Resolution resolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance. Violations

DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

GATHERING INTELLIGENCE ON US PERSONS IS DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

Domestic surveillance is info gathering on US persons

Definition Edit

Domestic surveillance is intelligence gathering on US persons

Before one can make any sort of assessment of domestic surveillance policies, it is first necessary to narrow the scope of the term “domestic surveillance.” Domestic surveillance is a subset of intelligence gathering. Intelligence, as it is to be understood in this context, is “information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those needs” (Lowenthal 2006, 2). In essence, domestic surveillance is a means to an end; the end being intelligence. The intelligence community best understands domestic surveillance as the acquisition of nonpublic information concerning United States persons (Executive Order 12333 (3.4) (i)). With this definition domestic surveillance remains an overly broad concept. This paper’s analysis, in terms of President Bush’s policies, focuses on electronic surveillance; specifically, wiretapping phone lines and obtaining caller information from phone companies. Section f of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 defines electronic surveillance as:

[T]he acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes;

US PERSONS DEFINED

US person defined

The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society RAND 2009 BRIAN A. JACKSON, EDITOR

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG804.pdf

3 Federal law and executive order define a U.S. person as “a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an unincorporated association with a substantial number of members who are citizens of the U.S. or are aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation that is incorporated in the U.S.” (NSA, undated). Although this definition would therefore allow information to be gathered on U.S. persons located abroad, our objective was to examine the creation of a domestic intelligence organization that would focus on—and whose activities would center around—individuals and organizations located inside the United States . Though such an agency might receive information about U.S. persons that was collected abroad by other intelligence agencies, it would not collect that information itself.

GATHERING INFO ON US CITIZENS IS DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

Domestic surveillance is whatever is needed to complete dossiers on US citizens

SURVEILLANCE DONE IN THE US IS DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

http://www.cmu.edu/hss/ehpp/documents/2014-City-Surveillance-Policy.pdf

n18. 50 U.S.C. 1801-1829 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). This Case Comment uses the word "domestic" to refer to searches and investigations conducted within the United States. The term "domestic foreign intelligence investigations" at first glance seems like an oxymoron, but it is not. As used in this Case Comment, the term refers to investigations conducted within the United States to obtain foreign intelligence information - that is, information pertaining to foreign nationals and their respective governments or international groups - as opposed to investigations conducted within the United States to obtain domestic intelligence information - that is, information pertaining to United States persons only. Notice that a United States person residing in the United States, however, could become the target of a foreign intelligence investigation if the Government were investigating that individual's relationship with a foreign government or international terrorist group. In other words, the difference between whether an investigation is a "domestic foreign intelligence investigation" or a "domestic intelligence investigation" turns on whether the investigation focuses in part on a foreign government or international group.

Domestic surveillance is surveillance in the US

Boston College Law Review May, 2006 47 B.C. L. Rev 505 ARTICLE: DECRYPTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: WARRANTLESS NSA SURVEILLANCE AND THE ENHANCED EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY PROVIDED BY ENCRYPTED VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL lexis

n100 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f). Section 1801(f) of FISA defines four types of conduct that are considered "electronic surveillance" under FISA. Signals collection operations that target U.S. persons outside the United States do not fit within any of these four definitions. The first three definitions require the targeted individual to be located inside of the United States to be considered "electronic surveillance." The fourth definition applies only to the use of surveillance devices within the United States. Therefore, the NSA's signals monitoring stations in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are not regulated by FISA. U.S. personnel located at these foreign stations presumably may monitor U.S. persons who are outside the United States, and that conduct technically would not be considered electronic surveillance under FISA's definitions. This highlights the fact that FISA was meant to govern only domestic surveillance taking place within U.S. borders. Although such efforts would not fall under FISA's definition of "electronic surveillance," USSID 18's minimization procedures still would apply and offer some protection to the rights of U.S. persons abroad. See generally USSID 18, supra note 13.

