Review of Asian Studies
General Hoang Van Thai, leader of the VC and operational leader of the Tet Offensive
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- The Kick Off of Tet Mau Thanh
- North Vietnamese Defense Minister Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap
- Allied Intelligence Issues
- Tet Mau Thanh, the Preface
- Crack the Sky, Shake the Earth”
General Hoang Van Thai, leader of the VC and operational leader of the Tet Offensive recommended negotiations, but concurrently sent large amounts of military equipment to the NVA so they could undertake conventional operations on the Soviet model. Northern leaders devised their own hybrid of the two concepts, thus, maintaining a critical balance between war dogma, internal/external policies, and foreign allies with “self-serving agendas.”30 Fearing that their internal political opponents might take power and thwart their planned Tet Mau Than uprising, on 27 July 1967, the radicals had several hundred pro-Soviet, party moderates, military officers, and intelligentsia arrested. Dubbed the Revisionist Anti-Party Affair, those arrested were all those who opposed the Politburo’s tactics and strategy for the proposed General Offensive. This action galvanized the militants’ strategy which rejected negotiations, forsook protracted warfare, and the focused on initiating a general offensive in the towns and cities of South Vietnam. More arrests occurred in November and December.31 The Kick Off of Tet Mau Thanh In the final analysis the operational plan for Tet Mau Thanh evolved from an April 1967 “COSVN proposal” sent to Hanoi from Gen. Thanh’s headquarters in South Vietnam. Northern leaders, in turn, instructed Thanh to come to Hanoi to map out his plan in detail to the Military Central Commission. Subsequently, Thanh presented the plan to the Politburo who accepted it and instructed him to begin arrangements immediately. To celebrate the decision, on the evening of July 6, Communist leaders gathered for a party with Thanh as the guest of honor. According to Vietnamese sources, while drinking a toast, Thanh, who had been drinking heavily, grabbed his chest and fell to the ground dead of a heart attack. Most western sources believed that the General died from wounds received during an U.S. bombing raid. His death did not slow preparations for the Offensive.32 Now in control of the Vietnamese Communist Party, the radicals pushed forward with planning for Tet Mau Thanh which would be a major conventional offensive to break the military deadlock. Senior officials determined that the South Vietnamese government and the U.S. presence were very unpopular among the people of the South and that a widespread attack would spark a spontaneous uprising of the population. Combined with the expected success of Communist offensive, they would sweep to a quick and decisive victory. They based this expectation on the notion that the ARVN’s combat effectiveness was gone and that the fall 1967 South Vietnamese presidential election, that had put Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky in power with only 24 percent of the popular vote, had established an unpopular government. This they believed due to the Buddhist upheavals of 1963 and 1966, the anti-war demonstrations in Saigon, and repeated disparagement of the Thieu government by the Southern news media.33 According to Lien-Hang T. Nguyen in his major study “The War Politburo” militant leaders believed that initiating the Tet Offensive would finally put an end to what they called “dovish calls for talks, criticism of military strategy, Chinese diatribes of Soviet perfidy, and Soviet pressure to negotiate—all of which needed to be silenced.”34 In October 1967, Politburo members decided to initiate the attacks during the Tet holiday, a decision they reaffirmed during their December meeting and formalized at the 14th Plenary session of the Party Central Committee in January 1968. During this conference, the militants pushed through Resolution 14 which, for the time being, ended any domestic opposition or “foreign obstruction.” Their stated goal was “a spontaneous uprising in order to win a decisive victory in the shortest time possible.” While they did make some concessions to the centrists, promising to start negotiations if possible, Tet Mau Thanh had been set in motion.35 
