in a “polite but unsafe manner”. However, the Chinese side believes that its planes and ships are operating professionally and in a safe manner. It is demanding that the US military stop all its close-in reconnaissance of China in order to eliminate the root cause of any possible conflicts. This profound dispute carries great weight in Sino-US relations and should be managed properly and immediately in order to avoid any accidental misfortunes. First, the US military’s close-in reconnaissance operations challenge or encroach upon China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In public statements, the US often says that it takes no position on the territorial disputes between China and Japan in the East China Sea, and between China and the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries in the South China Sea. But in military operations, the US reconnaissance and other types of planes often fly over China’s airspace over the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) or territorial waters, and its naval vessels cruise into China’s EEZ or territorial waters. What complicates the dispute is the different understanding or interpretation of EEZ and territorial waters by the two countries. Another even more difficult issue is the lack of common ground as to what the US military planes and naval vessels can do or cannot do in those flights and cruises in accordance with international norms or established rules. In essence, the problem lies in the fact that the US does not respect, in its deeds, China’s sovereignty in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, though it refrains from saying so publically. Therefore, the two countries cannot see eye to eye on the exact definition or location of so-called high seas or international airspace in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Under such circumstances, the US military’s close-in reconnaissance of China has long been an irritant in Sino-US relations. Second, such reconnaissance seriously damages the mutual strategic trust between the two countries. Generally speaking, the reconnaissance of China has much to do with its China policy, and in a certain sense, it serves as a kind of a barometer of its attitude towards China. A simple observation of the changes of the US military close-in reconnaissance operations of China in the last 60 years or more shows the point. During the 22 years or so between 1949 when the People’s Republic of China was born and 1972 when US President Richard Nixon visited China, the US reconnaissance of China was very intense as the US adopted a hostile policy towards China. Quite a number of US reconnaissance planes were shot down by Chinese missiles. But for 19 years after the visit to China by President Nixon, the US military reconnaissance of China virtually came to a stop as the US pursued a policy of working with China against the Soviet Union. It is interesting to note that after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, especially when China’s rise has gained momentum in the last 10 or 20 years, the US military close-in reconnaissance operations were resumed and gradually intensified. It is true that the recent accelerated close-in reconnaissance of China coincides with the US strategy of rebalance in Asia, and in fact it serves as evidence that its strategy of rebalance in Asia is directed at China, though the US officially denies it on public occasions. Third, accidents could be hardly be avoided when the US persists in carrying out high frequency close-in reconnaissance operations. As China is making good progress in the research and manufacture of sophisticated military equipment and weapons, as well as in the combat readiness drills and exercises, the desire of the US military to gather China’s military intelligence has grown stronger than ever before. It is most unlikely that the US would stop altogether its military close-in reconnaissance of China in the near future. In the meantime, the Chinese military will continue to spot, follow or track US reconnaissance planes and ships in the distance as it sees proper. It is believed that it would take necessary defensive measures when the US reconnaissance planes and ships threaten its security or encroach upon China’s sovereignty. Though both sides are trying to follow the rules stipulated in the China-US Memorandum of Understanding on Air and Maritime Encounters, nobody can guarantee that there would be no accidents or mistakes when the two sides have a number of serious maritime disputes unresolved. The worst scenario would be that a careless mistake by one side is interpreted as an intentional move by another, with simultaneous or automatic retaliation.


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