COMMUNICATION TO OR FROM THE US IS INCLUDED IN DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

Domestic surveillance includes transmission to or from abroad and can be for foreign intelligence

First, FISA generally falls within Congress's power to regulate domestic surveillance for foreign intelligence information. That power comes from the Commerce Clause, to the extent that the surveillance involves interception of information that travels through channels of interstate or foreign commerce such as telephone lines. n188 Additional power flows from congressional powers associated with war and foreign affairs as amplified by the Necessary and Proper Clause. n189 Indeed, the executive branch has never questioned that FISA generally falls within Congress's power, except to the extent that it infringes on the President's congressionally irreducible power under the Constitution. n190

Calls to, from, or within the US is domestic surveillance

http://www.wired.com/2014/03/feinstein-blasts-cia-snooping/

Communication from the US are domestic surveillance

Since Snowden leaked secret documents to the media, critics have called the NSA's domestic surveillance -- including a program that monitors the metadata of domestic phone calls -- a government overreach. Many of those same critics have asked the Obama administration and Congress to rein in the programs.

DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE IS INFORMATION EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THE US

Domestic surveillance deals with information transmitted within a country

Any foreign element means it is not domestic

Look, your tax dollars in action. Word wealth, SAT training class. As a public service, COUNTDOWN will now review, and, where applicable, provide translations of the White House take on what “domestic” means versus what “international” means, and then we‘ll add a few bonus examples of our own.

Quoting, “Deputy Director Of National Intelligence General Michael Hayden,” semicolon; “One End Of Any Call Targeted Under This Program Is Always Outside The United States.”

This is the glass-is-half-full view of warrantless eavesdropping, much as if a U.S. soldier, who, like the average human male, has about 12 pints of blood in his body, would lose six of those pints.

Critics of the NSA terrorist surveillance program would say, That soldier is half empty. The White House would remind you that that soldier is half full.

Anyway, the press release actually gives several examples of the differences between the meanings of these two words. “Definition, Domestic Versus International. Domestic Calls are calls inside the United States. International Calls are calls either to or from the United States.”

And don‘t forget to deposit $2 for the first five minutes, and an extra $2 to cover the cost of the guy listening in at the NSA.

“Domestic Flights,” the White House reminds us, “are flights from one American city to another. International Flights are flights to or from the United States.”

So what happens if I call a domestic airline about a flight to Europe, but they‘ve outsourced their reservation agents to India? Is that a domestic call about an international flight, or an international call about a domestic flight?

Wait, there‘s more. “Domestic Mail consists of letters and packages sent within the United States,” the press release reads. “International Mail consists of letters and packages sent to or from the United States.”

Advertise

And don‘t forget, we can not only open either kind, kind if we damn well feel like it, but if you‘re using an international stamp and we need it for our collection, we‘re keeping it.

International commerce. You know, the kind of stuff Jack Abramoff did for the -- Huh, leave Abramoff out of it? Gotcha, sorry.

Well, anyway, if you‘re still not clear on this domestic-versus-international stuff, as promised, a couple of more definitions to help pull you through.

Domestic is an adjective describing your dog or cat or any other animal you have as a pet, like a tiger or a boa constrictor. “The Internationale,” meanwhile, is the worldwide anthem of those socialists and communists.

Internationals are soccer players who play in countries in which they were not born. Domestics is an old-timey kind of term for people who cleaned your house.

International is the kind of law that lets us take terror suspects to old Soviet-era gulags in Eastern Europe and beat the crap out of them, while domestic is the kind of wine they bottle in California.

Thank you for your attention. Please pass your examination papers forward.

Statutes define domestic as wholly in the US

http://webpolicy.org/2014/12/03/eo-12333-on-american-soil/

Once again unpacking the legalese, these parallel provisions establish exclusivity for 1) “electronic surveillance” and 2) interception of “domestic” communications. As I explained above, intercepting a two-end foreign wireline communication doesn’t constitute “electronic surveillance.” As for what counts as a “domestic” communication, the statutes seem to mean a communication wholly within the United States.7 A two-end foreign communication would plainly flunk that definition.

So, there’s the three-step maneuver. If the NSA intercepts foreign-to-foreign voice or Internet traffic, as it transits the United States, that isn’t covered by either FISA or the Wiretap Act. All that’s left is Executive Order 12333.