North Vietnamese Defense Minister Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap While Vietnamese writers are critical of Western scholars claiming that General Giáp had little to do with planning or leading the Tet Offensive, both sides of this debate agree that Thanh’s operational plan was expanded and developed by a party committee led by Pham Hung, Thanh’s principle subordinate and, then, more or less amended by Giáp. Some have suggested the arrests and imprisonment of several members of Giap’s staff during the Revisionist Anti-Party Affair caused him to support the plan “reluctantly, under duress.” Besides, being a survivor of many years of internal intrigue within the Communist movement, he knew when to throw in his cards. With the radical Politburo having made its decision, his job was to make the plan work. The General combined low-intensity actions into what was basically a conventional military offensive and placed the burden of starting the popular uprising on the VC. He reasoned that if it worked everyone involved would be hailed as heroes. If the plan failed the blame would fall on the Party militants. The main forces to suffer would VC, not NVA and the moderates and centrists would then be able seek negotiations and a possible end to the U.S. bombing of the North. On the eve of Tet Mau Thanh, only militants were all in, the less extreme members of the Politburo were in a position to settle for a much less.36 The Communist operational plan called for a preliminary phase, during which they would make diversionary attacks along the border areas of South Vietnam to divert U.S. attention and forces away from the targeted urban centers. In the next phase, the General Offensive, General Uprising would begin with concurrent assaults on major allied bases and nearly every Southern city. Their main focus would be on Saigon and Hue. At the same time, the NVA would attack the U.S. Marine combat base at Khe Sanh. The exact purpose the siege of Khe Sanh is still open to debate. Was it as Giap and other writers contend designed to be a diversion to keep the Americans out of Saigon and Hue or was it his effort at another great victory similar to Dien Bien Phu. Khe Sanh meant that many NVA forces would not be part of urban assaults. According to Giap this was necessary to protect his supply lines and divert U.S. attention. To Giap assaults against other U.S. forces were of secondary importance, since he believed his main objective was to destabilize or destroy the ARVN and the Southern government through the popular uprising. If this is the case, then the main purpose of Tet Mau Thanh was to undermine South Vietnamese public support, not that of the U.S. In retrospect, there is contradictory evidence as to whether, or to what extent, Tet was supposed to affect either the March primaries or the November presidential election in the U.S. William Duiker and former Secretary of State Clark Clifford believe that Tet was aimed at U.S. public opinion, while Stanley Karnow does not.37 When General Nguyen Chi Thanh died, General Tran Van Tra assumed his position as the new military leader of COSVN. With Tet already in the preparatory phase it fell to him to make sure it worked. Years later he wrote that there were to be three distinct phases. The first was to be executed primarily by VC forces and to start on January 30. This involved nationwide attacks on as many South Vietnamese cities as possible. Coincidentally, fifth column operatives were to spread propaganda throughout the South to persuade ARVN soldiers to desert and the Southern population to initiate an insurrection against the government. While many did not believe this would achieve a quick victory, it would at least lead to the creation of a coalition government and the withdrawal of U.S. forces. If this failed, Phase II follow-on operations were scheduled for May 5, 1968. This they believed would likely lead to a negotiated settlement. If not they planned a third phase to begin on August 17.38 The troop and supply build-up began in the late summer of 1967. By the next January, they had gathered 81,000 tons of supplies in hidden depots all over South Vietnam. In turn, 7 infantry regiments and 20 independent battalions had come down the Ho Chi Minh Trail bringing the total of Communist troops in the South to 200,000. The VC soldiers were rearmed with new AK-47 assault rifles and B-40 rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). By the time Tet began they actually had more firepower than their ARVN counterparts. In order to create a smoke screen, Northern leaders began a diplomatic offensive on December 30, 1967, when Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh announced they would be willing to start negotiations with the U.S. that would end Operation Rolling Thunder. In spite of the scramble by American leaders to take them up on this proposal it amounted to nothing more than a diversion.39 Allied Intelligence Issues Even as the New Year began, the aforementioned intelligence reports began to reach the desks of ARVN and MACV leadership. They estimated that there were 130,000 NVA, 160,000 VC and 33,000 service and support troops in South Vietnam. These 323,000 enemy forces were organized into 9 divisions composed of 35 infantry and 20 artillery or anti-aircraft artillery regiments, which were, in turn, composed of 230 infantry and 6 sapper battalions. This evidence should have raised concerns among the Allies instead it had only a limited impact.40 During late 1967, Allied intelligence personnel continued to digest clues that revealed a major change in Communist strategic planning. By mid-December 1967, this data