Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China
NC/1NR EU CP Internal Net Benefit - OBOR Solves Terrorism/Drug Trade Extensions
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- 2NC/1NR EU CP Internal Net Benefit - OBOR Solves EU Economy
- 2AC European Union Counterplan Answers
- Cooperation between all three countries solve a ton of different impacts—the perm is best
- Hegemony
- US hegemony solves global warfare between the US and China—strong diplomacy solves
2NC/1NR EU CP Internal Net Benefit - OBOR Solves Terrorism/Drug Trade Extensions
RSIS, March 2016 [S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies a professional graduate school of international affairs at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. RSIS’ mission is to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of security studies and international affairs, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/PR160307_China-One-Belt-One-Road.pdf] The EU should focus on long-term priorities to engage China, taking into consideration not only Brussels’ present lack of available resources but also the high costs to be borne by the EU in the event of a new crisis in South and Central Asia. Although the priority of relations for Russia and the EU are related to the unfolding of the Ukrainian crisis, the Russian influence on its neighbours is going to endure. While the Central Asian republics are enacting a multi-vector foreign policy, balancing China’s economic might with Russia’s military power, the EU “flexible engagement” with the One Belt initiative could promote cooperation, combining the EU know-how, regional domestic needs with the affluence of Chinese investors. Chinese interests in Afghanistan could benefit from EU mechanisms that counter the spread of drug trade and illegal economies all over Eurasia. The first thing to do is for the EU to project a single voice to China and avoid representing different policies and priorities between Brussels and the EU member states. The key point to deliver to China is that strengthening of cross-regional Chinese- made infrastructure has to be balanced by an equitable access to construction projects by non- Chinese corporations. Moreover, transparency and access to the bidding process will also enhance Chinese SOEs’ competitiveness and facilitate the SOE reform in the long run. The OBOR initiative has already interconnected with other multilateral platforms such as the EEU and the EU active engagement could guarantee European companies the same level of access to the Chinese market that the Chinese companies are already enjoying in the European market. While China is in dire need of an update in its public diplomacy communication attempts to keep pace with increasing confidence in its own ODI process, it is critical to stress the long-term geopolitical consequences of its economic assertiveness. The EU involvement with the OBOR initiative will be a defining moment for Sino-European relations. As the EU needs to offer China a unified and confident approach on the OBOR initiative, China needs to provide a coordinated strategic plan that streamlines the plethora of institutional actors into an easily recognisable interlocutor. There is still time for the EU to catch the train if its policy and timeline are clear, sustainable and understood by all the parties concerned. 2NC/1NR EU CP Internal Net Benefit - OBOR Solves EU Economy
RSIS, March 2016 [S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies a professional graduate school of international affairs at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. RSIS’ mission is to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of security studies and international affairs, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/PR160307_China-One-Belt-One-Road.pdf] The Europe-China transport links promoted by China encompass several projects along different corridors, including high-speed rail connections, trans-national highways and pipelines. In Xi’s vision, the geostrategic land-locked position and economic development potential of the Central Asian states offer an opportunity for bridging trade flows between Asia and the EU. The envisaged Eurasian Land Bridge will benefit China with faster access to the EU market (less than three weeks compared to an average of five weeks by container shipping), while EU companies will not only have a cost-effective route for exports, but also an efficient way to import their own China-based production. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the Eurasian rail network has become an efficient trade route. Besides, from the Chinese geopolitical point of view, this route is safer than the maritime one because it avoids the choke point of the Straits of Malacca. The main trade routes include the following: 2AC European Union Counterplan Answers
Xiaotong, 2015 [Zhang, Writer for Wuhan Center for Economic Diplomacy, “The EU-China Bilateral Investment Treaty: Pros and Cons”, January 16, http://www.whuced.com/show/?id=170&siteid=3] Despite the fact that China and EU have had made their minds, setting the scope and substances of the lists would be a difficult mission. There would surely be domestic resistances on both sides as the substantive discussions on new market openings move along. Moreover, the gaps in terms of development stage and economic structures between the two players result in very different development needs, which might create new tensions. The EU, leading in many fields, such as service, industrial design and high-end manufacturing, attaches great importance to labor rights and environmental protection, whereas China, ranking top in manufacturing, hopes to remove investment barriers in the EU market. It’s foreseeable that China and EU will present two very different negative lists so as to protect their own industries and achieving their own demands. Such differences remain the biggest obstacle in the negotiation.
