Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China



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2NC/1NR AT #2—Diplomacy Fails




They say Diplomatic talks fail , but

[GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]



  1. Extend our Naiman evidence.

[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME]

It’s much better than their Washington Times evidence because: [PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME]

[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:

(it’s newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts)

(their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true)

(their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument)

( ) (their evidence supports our argument)



[WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]
[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

Their Washington Times evidence says that diplomacy will fail because other countries disagree about how to fix the problem. However, our Naiman evidence agrees that these talks will be tough, but that a solution is possible and the only way to fix the problem. Russia will get on board against ISIS.
[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]

This matters because: Talks can work to stop ISIS. Our internal link is true and we can prevent ISIS from using nuclear weapons.

  1. Diplomatic talks solve the Syrian conflict and contain ISIS—they snowball into greater successes



Vox World News, February 2016 [Major global news outlet, “Syria's ceasefire: what it means and doesn't”, http://www.vox.com/2016/2/11/10975722/syria-ceasefire-munich]
2) Best case, maybe this can be a baby step toward peace The idea of a peace deal for Syria still feels so remote and unlikely it is difficult to even imagine; the parties within Syria can't even talk to one another, much less the regional powers Iran and Saudi Arabia that treat Syria as their proxy war. None of that is solved by this ceasefire. At best, this agreement, however briefly it holds up, can serve as some confidence-building measure between the parties. Yes, they will spend its duration bickering, cheating, and accusing one another, before one or all of them tear it up. Still, being able to even negotiate a frail and likely doomed ceasefire is something, and the more time the parties spend talking, the more they can wear down the taboo of meeting and the taboo of compromising. That's not going to suddenly make a peace deal appear, but it makes the sheer diplomacy of it a little less difficult. 3) Do not count on everyone to adhere to the ceasefire Russia is putting its stamp on this ceasefire, along with the US, so Moscow will be under special scrutiny. And there's real reason to be skeptical it will hold to the terms, not least because it has long lied about its Syria airstrikes, saying they target ISIS when they in fact target anti-Assad rebels. Russia and its proxies in Ukraine frequently violated ceasefires there. But even if Russia does stick to the ceasefire, Moscow has shown over and over that its leverage over Bashar al-Assad is limited. There is no guarantee that Assad's forces will comply with the ceasefire. Even if both Assad and Russia comply, then their control over pro-Assad Shia militias is not complete, either. By the same token, Syria's anti-Assad rebels may have come together under an umbrella negotiating body, but there are still dozens of rebel groups, some of which could violate the ceasefire. The Syrian conflict is a tangled mess of dozens of local and foreign actors. The odds that all of them stick by the ceasefire throughout its duration is extremely low. The odds that the ceasefire falls apart, and probably quite quickly, assuming it ever even gets started, are very high. The moment someone first fires a rifle in Syria, there will be a spate of punditry demanding that America immediately plunge Syria back into war and abandon peace talks. Nonetheless, not all violations are equal. If and when those violations happen, the question becomes whether the violations are sufficiently systemic to necessitate ending the ceasefire entirely, or whether they are isolated enough that Syrians are better off if the ceasefire holds despite violations. 4) Whoever is seen as first breaking the ceasefire will suffer for it diplomatically This is an oh-so-faint silver lining to the near certainty that the ceasefire will quickly collapse: Whoever is seen as bringing it down will humiliate their allies and anger peace-talk mediators. This happened, for example, with ceasefire violations in Ukraine, which helped build momentum for the crushing European sanctions on Russia that eventually brought Moscow's offensive, if not to an end, at least to heel. So whoever is the worst bad actor here will end up outing themselves in ways that will bring them diplomatic costs, and make it easier to isolate that party at further rounds of talks. However, do not assume that will be someone on the pro-Assad side; it could rather end up being some anti-Assad rebel group, which would risk dangerously fracturing the coalition. So I suppose there's a gray lining to the silver lining. 5) There are ways to accomplish things other than by bombing The commentary in the US in the lead-up to Munich was exactly what you'd expect: comparing it to Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler at that same city in 1938, accusing President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry of not just incompetence but of deliberately selling out the Syrian rebels, and, most of all, declaring that American policy is morally bankrupt and responsible for abetting genocide. The central argument in all these many takes was that the only appropriate US policy on Syria is for the United States to escalate militarily — to do more killing — and to abandon diplomacy, which has been portrayed as not just a failure but a moral evil on par with genocide. I have previously argued that there was indeed likely a brief window, early in Syria's war, where US military action could have helped. But there is an unfortunate tendency in the US to believe that military action is the only ever appropriate policy in response to foreign crises and that diplomacy is not just ineffective but doomed to worsen violence. Maybe it will turn out that this ceasefire collapses quickly, or before it has even begun. Maybe it will turn out that this entire agreement was a massive ploy from the beginning meant to deliberately sacrifice massive Russian diplomatic capital just to delay further action from the US and its allies by a few days. But it seems at least possible that diplomacy will have won a much-needed respite, however brief, for the Syrian civilians whose fate matters most here. 6) Syrian peace talks, no matter how doomed, are still worth having As I wrote a week ago, even if peace talks never come anywhere near achieving a peace deal, the mere practice of bringing the parties together can win occasional (very) minor victories like this. Let's hope, though hope is a sadly relative term at this point when it comes to Syria, that there will be more.

