Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China


AC Democracy AT #1—US Violates Democracy



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2AC Democracy AT #1—US Violates Democracy



They say The US violates democracy, but

[GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]



  1. Extend our Williams and Human Rights Watch evidence.

[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME]

It’s much better than their Guardian evidence because: [PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME]

[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:

(it’s newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts)

(their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true)

(their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument)

( ) (their evidence supports our argument)

[WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]
[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

Their evidence quotes high-level Chinese government officials. Of course they’re going to say the US is bad democratically because they want to make themselves look better in comparison. Moreover, our evidence talks about the truly horrible abuses of democracy where people don’t get a fair trial, there’s no freedom of speech, and the internet is censored. While Trump is a bad guy, it doesn’t compare.

[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]



This matters because: we get our democracy harms and lead to our impact. If we don’t do the aff, then our democracy impact is inevitable.


  1. Cross-apply our human rights advantage—all of the violence against women, Tibetans, workers, and the LGBTQ community prove that democracy is comparatively worse in China than the US.



  1. Chinese democracy is in decline as those who disagree are silenced. A strong arm ruler will be elected and strike militarily—they have their own Trump problems



The Atlantic, 2015 [ “Chinese Democracy Isn't Inevitable”, May 29, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/chinese-democracy-isnt-inevitable/394325/]
The flaws in China’s political system are obvious. The government doesn’t even make a pretense of holding national elections and punishes those who openly call for multiparty rule. The press is heavily censored and the Internet is blocked. Top leaders are unconstrained by the rule of law. Even more worrisome, repression has been ramped up since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, suggesting that the regime is increasingly worried about its legitimacy. The Democracy Report Some China experts—most recently David Shambaugh of George Washington University—interpret these ominous signs as evidence that the Chinese political system is on the verge of collapse. But such an outcome is highly unlikely in the near future. The Communist Party is firmly in power, its top leader is popular, and no political alternative currently claims widespread support. And what would happen if the Party’s power did indeed crumble? The most likely result, in my view, would be rule by a populist strongman backed by elements of the country’s security and military forces. The new ruler might seek to buttress his legitimacy by launching military adventures abroad. President Xi would look tame by comparison. A more realistic and, arguably, desirable outcome would involve political change that builds on the advantages of the current system. But what exactly are the good parts of the Chinese political model? And how can they be advanced without repression? I believe the model can be improved in a more open political environment and, eventually, put before the people in a popular referendum.



