Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China
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- 2NC/1NR AT 6—No Impact/Security Inevitable
- Everything they say is a lie—security authors make up facts to justify war
- 2AC Affirmative Answers to China Securitization Kritik
- Focus on representations leads to inaction and bad education
- Permutation: Do both – Reform solves
- Link Turn: Engagement. Cooperation between the US and China will reduce tension and security rhetoric
- Turn: Abandoning politics cedes it to the elites – causes war, slavery, and authoritarianism
- No impact and no solvency: Government officials, news outlets, and think tanks in China and the US frequently use security rhetoric—the plan solves military fears
2NC/1NR AT #5—Impact CalculusThey say that they outweigh, but
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________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 2NC/1NR AT #6—No Impact/Security InevitableThey say Countries use security representations all the time, but
Pieterse, 2007 (Jan, Professor of Sociology – University of Illinois (Urbana), “Political and Economic Brinkmanship”, Review of International Political Economy, 14(3), p. 473) Brinkmanship and producing instability carry several meanings. The American military spends 48% of world military spending (2005) and represents a vast, virtually continuously growing establishment that is a world in itself with its own lingo, its own reasons, internecine battles and projects. That this large security establishment is a bipartisan project makes it politically relatively immune. That for security reasons it is an insular world shelters it from scrutiny. For reasons of ‘deniability’ the president is insulated from certain operations (Risen, 2006). That it is a completely hierarchical world onto itself makes it relatively unaccountable. Hence, to quote Rumsfeld, ‘stuff happens’. In part this is the familiar theme of the Praetorian Guard and the shadow state (Stockwell, 1991). It includes a military on the go, a military that seeks career advancement through role expansion, seeks expansion through threat inflation, and in inflated threats finds rationales for ruthless action and is thus subject to feedback from its own echo chambers. Misinformation broadcast by part of the intelligence apparatus blows back to other security circles where it may be taken for real (Johnson, 2000). Inhabiting a hall of mirrors this apparatus operates in a perpetual state of self hypnosis with, since it concerns classified information and covert ops, limited checks on its functioning. Alternative Solves: Our Turner evidence says that once we can fix our representations, then we can fix our politics. We can change how we work between governments, but we must fix our language first. Basically, we agree with the aff, we just have to do the alternative first. 2AC Affirmative Answers to China Securitization Kritik
Our interpretation is that the impacts of the Aff should be evaluated.
Nye, 2009 (Joseph - Professor and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School. , BA suma cum laude Princeton, PhD Harvard, Former Chair National Intelligence Council, Former Asst. Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/AR2009041202260_pf.html 4-13 President Obama has appointed some distinguished academic economists and lawyers to his administration, but few high-ranking political scientists have been named. In fact, the editors of a recent poll of more than 2,700 international relations experts declared that "the walls surrounding the ivory tower have never seemed so high." While important American scholars such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski took high-level foreign policy positions in the past, that path has tended to be a one-way street. Not many top-ranked scholars of international relations are going into government, and even fewer return to contribute to academic theory. The 2008 Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) poll, by the Institute for Theory and Practice in International Relations, showed that of the 25 scholars rated as producing the most interesting scholarship during the past five years, only three had ever held policy positions (two in the U.S. government and one in the United Nations). The fault for this growing gap lies not with the government but with the academics. Scholars are paying less attention to questions about how their work relates to the policy world, and in many departments a focus on policy can hurt one's career. Advancement comes faster for those who develop mathematical models, new methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to policymakers. A survey of articles published over the lifetime of the American Political Science Review found that about one in five dealt with policy prescription or criticism in the first half of the century, while only a handful did so after 1967. Editor Lee Sigelman observed in the journal's centennial issue that "if 'speaking truth to power' and contributing directly to public dialogue about the merits and demerits of various courses of action were still numbered among the functions of the profession, one would not have known it from leafing through its leading journal." As citizens, academics might be considered to have an obligation to help improve on policy ideas when they can. Moreover, such engagement can enhance and enrich academic work, and thus the ability of academics to teach the next generation. As former undersecretary of state David Newsom argued a decade ago, "the growing withdrawal of university scholars behind curtains of theory and modeling would not have wider significance if this trend did not raise questions regarding the preparation of new generations and the future influence of the academic community on public and official perceptions of international issues and events. Teachers plant seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation; this is probably the academic world's most lasting contribution." Yet too often scholars teach theory and methods that are relevant to other academics but not to the majority of the students sitting in the classroom before them. Some academics say that while the growing gap between theory and policy may have costs for policy, it has produced better social science theory, and that this is more important than whether such scholarship is relevant. Also, to some extent, the gap is an inevitable result of the growth and specialization of knowledge. Few people can keep up with their subfields, much less all of social science. But the danger is that academic theorizing will say more and more about less and less. Even when academics supplement their usual trickle-down approach to policy by writing in journals, newspapers or blogs, or by consulting for candidates or public officials, they face many competitors for attention. More than 1,200 think tanks in the United States provide not only ideas but also experts ready to comment or consult at a moment's notice. Some of these new transmission belts serve as translators and additional outlets for academic ideas, but many add a bias provided by their founders and funders. As a group, think tanks are heterogeneous in scope, funding, ideology and location, but universities generally offer a more neutral viewpoint. While pluralism of institutional pathways is good for democracy, the policy process is diminished by the withdrawal of the academic community. The solutions must come via a reappraisal within the academy itself. Departments should give greater weight to real-world relevance and impact in hiring and promoting young scholars. Journals could place greater weight on relevance in evaluating submissions. Studies of specific regions deserve more attention. Universities could facilitate interest in the world by giving junior faculty members greater incentives to participate in it. That should include greater toleration of unpopular policy positions. One could multiply such useful suggestions, but young people should not hold their breath waiting for them to be implemented. If anything, the trends in academic life seem to be headed in the opposite direction.