convinced many in Washington and Saigon that something big was underway. From October to December Allied intelligence agencies observed signs of an extensive enemy military buildup. In addition to captured documents, such as a copy of Resolution 13, first hand observations of VC and NVA logistical movements made it clear they were going to make an assault somewhere. In October operatives reported that the number of enemy trucks moving south along the Ho Chí Minh Trail had grown from the previous monthly average of 480 to 1,116. At the end of November, this number had reached 3,823 and, in December, 6,315.41 In response, on December 20, Gen. Westmoreland cabled Washington that he expected the Communists “to undertake an intensified countrywide effort, perhaps a maximum effort, over a relatively short period of time.”42 Even though the Allies had significant warning that something big was in the works, once it came the size and extent of the Tet Offensive proved to be a surprise. Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung of the ARVN, in his book on the General Offensives of 1968-1969, placed the blame on Allied intelligence’s tendency to approximate the Communist’s most plausible course of action based on their abilities, not their intentions. In short, the U.S. believed that such a broad scale offensive was foolish and something they certainly would not undertake. They did not realize that the plan was not based on cautious logic, but rather a bold stroke based on ideological enthusiasm. U.S. and Southern intelligence analysts determined that the enemy did not have the resources to initiate such an ambitious scheme. As Hoang put it, “There was little possibility that the enemy could initiate a general offensive, regardless of his intentions.”43 Yet another reason for the confusion rests with the lack of collaboration among the various and often rival U.S. and South Vietnamese information gathering groups. Army and CIA analysts constantly disagreed with one another and jealously protected their turf. Similar issues existed prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the German attack that initiated the Battle of the Bulge and, of course, the suspicions that facilitated the attacks of 9/11. Then again, sometimes even if you have the plans you can’t believe them. Before the Battle of Antietam Union General George McClellan had in a stroke of good luck received General Robert E. Lee’s exact battle plans wrapped around a handful of cigars. McClellan could not believe it was not a ruse and not until the last minute did he decide they were real. In this case the U.S. assessment followed a similar pattern. As one MACV intelligence specialist remarked, “If we’d gotten the whole battle plan, it wouldn’t have been believed. It wouldn’t have been credible to us.”44 Tet Mau Thanh, the Preface Between April and October of 1967, American leaders in Saigon became increasingly puzzled by a numerous, seemingly unconnected engagements launched by the VC and NVA along the border regions. On April 24, 1967 a Marine Corps reconnaissance patrol stumbled on a sizeable NVA force preparing to attack the airstrip and combat base at Khe Sanh which was the Marines’ western defensive position in Quang Tri Province. When the enemy withdrew on May 9, 940 NVA and 155 Marines were dead. Then, throughout most of September and October PAVN artillery units fired 100-150 rounds per day at the Marine outpost at Con Thien located near the DMZ. This led Gen. Westmoreland to initiate Operation Neutralize, an aerial bombing campaign that sent 4,000 sorties against the NVA artillery sites just north of the DMZ. In retrospect it should have been clear that all of this was a diversion in preparation of something important. The Allies seemed not to grasp this warning.45 On October 27, a NVA regiment assaulted an ARVN battalion at Song Be, the capital of Phuoc Long Province and on the 29th another enemy regiment struck an American Special Forces outpost at Loc Nich in Binh Long Province. The second attack initiated a ten-day battle that included elements of the elite ARVN 18th Division and U.S. 1st Infantry Division and cost the Communist 800 killed. The most intense engagement of what became known as the “Border Battles,” commenced in early November in and around Dak To in Kon Tum Province. This time the NVA committed four regiments of their 1st Division. The Americans committed the 4th Infantry Division and the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The ARVN sent in infantry and airborne elements to a battle that last 22 days. The enemy gained nothing and lost 1,500 killed. The U.S. had 262 killed. When Westmoreland asked his intelligence experts what this all meant they could not definitively pinpoint the PAVN motives for these series of large-scale actions in remote regions where U.S. firepower and aerial superiority could operate with impunity. According to the MACV analysts, these operations made no sense either tactically or strategically. In