  1. Even if it’s partially contradictory, it’s still good to do


Cihangir-Tetik , 2014 Damla Cihangir-Tetik is a Ph.D Candidate in Political Science, Sabanci University/Istanbul as well as Project Coordinator for Transparency International Turkey, pg online @ http://idsmagazine.org/human-rights-and-democracy-promotion-as-foreign-policy-tools-of-transatlantic-partners-by-damla-cihangir-tetik/
Regarding human rights protection and democracy promotion, the “discrepancy of the West” argument reached its peak with the “war on terrorism” policy of the US after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Western democracy promotion and human rights norms deteriorated with the US-led operation in Afghanistan in order to fight against global terrorism and with the invasion of Iraq by the US and Britain. Additionally, the treatment of prisoners by the US officials in Guantanamo Bay, Bagram in Afghanistan and Abu Ghraib was perceived as aggressive, paternalistic, neo-imperialist and a combination of all those by the rest of the international community (Burnell 2010, 2). Importantly, the EU and especially the US are faced with an important credibility problem at the moment concerning their efforts towards international human rights protection and democracy promotion in the rest of the world. “Credibility refers to the fact that democratization is hardly ever the only foreign policy goal of those governments who provide democracy assistance” (Burnell 2010). As Bermeo explains, even though the US has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on democracy and good governance in Egypt, its military aid, which is much more higher than the ones for democratization, increases the scepticism towards the priority of the US in Egypt (Bermeo 2009). “Democracy promotion can therefore only succeed if it is embedded within the overall set of foreign policies of the promoting country and if the promoting country itself adheres to the rules, norms and values it claims to want to become more widespread” (Burnell 2010). Similarly, concerning international human rights protection, the US fails to accede to the ICC with others – including China, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia – and this discourages these states and also the others from engaging in activities that promote human rights (Muftuler-Bac and Peterson 2014). As a result, at the moment it is not expected from the US to be a global leader of human rights protection and democracy promotion internationally. However, one has to keep in mind that the US under President Wilson’s administration was leading both bilateral and multilateral means of democracy promotion at the beginning of the 20th century. The US has established USAID in 1961 and the National Endowment for Democracy as its main democracy promotion instruments. In the mission statement of the State Department, democracy promotion is underlined as a political purpose for the US; “…advance freedom for benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system” (US Department of State 2007). As Babayan mentions, different US administrations have different modes of democracy promotion and human rights protection. While in the 1990s President Clinton made democracy promotion one of the three main pillars of his foreign policy, President George W. Bush adopted a different democracy promotion rhetoric, which is combined with military means and which President Obama later distanced himself from (Babayan 2013, Babayan and Huber 2012, 3). Even though he continues to apply human rights and democracy promotion policies, he is much more cautious than his predecessors because of increasing multipolarity in global security environment and increasing domestic pressures. According to discussed outcomes of diverse Western-led human rights protection and democracy promotion policies there is no certain, clear answer to the question of “do human rights protection and democracy promotion policies of the West work?” The answer is both “yes” and “no”. As Gravingholt et. al. mention, the foremost reason for this blurriness is the unknown precise rules of democratization (Gravingholt et. al. 2009). It is the same for human rights protection, an area where international legal norms and rules are not specified, internationalized and applicable until now, even though some improved steps regarding the creation of enforceable rules of International Criminal Court (ICC) and International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Even the US and the EU have different approaches regarding human rights protection and democracy promotion and several disagreements on some issues, ranging from counterterrorism policies to private data collection and their shared security measures. As mentioned above, even though there is a continuation of the “discrepancy of the West” and/or the “credibility problem of the West”, the transatlantic partners still lead human rights protection and democracy promotion internationally. Therefore, they have been pushing other states, IOs and non-state actors for the creation of international norms in the multilateral framework. However, this leadership perception is now insufficient to abolish the question: Has the West dropped human rights protection and democracy as a norm in response to the emergence of alternative political regimes to the Western democracy, especially by the rise of China and Russia as global powers?

  1. U.S. domestic policy has no effect on the ability for us to project human rights norms credibly



Moravcsik, 2005 Andrew Moravcsik 5, PhD and a Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, 2005, "The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy," American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/paradox.pdf
It is natural to ask: What are the consequences of U.S. "exemptionalismand noncompliance? International lawyers and human rights activists regularly issue dire warnings about the ways in which the apparent hypocrisy of the United States encourages foreign governments to violate human rights, ignore international pressure, and undermine international human rights institutions. In Patricia Derian's oft-cited statement before the Senate in I979: "Ratification by the United States significantly will enhance the legitimacy and acceptance of these standards. It will encourage other countries to join those which have already accepted the treaties. And, in countries where human rights generally are not respected, it will aid citizens in raising human rights issues.""' One constantly hears this refrain. Yet there is little empirical reason to accept it. Human rights norms have in fact spread widely without much attention to U.S. domestic policy. In the wake of the "third wave" democratization in Eastern Europe, East Asia, and Latin America, government after government moved ahead toward more active domestic and international human rights policies without attending to U.S. domestic or international practice." The human rights movement has firmly embedded itself in public opinion and NGO networks, in the United States as well as elsewhere, despite the dubious legal status of international norms in the United States. One reads occasional quotations from recalcitrant governments citing American noncompliance in their own defense-most recently Israel and Australia-but there is little evidence that this was more than a redundant justification for policies made on other grounds. Other governments adhere or do not adhere to global norms, comply or do not comply with judgments of tribunals, for reasons that seem to have little to do with U.S. multilateral policy.




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