NSA IS NOT DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program is NOT DOMESTIC surveillance

Mr. CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear today to discuss the constitutional limitations on domestic surveillance.

I should make clear that I am speaking here on my own behalf.

Let me begin by stating that I believe President Bush was fully within his constitutional and statutory authority when he authorized the TSP. The President's critics have variously described this program as widespread, domestic and illegal. Based upon the published accounts, it is none of these things. Rather, it is a targeted program on the international communications of individuals engaged in an armed conflict with the United States and is fully consistent with FISA.

In assessing the Administration's actions here, it is important to highlight how narrow is the actual dispute over the NSA program. Few of the President's critics claim that he should not have ordered the interception of al-Qaida's global communications or that he needed the FISA Court's permission to intercept al-Qaida commu- nications abroad. It is only with respect to communications actually intercepted inside the United States or where the target is a United States person in the United States, that FISA is relevant at all to this national discussion.

If either party in a transmission is outside the US, interception is NOT DOMESTIC surveillance

NSA is limited to communications with at least one outside the US

Massive amounts of raw Internet traffic The NSA intercepts huge amounts of raw data, and stores billions of communication records per day in its databases. Using the NSA’s XKEYSCORE software, analysts can see “nearly everything a user does on the Internet” including emails, social media posts, web sites you visit, addresses typed into Google Maps, files sent, and more. Currently the NSA is only authorized to intercept Internet communications with at least one end outside the U.S., though the domestic collection program used to be broader. But because there is no fully reliable automatic way to separate domestic from international communications, this program also captures some amount of U.S. citizens’ purely domestic Internet activity, such as emails, social media posts, instant messages, the sites you visit and online purchases you make.

The contents of an unknown number of phone calls There have been several reports that the NSA records the audio contents of some phone calls and a leaked document confirms this. This reportedly happens “on a much smaller scale” than the programs above, after analysts select specific people as “targets.” Calls to or from U.S. phone numbers can be recorded, as long as the other end is outside the U.S. or one of the callers is involved in "international terrorism". There does not seem to be any public information about the collection of text messages, which would be much more practical to collect in bulk because of their smaller size.

The NSA has been prohibited from recording domestic communications since the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act but at least two of these programs -- phone records collection and Internet cable taps -- involve huge volumes of Americans’ data.

GEOGRAPHY BASED DISTINCTION ELIMINATED BY INTERNET

Internet routing eliminates the foreign – domestic distinction based on geography

https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/eavesdropping101.pdf

The Internet and technologies that rely upon it (such as electronic mail, web surfing and Internet-based telephones known as Voice over IP or VOIP) works by breaking information into small “packets.” Each packet is then routed across the network of computers that make up the Internet according to the most efficient path at that moment, like a driver trying to avoid traffic jams as he makes his way across a city. Once all the packets – which are labeled with their origin, destination and other “header” information – have arrived, they are then reassembled.

An important result of this technology is that on the Internet, there is no longer a meaningful distinction between “domestic” and “international” routes of a communication. It was once relatively easy for the NSA, which by law is limited to “foreign intelligence,” to aim its interception technologies at purely “foreign” communications. But now, an e-mail sent from London to Paris, for example, might well be routed through the west coast of the Uned States (when, f or example, it is a busy mid-morning in Europe but the middle of the night in California) along the same path traveled by mail between Los Angeles and San Francisco.

That system makes the NSA all the more eager to get access to centralized Internet exchange points operated by a few telecommunications giants. But because of the way this technology works, eavesdropping on an IP communication is a completely different ballgame from using an old-fashioned “wire- tap” on a single line. The packets of interest to the eavesdropper are mixed in with all the other traffic that crosses through that path- way – domestic and international.