retrospect this was the first stage of their operational plan for the Tet Offensive. They had fixed America’s attention on the borders and drawn the bulk of U.S. forces away from the heavily populated coastal lowlands and cities.46 The most significant diversion began on January 21, 1968, at the Marine base near Khe Sanh where 40,000 NVA attacked and surrounded the Marines until July 9. General Westmoreland and MACV intelligence officials were certain that the enemy was focused on overrunning the base in order to take control of the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. With this concern foremost in his mind, the General sent a quarter of million men, including half of MACV’s U.S. maneuver battalions, to the I Corps Tactical Zone.47 The commander of III Corps and the Capital Military District, Lt. Gen. Frederick Weyand, was deeply concerned by Westmoreland’s deployment of troops. Perhaps it was Weyand’s instincts as a former intelligence officer that caused him to distrust the Communists’ action. Whatever his reasons, Weyand contacted Westmoreland on January 10 to express his concerns and urge him to alter his repositioning of so many troops. Fortunately, Westmoreland agreed with Weyand and instructed his staff to bring 15 battalions back from their positions near the Cambodian border to the suburbs of Saigon. Later, it proved to be a fortuitous action since 27 Allied battalions defended the city and the surrounding area when the enemy struck. In many ways this decision was one of the most important tactical choices of the war.48 In early January 1968, America had 331,098 Army personnel and 78,013 Marines in 9 divisions, an armored cavalry regiment, and two separate brigades inside the borders of South Vietnam. The Allies also had the 1st Australian Task Force, 1 Royal Thai regiment, 2 South Korean infantry divisions, and 1 Korean Marine Corps brigade. The ARVN had 350,000 men serving in their Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. There were also 151,000 South Vietnamese Regional Forces troops and 149,000 South Vietnamese Popular Forces i.e., regional and local militias.49 In spite of these numbers and Weyand’s adept analysis, just prior to Tet Mau Thanh, the Allies remained ill-prepared, probably because in October leaders in Hanoi had announced they would observe a 7-day Tet holiday truce between January 27 and February 3. With these assurances Southern leaders allowed roughly half of their troops to take leave. However, with his suspicions peaked Gen. Westmoreland cancelled leave in I Corps and asked President Thieu to do the same. Thieu agreed to reduce the cease-fire to 36 hours but would not go further declaring that it would harm troop morale and affirm Communist propaganda.50 On January 28, 1968, ARVN patrols captured eleven VC cadres in the city of Qui Nhon. They had two pre-recorded audio tapes with an impassioned communication entreating the inhabitants in Saigon, Huế, and Da Nang to rise up against the puppet regime in Saigon. The next afternoon, the chief of the ARVN Joint General Staff, General Cao Van Vien, directed his four corps commanders to put their troops on high alert. In spite of this, no one, not even Westmoreland, acted with any sense of urgency. If the General did understand what a dangerous situation the Allies were in, he did not make this clear to any of his subordinates. During the evening of January 30, 200 American officers, all on the MACV intelligence staff went to a pool party at their quarters in Saigon.51 One attendee, James Meecham, an analyst at the Combined Intelligence Center, recalled that: “I had no conception Tet was coming, absolutely zero... Of the 200-odd officers present, no one I talked to knew Tet was coming, without exception.”52 Perhaps worst of all, Westmoreland failed to sufficiently alert leaders in Washington to his concerns. Even though he informed President Johnson as early as 25 January that there was a significant chance of “widespread” Communist attacks, he was so optimistic in every other way that no one in Washington was prepared.53 “Crack the Sky, Shake the Earth”54 Depending on what sources you read or who you believe, the initial assaults that started the Tet Offensive began either on purpose or by accident just after midnight on January 30. Almost simultaneously enemy units struck targets in all five provincial capitals in II Corps and I Corps as well as the major city of Da Nang. Over the years, some experts have argued that these first attacks commenced prematurely due to misunderstanding over the change in the calendar date by Communist units. Leaders in Hanoi chose to arbitrarily shift the holiday date forward in an effort to provide the people of North Vietnam a breather from what they were certain would be retaliatory air strikes. Whether this is true or not, what is clear is that all of the eight attacks that took place on the first day were supervised by the NVA headquarters in Military Region Five. The first target to be assaulted