Yi, 2013 [Wang, associate research fellow with China Institute of International Studies, “Sino-European-U.S. Relations and the Possibilities of Trilateral Cooperation”, August 13, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-08/19/content_6223055_2.htm] Competition between the three sides in terms of geopolitics, trade and hotspot issues is intensifying, and structural conflicts are inevitable. That being said, the common interests shared by the three sides are steadily growing, and positive interactions are increasing instead of decreasing. Mired in long-term difficulties, the United States and European economies need to maintain and strengthen cooperation with China for their own interests. The differences between China on the one hand and Europe and the United States on the other hand in terms of economic development and macroeconomic industrial structure make it both possible and necessary for them to develop complementary and mutually beneficial relations. China, Europe and the United States are already key and indispensable players on an array of issues, from the reform of the UN and the international financial system, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, immigration, economics, trade, global governance, climate change, energy and food security and other important issues. The three sides’ policies and positions are interlinked, interactive and mutually influenced. China’s idea of “G3 Co-governance” and Western scholars’ conception of a “tripartite coexistence” of the RMB, the euro and the U.S. dollar have indirectly proved the eagerness of Europe and the United States to cooperate with China. The main reason for this eagerness is that China, Europe and the United States are already the most prominent actors on the international stage, comprising the key stakeholders in global strategic issues. This dynamic determines that trilateral relations between the three parties are a combination of cooperation and competition. On the one hand, the three sides have a strong incentive to cooperate: if they work together, they can mutually benefit and better cope with various challenges. China, Europe and the United States, along with all other countries, are facing an array of global issues, and it is in the interest of all countries to get together to effectively cope with these challenges. On the other hand, there is competition among the three parties in their attempts to meet these challenges. The core of their competition rests on how the three sides can fairly and justly share and allocate responsibilities and obligations in the international community. The essence of their competition is the struggle for space and the rights of national development – in sum, it involves an optimization and change of responsibilities, rights and returns in the international system.
Mendis and Wang, May 2016 [Patrick and Joey, Mendis is a Rajawali senior fellow of the Kennedy School of Government’s Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard University and Wang is a defense analyst and a graduate of the Naval War College, the National Defense University, and the Harvard Kennedy School, “Who Can Contain China When U.S. Policy Fails?”, 5/1, http://www.theglobalist.com/who-can-contain-china-when-united-states-policy-fails/] Throughout these intervening 20th century years, the meager trading relationship went through fits and starts. Nonetheless, when Deng Xiaoping took China’s helm and embarked on a path toward trade liberalization and modernization, China’s significance to the world economy began to emerge. Eventually this led to its accession to the WTO in 2001. With U.S. assistance, via trade policy, China has crossed the economic Rubicon where there is no return. According to a September 2015 Congressional Research Service report, total U.S. trade has risen from $2 million in 1979 to $591 billion in 2014: “China is currently the United States’ second-largest trading partner, its third largest export market, and its biggest source of imports.” China’s fixation with security in the South China Sea, Indian Ocean and other sea lines of communication (SLOCs) is not without cause. Seven of the world’s top ten container ports are in China. China’s export economy survives by these trade routes. Any disruption to these routes would be a significant impact not only to its economy but also to the American and global economies. The latter has been demonstrated by the ripple effects of recent stock exchange plunges in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Autonomous but Interdependent. Indeed, China’s rise could easily be viewed as an existential threat. Beijing’s ability to project power today has never been greater, both economically and militarily. And the signs of aspiring hegemony are underscored by that ability. Yet, China’s rising power could also be welcomed as another global force capable of burden-sharing. One that can contribute to fighting a myriad of threats, such as participating with multinational forces in maintaining the security of SLOCs, counterpiracy, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and a variety of other global missions. These are the threats that China and the rest of the world really face. In other words, with great power comes great responsibility. Recognizing that any disruption to China’s economy would mean a disruption to the U.S. economy, the United States should support China in maintaining a healthy trade relationship. It should also continue to focus on building a much needed trust, promoting fair competition and engaging China to join rule-based institutions and paving the road toward a MAP doctrine.
Thayer, 2007 [Bradley. A is an Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, “American Empire: A Debate”, Taylor and Francis Group, 2007] So it is with the United States today. Peace and stability are major benefits of the American Empire. The fact that America is so powerful actually reduces the likelihood of major war. Scholars of international politics have found that the presence of a dominant state in international politics actually reduces the likelihood of war because weaker states, including even great powers, know that it is unlikely that they could challenge the dominant state and win. They may resort to other mechanisms or tactics to challenge the dominant country, but are unlikely to do so directly. This means that there will be no wars between great powers. At least, not until a challenger (certainly China) thinks it can overthrow the dominant state (the United States). But there will be intense security competition—both China and the United States will watch each other closely, with their intelligence communities increasingly focused on each other, their diplomats striving to ensure that countries around the world do not align with the other, and their militaries seeing the other as their principal threat. This is not unusual in international politics but, in fact, is its “normal” condition. Americans may not pay much attention to it until a crisis occurs. But right now states are competing with one another. This is because international politics does not sleep; it never takes a rest. Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2015 2015 -> Police Militarization 2015 -> 2015 ihbb championships: hs history Bowl Round 4 – Prelims First Quarter 2015 -> Wrtp/big step · 3841 W. Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, wi 53208 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 December 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Darton College 2015 -> Training Workshop on Planning and Implementation of Multi-Sectoral Development Programme (MsDP) in Bihar Date : 6th 2015 -> Rao bulletin 15 June 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 September 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 August 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Science, and transportation united states senate Download 2.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
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