  1. Thousands are dying in Syria and diplomacy is the only answer—it has historically worked in Europe



Chomsky, May 2016 [Noam, American linguist, philosopher, cognitive scientist, historian, logician, social critic, and political activist, M.I.T. professor, “Noam Chomsky's Simple 2-Step Solution to Minimize the Atrocities in Syria”, May 19, http://www.alternet.org/world/noam-chomsky-syria-conflict-cut-flow-arms-stop-bombing-stem-atrocities]
NOAM CHOMSKY: Syria is spiraling into real disaster, a virtual suicide. And the only sensible approach, the only slim hope, for Syria is efforts to reduce the violence and destruction, to establish small regional ceasefire zones and to move toward some kind of diplomatic settlement. There are steps in that direction. Also, it’s necessary to cut off the flow of arms, as much as possible, to everyone. That means to the vicious and brutal Assad regime, primarily Russia and Iran, to the monstrous ISIS, which has been getting support tacitly through Turkey, through—to the al-Nusra Front, which is hardly different, has just the—the al-Qaeda affiliate, technically broke from it, but actually the al-Qaeda affiliate, which is now planning its own—some sort of emirate, getting arms from our allies, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Our own—the CIA is arming them. We don’t know at what level; it’s clandestine. As much as possible, cut back the flow of arms, the level of violence, try to save people from destruction. There should be far more support going simply for humanitarian aid. Those who are building some sort of a society in Syria—notably, the Kurds—should be supported in that effort. These efforts should be made to cut off the flow of jihadis from the places where they’re coming from. And that means understanding why it’s happening. It’s not enough just to say, "OK, let’s bomb them to oblivion." This is happening for reasons. Some of the reasons, unfortunately, are—we can’t reverse. The U.S. invasion of Iraq was a major reason in the development, a primary reason in the incitement of sectarian conflicts, which have now exploded into these monstrosities. That’s water under the bridge, unfortunately, though we can make sure not to do that—not to continue with that. But we may like it or not, but ISIS, the ISIL, whatever you want to call it, does have popular support even among people who hate it. The Sunni—much of the Sunni population of Iraq and Syria evidently regards it as better than the alternative, something which at least defends them from the alternative. From the Western countries, the flow of jihadis is primarily from young people who are—who live in conditions of humiliation, degradation, repression, and want something decent—want some dignity in their lives, want something idealistic. They’re picking the wrong horse, by a large margin, but you can understand what they’re aiming for. And there’s plenty of research and studies—Scott Atran and others have worked on this and have plenty of evidence about it. And those—alleviating and dealing with those real problems can be a way to reduce the level of violence and destruction. It’s much more dramatic to say, "Let’s carpet bomb them," or "Let’s bomb them to oblivion," or "Let’s send in troops." But that simply makes the situation far worse. Actually, we’ve seen it for 15 years. Just take a look at the so-called war on terror, which George W. Bush declared—actually, redeclared; Reagan had declared it—but redeclared in 2001. At that point, jihadi terrorism was located in a tiny tribal area near the Afghan-Pakistan border. Where is—and since then, we’ve been hitting one or another center of what we call terrorism with a sledgehammer. What’s happened? Each time, it spreads. By now, it’s all over the world. It’s all over Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia, everywhere you look. Take the bombing of Libya, which Hillary Clinton was strongly in favor of, one of the leaders of, smashed up Libya, destroyed a functioning society. The bombing sharply escalated the level of atrocities by a large factor, devastated the country, left it in the hands of warring militias, opened the door for ISIS to establish a base, spread jihadis and heavy weapons all through Africa, in fact, into the Middle East. Last year, the—according to U.N. statistics, the worst terror in the world was in West Africa, Boko Haram and others, to a considerable extent an offshoot of the bombing of Libya. That’s what happens when you hit vulnerable systems with a sledgehammer, not knowing what you’re doing and not looking at the roots of where these movements are developing from. So you have to understand the—understand where it’s coming from, where the appeal lies, what the roots are—there are often quite genuine grievances—at the same time try to cut back the level of violence. And, you know, we’ve had experience where things like this worked. Take, say, IRA terrorism. It was pretty severe. Now, they practically murdered the whole British Cabinet at one point. As long as Britain responded to IRA terrorism with more terror and violence, it simply escalated. As soon as Britain finally began—incidentally, with some helpful U.S. assistance at this point—in paying some attention to the actual grievances of Northern Irish Catholics, as soon as they started with that, violence subsided, reduced. People who had been called leading terrorists showed up on negotiating teams, even, finally, in the government. I happened to be in Belfast in 1993. It was a war zone, literally. I was there again a couple of years ago. It looks like any other city. You can see ethnic antagonisms, but nothing terribly out of the ordinary. That’s the way to deal with these issues. Incidentally, what’s happening in Syria right now is horrendous, but we shouldn’t—useful to remember that it’s not the first time. If you go back a century, almost exactly a century, the end of the First World War, there were hundreds of thousands of people starving to death in Syria. Proportionally, proportional to the population, it’s likely that more Syrians died in the First World War than any other belligerent. Syria did revive, and it can revive again.

  1. Iran is a major player and they support the talks



Tasnim News Agency, May 2016 [Major Iranian news outlet, “Diplomacy Only Solution to Syria Crisis: Iran’s Deputy FM”, http://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2016/05/07/1068234/diplomacy-only-solution-to-syria-crisis-iran-s-deputy-fm]
TEHRAN (Tasnim) – Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs Hossein Amir Abdollahian stressed that the Syrian crisis should be resolved only through a political approach. "We believe it is necessary to push forward the political process, and the Geneva talks are the only way to resolve the Syrian issue," Amir Abdollahian told Sputnik recently after a meeting with Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov in Moscow. He further reaffirmed Iran’s support for the Syrian government and nation in their fight against terrorist groups. "We will continue to support Assad and the Syrian people in their struggle against terrorism, and we will make efforts to ensure that political negotiations are successful," Amir Abdollahian said.



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