Loader and Walker, 2007 [Ian Loader (Professor of Criminology at Oxford University) and Neil Walker (Professor of Public Law and the Law of Nature and Nations at the University of Edinburgh) Civilizing Security “Chapter 1: Uncivil Society?”page 7] Our argument in this book is that security is a valuable public good, a constitutive ingredient of the good society, and that the democratic state has a necessary and virtuous role to play in the production of this good. The state, and in particular the forms of public policing governed by it, is, we shall argue, indispensable to the task of fostering and sustaining liveable political communities in the contemporary world. It is, in the words of our title, pivotal to the project of civilizing security. By invoking this phrase we have in mind two ideas, both of which we develop in the course of the book. The first, which is relatively familiar if not uncontroversial, is that security needs civilizing. States – even those that claim with some justification to be ‘liberal’ or ‘democratic’ – have a capacity when self-consciously pursuing a condition called ‘security’ to act in a fashion injurious to it. So too do non-state ‘security’ actors, a point we return to below and throughout the book. They proceed in ways that trample over the basic liberties of citizens; that forge security for some groups while imposing illegitimate burdens of insecurity upon others, or that extend the coercive reach of the state – and security discourse – over social and political life. As monopoly holders of the means of legitimate physical and symbolic violence, modern states possess a built-in, paradoxical tendency to undermine the very liberties and security they are constituted to protect. Under conditions of fear, such as obtain across many parts of the globe today, states and their police forces are prone to deploying their power in precisely such uncivil, insecurity instilling ways. If the state is to perform the ordering and solidarity nourishing work that we argue is vital to the production of secure political communities then it must, consequently, be connected to forms of discursive contestation, democratic scrutiny and constitutional control. The state is a great civilizing force, a necessary and virtuous component of the good society. But if it is to take on this role, the state must itself be civilized – made safe by and for democracy.
Etzioni, 2004 -- professor of International Relations at the George Washington University (Amitai, 2004, "The Emerging Global Normative Synthesis," The Journal of Political Philosophy, 12(2), http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/etzioni/A318.pdf) Both those who favor isolating authoritarian regimes (North Korea, Cuba, etc.) and those who favor engaging them have similar goals--changing these regimes to make more room for autonomy, especially for human rights, although typically other policy goals are also involved, for instance, efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass desecration. (The term engagement is used to refer to fostering travel, trade, cultural exchanges, visits from leaders, and diplomatic relations, while isolation entails curtailing all of these.) Although neither camp sets out to advance the normative synthesis laid out in this essay, the effect of increasing autonomy in these societies would be to move them in the said direction. Both camps argue for the policy approach they favor in the name of normative principles. For instance, those who favor engagement argue that it is more conducive to peace; those who favor isolation claim that it 'generates the needed pressures to advance human rights. The debate would benefit by a greater reliance on empirical evidence, which strongly suggests that under most conditions engagement is much more effective than isolation. It is almost enough to list the regimes that have been isolated and those that have been engaged (or compare the periods they were isolated versus engaged) to document the point, even though there are significant differences among the various societies involved.36 The United States isolated Castro's Cuba for four decades, banning trade with and travel to and from Cuba, as well as exerting pressure on other societies to follow the same course. However, Cuba resisted for more than a generation, granting its people more rights, democratic reforms, and opening markets. Saddam's Iraq and North Korea are two other authoritarian regimes that were isolated; still they persisted for decades. China was first isolated and yielded little, but following Nixon's "opening", the country gradually changed, making much more room for economic autonomy, as well as for some political autonomy. The same holds for North Vietnam. The fifteen Soviet Republics changed even more, including on the political front, largely after they were engaged rather than when they were isolated. The dramatic .change in South Africa from apartheid, in which the overwhelming majority was denied most measures of autonomy, to the current regime also followed a shift from isolation to engagement. However, those who oppose engagement have argued that after years of engagement China is no closer to valuing the freedoms Americans do and that isolation has been effective in wresting concessions out of Beijing.3? Senator Jesse Helms, a strong supporter of the isolation tactic, lists Switzerland, Nigeria, the former Soviet Union, Poland and Guatemala among the countries that have modified their behavior in response to actual or threatened United States sanctions.38 However, a detailed examination of these situations will show that in most cases the isolation measures, and their effects, were limited (for example, getting Switzerland to change its banking laws), while engagement had much more encompassing effects. Moreover, engagement does not mean that no sanctions can be imposed; sanctions are imposed, for instance, by the World Trade Organization when trade agreements are violated. The reasons engagement is often so much more effective, and that it entails neither a violation of principles (for example, our commitments to human rights) nor endangers our security (as we learn to screen those we let in much better), need not be explored here. The only key point relevant to the present analysis is that engagement has, and one must expect will continue to do so, encouraged authoritarian societies to introduce more autonomy-and thus move them toward the global synthesis. The proper measure of progress, though, is not whether they become exact or even close copies of the American regime, but whether they find their own balanced combination of a strong autonomy with social order, largely based on soft power.