was at Nha Trang, the headquarters of the U.S. I Field Force. This was followed in short order by attacks on Ban Me Thuot, Kon Tum, Hoi An, Tuy Hoa, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Pleiku. Each attack began with a rocket and/or mortar barrage, followed closely by a massed infantry onslaught carried out by a battalion-size group of VC, often supported by NVA regulars. Frequently indigenous cadres acted as guides. They led enemy troops to the local ARVN headquarters and the radio stations in an effort to eliminate senior leadership and communications. As shocking as the assaults proved to be, locally, they were not well coordinated and by dawn the next day nearly all Communist forces had been denied their objectives. The new MACV chief of intelligence, Gen. Phillip B. Davidson, contacted Gen. Westmoreland and warned that “This is going to happen in the rest of the country tonight and tomorrow morning.” Literally, within minutes the entire U.S. military had been contacted and placed on maximum alert. The same orders were dispatched to all ARVN units as well. Even with this object lesson staring them in the face, Allied units moved slowly often disregarding orders cancelling leave.55 By the end of the 30th, the first wave of attacks had died down and Allied forces and South Vietnamese citizens took a deep breath and hoped the worst had passed. It had not. It was only the beginning. Around 3:00 a.m. on January 31 enemy forces struck again. In the Capital Military District, they struck Saigon, Cholon and Gia Dinh. Simultaneously, they attacked Huế, Quang Tin, Tam Ky and Quang Ngai as well as American bases at Phu Bai and Chu Lai in I Corps. They also struck Phan Thiet, Bong Son and An Khe in II Corps, and Can Tho and Vinh Long in IV Corps. Finally, they assaulted Tuy Hoa and Quảng Trị again. The following day, they attacked Bien Hoa, Long Thanh and Binh Duong in III Corps and Kien Hoa, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Kien Giang, Vĩnh Bình, Ben Tre, and Kien Tuong in IV Corps. The final assault of this initial operation was launched against Bac Lieu in IV Corps on February 10. All together more than 84,000 communist troops took part in Tet with thousands more standing by to act as reinforcements or blocking forces. Communist forces also mortared or rocketed every major Allied airfield and attacked 64 district capitals and scores of smaller towns.56 On the first day of Mau Thanh Tet, CIA intelligence analysts penned a Top Secret intelligence memorandum entitled “The Communist Tet Offensive” for senior leaders and other intelligence personnel providing an initial evaluation of the Offensive. They argued that, “The current series of coordinated enemy attacks in South Vietnam appears designed for maximum psychological impact and to demonstrate the Communists’ continued power despite the presence of strong US forces.” They asserted, “The Communists clearly have made careful preparations for the offensive. These preparations point to a major assault in the Khe Sanh area possibly in conjunction with a drive throughout the northern portion of the I Corps area, and widespread attacks against US installations may be preparatory to or in support of such action.” They concluded, “The enemy probably hopes to score some major battlefield successes during their campaign. Their military actions appear related to Hanoi’s recent offer to open talks, but it is questionable that the Communists are making a final desperate bid before suing for peace.”57 In most cases South Vietnamese forces were able to repel the enemy within a few hours; at worst in two or three days. Still, heavy fighting went on for a week or more at places like Kon Tum, Buôn Ma Thuột, Phan Thiết, Cần Thơ, and Bến Tre. According to Westmoreland, the outcome was normally a decisive ARVN victory led by some “excellent local commanders.” Of note was the fact that throughout the Tet no South Vietnamese unit broke or defected. The General later said that he responded to the news of the Offensive with “optimism,” both in media presentations and in his reports to Washington.58 While this might well be how he remembered it, others who observed his actions asserted that he was, “stunned that the communists had been able to coordinate so many attacks in such secrecy” and he was “dispirited and deeply shaken.”59 Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford later recalled that at the time of the initial attacks, the reaction of the U.S. military leadership “approached panic.”60 Even if one accepts Westmoreland’s version, one aspect on which he miscalculated was his conviction that Khe Sanh was the real enemy objective and that 155 attacks by 84,000 troops was a diversion. It was an argument he would make until mid-February when the size and intensity of the Offensive made it impossible to ignore reality.61 Peter , a reporter for the Washington Post, remarked, “How could any effort against Saigon, especially downtown Saigon, be a diversion?”62 In