Surveillance can no longer be categorized by geography

The second basic fact is that modern communications networks obliterate many of the assumptions about the importance of geography that had long structured surveillance law. A “domestic” Internet communication between a user in Manhattan and a server in Palo Alto might, at midday in the United States, be routed through nocturnal Asia’s less congested pipes, or to a mirror in Ireland, while a “foreign” e-mail service operated from Egypt may be hosted in San Antonio. “What we really need to do is all the bad guys need to be on this section of the Internet,” former NSA director Keith Alexander likes to joke. “And they only operate over here. All good people operate over here. All bad guys over here.” It’s never been quite that easy—but General Alexander’s dream scenario used to be closer to the truth. State adversaries communicated primarily over dedicated circuits that could be intercepted wholesale without much worry about bumping into innocent Americans, whereas a communication entering the United States could generally be presumed to be with someone in the United States. The traditional division of intelligence powers by physical geography—particularized warrants on this side of the border, an interception free-for-all on the other—no longer tracks the reality of global information flows.

Geographic distinctions are antiquated due to modern communication

Apart from the issue of private corporations gathering and sharing intelligence, FISA's surveillance definition is antiquated due to the distinction it makes between data acquired inside or outside of the U.S. Again, government observation only qualifies as surveillance if the data is acquired inside the U.S. or if one or more of the parties is a known U.S. person, inside the U.S., who the government is targeting intentionally. In other words, unrestrained and indiscriminate eavesdropping by the NSA is allowed under FISA as long as the communication is not physically intercepted within the U.S., and the target is either: (1) someone known to be a non-U.S. person, (2) someone who is intentionally targeted but whose identity is unknown, or (3) anyone else in the world who is not intentionally being targeted.

Internet has eliminated the geographic based distinction between foreign and domestic

That’s the topic of a TEDx-Charlottesville talk by whistleblower John Napier Tye, entitled “Why I spoke out against the NSA.” Tye objected to NSA surveillance while working in the US State Department. He explains that EO 12333 governs data collected overseas, as opposed to domestic surveillance which is authorized by statute. However, because Americans’ emails and other communications are stored in servers all over the globe, the distinction between domestic and international surveillance is much less salient than when the order was originally given by President Reagan in 1981.

Internet routes communications through the US

http://webpolicy.org/2014/12/03/eo-12333-on-american-soil/

Data cannot be distinguished by geography

Response Essays The Drama Ahead: Google versus America http://www.cato-unbound.org/contributors/marcy-wheeler

That’s an important implication of Sanchez’ point that “modern communications networks obliterate many of the assumptions about the importance of geography.” American tech companies now store data overseas, as well as in the United States. Americans’ data is mixed in with foreigners’ data overseas. Many of the more stunning programs described by Snowden’s documents – the collection of 5 billion records a day showing cell location, NSA partner GCHQ’s collection of millions of people’s intimate webcam images, and, of course, the theft of data from Google and Yahoo’s servers – may suck up Americans’ records too.

Plus there’s evidence the NSA is accessing U.S. person data overseas. The agency permits specially trained analysts to conduct Internet metadata contact chaining including the records of Americans from data collected overseas. And in a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing earlier this year, Colorado Senator Mark Udall asked hypothetically what would happen with a “a vast trove of U.S. person information” collected overseas; the answer was such data would not get FISA protection (California Senator Dianne Feinstein, the Intelligence Committee Chair, asked an even more oblique question on the topic).

FOREIGN / DOMESTIC IS DEFINED BY THE NATURE OF THE INFORMATION, NOT LOCATION

"Foreign" refers to the nature of the information, not the location

1. Foreign Intelligence Defined

The definition of "foreign intelligence" is critical to the constitutional analysis of the Protect America Act. The Act does not provide a different definition of "foreign intelligence" from the one provided in FISA; thus in interpreting the Protect America Act, FISA's definition of "foreign intelligence" applies. n84 In FISA's definition, "foreign" applies to the content of the information gathered, and not to the location in (or from) which the information is gathered, or the nationality of the sources from which it is gathered. n85 Instead, "foreign intelligence" means "information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against ... " harms or clandestine operations against the United States. n86 The definition [*184] does not contain any language limiting the country from which the information may be collected. n87 Thus, while the Act's asserted purpose is to collect foreign intelligence, the Act's definition of foreign intelligence does not provide inherent protection against domestic surveillance - domestic surveillance is not precluded from the definition of foreign surveillance. How an act defines its terms, rather than the terms themselves out of context, dictates the Act's application; this is a critical point in understanding the Protect America Act's far-reaching implications.