Boggs, 2000 (CAROL BOGGS, Professor of POLITICAL SCIENCE – SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 00, THE END OF POLITICS, 250-1) But it is a very deceptive and misleading minimalism. While Oakeshott debunks political mechanisms and rational planning, as either useless or dangerous, the actually existing power structure-replete with its own centralized state apparatus, institutional hierarchies, conscious designs, and indeed, rational plans-remains fully intact, insulated from the minimalist critique. In other words, ideologies and plans are perfectly acceptable for elites who preside over established governing systems, but not for ordinary citizens or groups anxious to challenge the status quo. Such one-sided minimalism gives carte blanche to elites who naturally desire as much space to maneuver as possible. The flight from “abstract principles” rules out ethical attacks on injustices that may pervade the status quo (slavery or imperialist wars, for example) insofar as those injustices might be seen as too deeply embedded in the social and institutional matrix of the time to be the target of oppositional political action. If politics is reduced to nothing other than a process of everyday muddling-through, then people are condemned to accept the harsh realities of an exploitative and authoritarian system, with no choice but to yield to the dictates of “conventional wisdom”. Systematic attempts to ameliorate oppressive conditions would, in Oakeshott’s view, turn into a political nightmare. A belief that totalitarianism might results from extreme attempts to put society in order is one thing; to argue that all politicized efforts to change the world are necessary doomed either to impotence or totalitarianism requires a completely different (and indefensible) set of premises. Oakeshott’s minimalism poses yet another, but still related, range of problems: the shrinkage of politics hardly suggests that corporate colonization, social hierarchies, or centralized state and military institutions will magically disappear from people’s lives. Far from it: the public space vacated by ordinary citizens, well informed and ready to fight for their interests, simply gives elites more room to consolidate their own power and privilege. Beyond that, the fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian civil society, not too far removed from the excessive individualism, social Darwinism and urban violence of the American landscape could open the door to a modern Leviathan intent on restoring order and unity in the face of social disintegration. Viewed in this light, the contemporary drift towards antipolitics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more authoritarian and reactionary guise-or it could simply end up reinforcing the dominant state-corporate system. In either case, the state would probably become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.16 And either outcome would run counter to the facile antirationalism of Oakeshott’s Burkean muddling-through theories.
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The Atlantic, 2015 [Major news organization, “Just How Great a Threat Is China?”, 6/4, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/about-the-china-threat-on-the-the-35th-of-may/394988/] That is, statements of this sort matter. But what matters much more, for China and the United States and Israel and Iran, is whether governments act on these beliefs. And in looking at Liu Mingfu’s book as a guide to Chinese policy, bear these points in mind as well: • The extent to which the PLA feels circled-in and outgunned by the U.S. military is almost impossible for most Americans to imagine. In the United States, everyone assumes that China is ever-ascendant, while America is overcommitted, war-weary, and generally played-out. For reasons I’ve laid out many times (e.g. here and in our recent American Futures reports), I think the declinist view of U.S. prospects is wrong—or at least premature, and not inevitable. But for very different reasons, the U.S. situation can look simultaneously overextended and highly aggressive from the Chinese point of view. At Chinese think tanks and government offices, I’ve seen maps like the one below—showing U.S. forces, allies, or non-enemies, all around the Chinese “homeland.” I came to know by heart the speech that would go along with the map: “How would you Americans feel if China had forces staged in Canada and Mexico? [By which they mean the encampments in Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere.] How would you react if we sold attack aircraft to a regime committed to your destruction? [By which they mean Taiwan.]” The point is not that PLA hawks have an accurate or balanced worldview. They don’t. It is to remind Americans of how different things look from the PLA’s perspective, and why they might be itching to say that “American rules” were “unfair.” Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2015 2015 -> Police Militarization 2015 -> 2015 ihbb championships: hs history Bowl Round 4 – Prelims First Quarter 2015 -> Wrtp/big step · 3841 W. Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, wi 53208 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 December 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Darton College 2015 -> Training Workshop on Planning and Implementation of Multi-Sectoral Development Programme (MsDP) in Bihar Date : 6th 2015 -> Rao bulletin 15 June 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 September 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 August 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Science, and transportation united states senate Download 2.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
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