Saigon, which was the main focus of the Tet Offensive, the enemy’s primary goals were all in the downtown district. They included the ARVN General Staff headquarters located at Tan Son Nhut Air Base; the U.S. Embassy, the Independence Palace, the Long Binh Naval Base, and the National Radio Station. Each target location was attacked by small components of the local C-10 Sapper Battalion. On the outskirts of Saigon ten VC Local Force Battalions attacked the central police station, the Artillery Command and the Armored Command headquarters the last two located at Go Vap. Ultimately their tactical plan called for all these units to capture and hold their positions for at least 48 hours, by which time reinforcements were expected to arrive and support them.63 It was an extraordinarily complex and risky plan and one that had numerous opportunities for failure. It was the job of the ARVN to defend the Capital Military Zone. When the Tet Offensive began there were eight ARVN infantry battalions supported by the local police force in Saigon. Within four days five ARVN Ranger Battalions, five Marine Corps Battalions, and five ARVN Airborne Battalions had joined them. In addition, the U.S. Army’s 716th Military Police Battalion, six infantry battalions, one mechanized battalion, and six artillery battalions participated in the defense of Saigon.64 As the conflict unfolded, one of the key enemy targets was the Armored Command and Artillery Command headquarters on the northern edge of the city. The enemy planned to surprise the defenders and seize the tanks that they believed were stored there and then use them along with captured artillery pieces against the U.S. and ARVN forces. In fact, the tanks had been moved to another base two months earlier. The artillery pieces’ breech blocks had been removed, which made them unusable. Another vital target proved to be the National Radio Station. The VC storm troopers were supposed to capture the broadcasting facility and transmit a tape recording of Ho Chi Minh proclaiming the liberation of Saigon and calling for a “General Uprising” against the Saigon government. While they were able to take the building and hold it for six hours, they were not able to make broadcast because the audio lines stretching from the main studio to the transmitting tower had been severed soon after they took the facility.65 The most spectacular assault took place at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. Many Americans back home had viewed television scenes of the massive six-story stone building sitting in the middle of a four-acre compound. It had just been completed in September of the previous year. At 2:45 a.m., on the 31st, 19 VC sappers blew a hole in the 8-foot-high wall that surrounded the main building. They charged it but failed to take it and, with their officers dead, were forced to take up positions in the chancery grounds. They fought for six hours, resisting to the bitter end. Eventually, all 19 were either killed or captured by U.S. reinforcements that landed on the roof of the main building. By 9:20 a.m. Allied personnel had secured the Embassy and grounds having lost five Americans killed.66 As the drama near the U.S. Embassy played out, small squads of VC dispersed throughout the city attacking the homes and billets of ARVN officers and enlisted men as well as district police stations. They possessed hit lists with the names of military officers and civil servants on them. Where they could, they rounded up and executed as many as possible. As the ARVN beat back these attacks they retaliated against any VC they could capture. In one of the most iconic photographs of the war, on February 1st, General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, chief of the National Police, personally executed a VC officer named Nguyen Van Lem, (also known as Bay Lap/Hop) who had been arrested wearing civilian clothes. Famed Associated Press photographer Eddie Adams had taken the photo while NBC’s Vu Suu made a film of the event. Within days the photo had appeared in nearly every major newspaper or magazine in the world including Life Magazine and the New York Times. The film appeared on NBC. The event proved to be a public relations nightmare for the United States with world leaders condemning the act. Ironically, Loan’s actions did have some justification since Lem’s VC unit had just massacred the family of one of Loan’s best friends and had executed dozens of other ARVN earlier in the morning.67 Concurrently, just outside the city proper two VC battalions attacked the U.S. logistics and headquarters complex at Long Binh while a Communist battalion struck Bien Hoa AB. Nearby, the ARVN III Corps Headquarters was assaulted by yet another battalion and Tan Son Nhut AB was targeted by three more enemy battalions. In the latter case, a battalion of ARVN paratroopers were present waiting to be transported to Da Nang. When the VC struck they hurled them back.68 
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