SURVEILLANCE OF FOREIGN THREATS IS NOT DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

Surveillance of foreign agents is not domestic surveillance even if in the US

Eggen also continues the mainstream media’s propagandistic use of the term “domestic surveillance [or 'spying'] program.” In actuality, the electronic surveillance that the NSA is doing — i.e., eavesdropping on content of conversations — is not “domestic.” A call is not considered “domestic” just because one party to it happens to be inside the U.S., just as an investigation is not “domestic” just because some of the subjects of interest happen to reside inside our country. Mohammed Atta was an agent of a foreign power, al Qaeda. Surveilling him — had we done it — would not have been “domestic spying.”

That is, the Court understood what most Americans understand but what the media, civil libertarians and many members of Congress refuse to acknowledge: if we are investigating the activities of agents of foreign powers inside the United States, that is not DOMESTIC surveillance. It is FOREIGN counter-intelligence.

That, in part, is why the statute regulating wiretaps on foreign powers operating within the U.S. — the one the media has suddenly decided it loves after bad-mouthing it for years as a rubber-stamp — is called the FOREIGN Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The United States has never needed court permission to conduct wiretapping outside U.S. territory; the wiretapping it does inside U.S. territory for national security purposes is FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, not “domestic surveillance.”

Foreign intelligence is NOT DOMESTIC surveillance

http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/result/pqpresultpage.gispdfhitspanel.pdflink/http%3A$2f$2fprod.cosmos.dc4.bowker-dmz.com$2fapp-bin$2fgis-hearing$2f3$2f7$2f2$2f7$2fhrg-2007-hjh-0042_from_1_to_156.pdf/entitlementkeys=1234|app-gis|hearing|hrg-2007-hjh-0042

that power, especially the power to invade people's privacy, must never be exercised unchecked

Foreign surveillance includes American citizens

Case law is split regarding the constitutionality of wiretapping's use on foreign nationals for obtaining foreign intelligence; courts agree, however, that wiretapping for the purpose of domestic security does not pass constitutional muster.

FISA – EXECUTIVE ORDER DISTINCTION FAILS

The FISA / Excutive Order distinction fails

http://webpolicy.org/2014/12/03/eo-12333-on-american-soil/

So, that’s the conventional wisdom. American soil: FISA. Foreign soil: EO 12333. Unfortunately, the legal landscape is more complicated.

INVESTIGATION OF COMMON CRIMES IS NOT DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

Domestic surveillance is distinct from ordinary crime

The Review of Litigation Winter, 2004 23 Rev. Litig. 209 NOTE: Feeling Insecure?: United States v. Bin Laden and the Merits of a Foreign-Intelligence Exception For Searches Abroad lexis

Courts regularly deal with the most difficult issues of our society. There is no reason to believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic security cases. Certainly courts can recognize that domestic surveillance involves different considerations from the surveillance of "ordinary crime." If the threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement officers to convey its significance to a court, one may question whether there is probable cause for surveillance. n141

Domestic surveillance excludes criminal acts

The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society RAND 2009 BRIAN A. JACKSON, EDITOR

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG804.pdf

To guide the work reported in this volume, we define domestic intelligence as efforts by government organizations to gather, assess, and act on information about individuals or organizations in the United States or U.S. persons elsewhere 3 that are not related to the investigation of a known past criminal act or specific planned criminal activity

.

Supreme Court distinguishes domestic surveillance from criminal surveillance

CRS Report The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the Statutory Framework and U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review Decisions

Updated February 15, 2007 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL30465.pdf

Investigations for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence give rise to a tension between the Government’s legitimate national security interests and the protection of privacy interests.6 The stage was set for legislation to address these competing concerns in part by Supreme Court decisions on related issues. In Katz v. United States

, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court held that the protections of the Fourth Amendment extended to circumstances involving electronic surveillance of oral communications without physical intrusion.7 The Katz Court stated, however, that its holding did not extend to cases involving national security.8 In United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (the Keith case), the Court regarded Katz as “implicitly recogniz[ing] that the broad and unsuspected governmental incursions into conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails necessitate the application of Fourth Amendment safeguards.”9 Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the Keith Court, framed the matter before the Court as follows:

The issue before us is an important one for the people of our country and their Government. It involves the delicate question of the President’s power, acting through the Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance in internal security matters without prior judicial approval. Successive Presidents for more than one-quarter of a century have authorized such surveillance in varying degrees, without guidance from the Congress or a definitive decision of this Court. This case brings the issue here for the first time. Its resolution is a matter of national concern, requiring sensitivity both to the Government’s right to protect itself from unlawful subversion and attack and to the citizen’s right to be secure in his privacy against unreasonable Government intrusion.10

The Court held that, in the case of intelligence gathering involving domestic security surveillance, prior judicial approval was required to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.11 Justice Powell emphasized that the case before it “require[d] no judgment on the scope of the President’s surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign

powers, within or without the country.”12 The Court expressed no opinion as to “the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents.”13 However, the guidance which the Court provided in

Keith with respect to national security surveillance in a domestic context to some degree presaged the approach Congress was to take in foreign intelligence surveillance. The Keith Court observed in part:

Domestic security surveillance has different legal standards

In United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 299, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1972), the Supreme Court addressed the "delicate question of the President's power, acting through the Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance in internal security matters without [**26] prior judicial approval." The Court held that such judicial approval is necessary to satisfy the Fourth Amendment in conducting domestic security surveillance, but it specifically declined to address the scope of the President's surveillance power with respect to foreign intelligence. Id. at 323-24. However, Keith took care to explain that HN33Go to this Headnote in the case.the specific statutory requirements for electronic surveillance of "ordinary crime" under Title III 11 -- including the requirement [*993] of probable cause to believe an individual has, is, or is about to commit a crime -- were not constitutionally mandated in the context of domestic security surveillance for national security purposes. Id. at 322. Noting that HN34Go to this Headnote in the case.domestic security surveillance involves different policy and practical considerations from surveillance of "ordinary crime," Keith stated that "the focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of crime." Id. Thus, the appropriate Fourth Amendment inquiry is one of reasonableness: "Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information [**27] and the protected rights of our citizens." Id. at 322-23.

Criminal surveillance requires probable cause; FISA does not

INVESTIGATION OF COMMON CRIMES IS DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

Domestic surveillance includes criminal and regulatory investigation – drone example proves

DOJ guidelines on criminal investigation are for domestic surveillance

n238. See Attorney General Guidelines, supra note 13; Lininger, supra note 13. These guidelines apply to domestic surveillance only; that is, surveillance of conduct that involves potential criminal activity, rather than foreign intelligence. The guidelines governing foreign intelligence are classified. Portions of prior foreign intelligence surveillance guidelines from 1995 have been released, but nothing since that time has been made available to the public. The 1995 guidelines give investigators much greater leeway to collect intelligence than do the domestic surveillance guidelines. See Attorney General Guidelines For FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection And Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations (1995), available at http://www.politrix.org/foia/fbi/fbi-guide.htm.

There is no clear distinction between national security and criminal investigation

Domestic surveillance includes law enforcement

The ECPA also provides remedy for those individuals victimized by unlawful electronic surveillance. If an individual uses a practice in contravention of the ECPA, the victim may bring suit for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and equitable relief, if equitable relief can rectify the harm. The plaintiff may only bring suit against the individual who performed the recording; plaintiffs may not sue any third-party that receives a copy of the recording and subsequently distributes it.

There is no difference between criminal and security surveillance

Surveillance includes criminal investigation

November 23, 1993, Decided lexis

Second, petitioner has no alternative remedies capable of effectively protecting its substantial interests. Electronic surveillance involves major criminal investigations and requires a significant expenditure of government resources. Petitioner thus has a strong interest in ensuring the admissibility of evidence it gathers by electronic surveillance. Suppression on the ground that surveillance was authorized by an invalid Title III order would result in a significant waste of government resources. Furthermore, the government as parens patriae has an interest in avoiding illegal invasions of its citizens' privacy.

DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE INVOLVES RELATIONSHIP INFIDELITY

Domestic surveillance involves investigating relationship infidelity