Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China
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- Link and Internal-Link: US-China cooperation makes Taiwan more vulnerable and leads to war
- China-Taiwan conflict becomes nuclear WWIII
1NC Taiwan Relations Disadvantage
Krepinevich, 2015 [Andrew, President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, March/April, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-02-16/how-deter-china] In the U.S. military, at least, the “pivot” to Asia has begun. By 2020, the navy and the air force plan to base 60 percent of their forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The Pentagon, meanwhile, is investing a growing share of its shrinking resources in new long-range bombers and nuclear-powered submarines designed to operate in high-threat environments. These changes are clearly meant to check an increasingly assertive China. And with good reason: Beijing’s expanding territorial claims threaten virtually every country along what is commonly known as “the first island chain,” encompassing parts of Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan—all of which Washington is obligated to protect. But to reliably deter Chinese aggression, the Pentagon will have to go even further. Emerging Chinese capabilities are intended to blunt Washington’s ability to provide military support to its allies and partners. Although deterrence through the prospect of punishment, in the form of air strikes and naval blockades, has a role to play in discouraging Chinese adventurism, Washington’s goal, and that of its allies and partners, should be to achieve deterrence through denial—to convince Beijing that it simply cannot achieve its objectives with force. Leveraging the latent potential of U.S., allied, and partner ground forces, Washington can best achieve this objective by establishing a series of linked defenses along the first island chain—an “Archipelagic Defense”—and, in so doing, deny Beijing the ability to achieve its revisionist aims through aggression or coercion.
Brookings Institution, 2010 [“China’s Growing Strength, Taiwan's Diminishing Options”, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/11/china-taiwan-wang] The shifting cross-Strait military balance in China’s favor has negative consequences for Taiwan’s security. First, though unlikely at present, should Beijing decide to use military coercion in the future, Taiwan could be forced to sacrifice its interests and accommodate Beijing's demands. Second, China's increased anti-access and area-denial capabilities could delay or frustrate U.S. attempts to support Taiwan in case of conflict, raising the costs of U.S. intervention. Taiwan's heightened sense of vulnerability and the increased uncertainty of U.S. support have the effect of reducing the island’s bargaining power with the mainland. In addition, China's overall military rise might lead Taiwan’s allies to question the necessity of support. For instance, U.S. Senator Arlen Specter, describing Taiwan as “an irritant to mainland China,” suggested that Washington should revise its arms sale policy to Taiwan because even a reasonable increase in armaments sold to Taiwan “would not be sufficient to stem the tide” if China decided to invade the island.[4] The rising difficulty of defending against a mainland attack is likely to raise doubt about the utility of coming to Taiwan's defense. Compounding the problem is the decline in Taiwan’s defense budget as a percentage of GDP over the years, leading some analysts to question Taiwan's determination to defend itself. A reassessment of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, however, would have tremendous implications for Taiwan’s security. Over the decades, U.S. support has been the indispensible factor for the survival of the island. The U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, in effect from 1954 to 1980, provided an alliance that guaranteed Taiwan’s security. U.S.-Taiwan security relations continued after Washington switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing, and sustained arms sales to Taiwan helped strengthen the island's defense. The Taiwan Relations Act, enacted by U.S. Congress in 1979, stipulates that “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” The arms sales, in addition to strengthening Taiwan’s defense, also indicate the level of political support from Washington. Beijing sought to restrict U.S. arms sale to Taiwan in the August 17, 1982 Communiqué. But before he formally agreed to the communiqué, President Reagan secretly sent an envoy to deliver what became known as the Six Assurances to Taipei affirming that Washington would not “set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan.”[5] The pledge not to set a termination date, however, may be meaningless if Washington does not sell Taiwan the equipment that it needs.
White, 2015 [Hugh, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra, “Would America Risk a Nuclear War with China over Taiwan?”, May 5, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-risk-nuclear-war-china-over-taiwan-12808] Things are different today. China's economy is now so big and so central to global trade and capital flows that the consequences of any disruption would be just as serious for America as for China. Militarily, America can no longer expect a swift and certain victory in a war over Taiwan. China's anti-access/area-denial capabilities would preclude direct US intervention unless those capabilities had first been degraded by a sustained and wide-ranging strike campaign against Chinese bases and forces. China would very likely respond to such a campaign with attacks on US and allied bases throughout Asia. The US has no evident means to cap the resulting escalation spiral, and no one could be sure it would stop below the nuclear threshold. The possibility of nuclear attacks on US cities would have to be considered These new realities of power mean that today a US-China conflict would impose equal risks and costs on both sides. And where costs and risks are equal, the advantage lies with those who have more at stake, and hence greater resolve. China's leaders today seem to think they hold this advantage, and they are probably right. It is therefore a big mistake to keep assuming, as many people seem to do, that China would be sure to back off before a crisis over Taiwan became a conflict. Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2015 2015 -> Police Militarization 2015 -> 2015 ihbb championships: hs history Bowl Round 4 – Prelims First Quarter 2015 -> Wrtp/big step · 3841 W. Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, wi 53208 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 December 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Darton College 2015 -> Training Workshop on Planning and Implementation of Multi-Sectoral Development Programme (MsDP) in Bihar Date : 6th 2015 -> Rao bulletin 15 June 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 September 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 August 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Science, and transportation united states senate Download 2.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
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