Russia 111201 Basic Political Developments

Bishkek looks for donors

The new head of Kyrgyzstan gets some surprising friends.

Today a new president will be inaugurated in Kyrgyzstan.

Now the former prime minister of Kyrgyzstan, Almazbek Atambayev, has been elected the country’s new president in the first round of the presidential elections, held in late October, Rossiyskaya Gazeta (RG) has closely followed the politician’s ascent to the heights of power. During the presidential campaign, we provided the Kyrgyz leader an opportunity to tell Russian readers about his political agenda on the pages of RG. The main emphasis of Atambayev’s agenda was Kyrgyzstan’s closer integration with the countries of the Customs Union, and Russia in particular.

Meanwhile, joint participation in the integrated project with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus will require Bishkek to start taking some real steps away from re-exportation of Chinese consumer goods and towards domestic production of goods. To do this, however, political will alone won’t suffice. The economic situation in the country is dismal. PM Atambayev is handing the country over to President Atambayev with a foreign debt of nearly $3 billion and a state budget deficit of nearly a quarter of GDP. Without immediate cash infusions from the outside, the Kyrgyz economy has no chance of reaching the level of the member states of the Customs Union. In these conditions, the only donor capable of keeping Kyrgyzstan stay afloat, is the Customs Union trio. But instead of launching integration programs, the Kyrgyz leadership is blatantly starting to bargain with the Customs Union and trying to obtain all imaginable and unimaginable preferences and privileges.

Among some of Almazbek Atambayev’s high-profile statements was his public assurance on the withdrawal of the Manas air base, scheduled for 2014.

However, both local and Russian experts are not inclined to agree that the new Kyrgyz leadership will be able to fulfill that promise. In light of the progressive cooling in relations between the US and Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan is starting to play an increasingly important role in the chain of supply for the NATO contingent in Afghanistan. Washington has already expressed its intention to hold consultations with the new leadership of Kyrgyzstan about the extension of the Manas air base lease. In November, interim president Roza Otunbayeva, who is leaving the political scene, made it clear in New York that we should wait until 2014 to see what happens. And that is against the background of Bishkek’s continuing assurances on a strategic partnership with Russia.

Incidentally, among the guests invited to attend the presidential inauguration in Kyrgyzstan, are one of the advocates of the expansion of NATO on post-Soviet territory, Mikhail Saakashvili, and the leader of a NATO member state, Turkish President Abdullah Gul. While still serving as prime minister, Atambayev suggested that Turkey enter Manas in the place of the US, claiming that with Ankara’s help the military facility could be transformed into a civilian transit center. This raises the question of why does Kyrgyzstan, a CSTO member and a potential member of the Customs Union, need to continue flirting with NATO? It seems as though Tien Shan is again trying to play a “multi-vector” game. In the past, this policy has often led the country to social upheaval which usually ended with revolutions.

Meanwhile, Atambayev’s inauguration will be modest. Official sources estimate it will cost the budget around $25,000. Nevertheless, the ceremony promises to be memorable. It will be the first time a leader of a post-Soviet secular republic will pledge to serve the people before God. However, for many voters, Atambayev has become a figure of compromise, and has mainly been associated with future support from Russia.

Lukashenka in Moscow: The Prodigal Son Is Coming Back?

Last Friday, after months of uncertainty, Alyaksandr Lukashenka decisively moved to guarantee his political survival for the foreseeable future by signing a series of agreements with Russia. This was the sequel to Belarus's earlier entry into the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union.

The agreements came as a disappointment to the Western politicians who had speculated that the isolation of Belarus, coupled with the economic crisis, would eventually bring down or at least affect the regime. Speaking on Wednesday, Russian ambassador to Belarus declared that Russian support to Belarusian regime in 2011-2012 would exceed $7 bn, and assumed that in two-three years living standards in the country would return to the level of early 2011.

Belarus sold its remaining 50 percent stake of “Beltransgaz” to Russia for $2.5 bn, giving Russia full ownership over the distribution of Siberian gas pumped to Europe. In exchange, Belarus received a $10 bn soft loan to build a nuclear power plant in Hrodna region; a three-year agreement whereby Belarus will get Russian natural gas for less than half the selling price to Europe, saving Belarus an estimated $3 bn a year; and finally, confirmation of the next tranche of the bailout loan from the Eurasian Economic Community.

The Belarusian regime has sold Beltransgaz, entered the Eurasian Economic Union, and eagerly taken Russian loans. According to Dzianis Melyantsou of the Belarusian Institute of Strategic Studies, Lukashenka essentially reverted to the subsidies mechanism that earlier defined Belarus-Russia relations - even at the price of national independence. As Melyantsou notes, this is still less of a price to pay than accepting the conditionality imposed by Western nations in return for uncertain promises of financial support.

With Russian support, Lukashenka has more freedom to adopt authoritarian measures. He can use fear in society to avert liberalization and maintain his grip on power. The Belarusian opposition and civil society will have less room to maneuver and will face a new wave of persecutions. 

The Russian politicians toyed with the idea of supporting an alternative to Lukashenka recently, but the Kremlin seems to have realized that the Belarusian ruler satisfies its needs by maintaining the status quo, ruling efficiently, and professing a stronger loyalty toward Russia than many other post-Soviet nations. Ahead of the presidential elections in Russia next year, Vladimir Putin touts the integration theme - the Kremlin is willing to help Lukashenka to guarantee his support for the Eurasian Economic Union.

Now more than ever, the European Union's stance on the 'Belarus issue' matters, because national pro-democracy movement has been weakened and is in need of extensive support. Unfortunately, many in the European Union are apparently comfortable with Belarus staying in the Russian sphere of influence. Particularly disturbing is a recent commentary given by Deutsche Welle (DW) – a public broadcaster supervised by the German government – on the recent agreements between Belarus and Russia.

Andrei Gurkov of DW, emphasizedpolitical component of new agreements, defining two main tasks of new treaties as “to take under complete [Russian] control the gas transportation system of this country and to stimulate Eurasian integration processes in this country. In other words, to more strongly tight Minsk to itself”. And to leave no ambiguities: “In principle, both aims correspond with the interests of the Europeans*.”

Even worse, DW has been most concerned with whether the bailouts to Belarus might hurt Moscow in the future. Underlying this is a clear parallel drawn between Belarus and Greece: the commentator wants Russia to avoid the problems the EU is now facing. DW analyzes how Russia can gain from issuing loans and seizing Belarusian assets. Gurkov states: “We want to believe that Moscow understands it well and is operating out of sober calculation. A borrower sinking in his own debts will sooner or later pay with shares of the most attractive [Belarusian] enterprises. However, it is very important not to mistake the true value of these assets.”

It appears that today Poland is the only EU country that seriously takes the idea of an independent and free Belarus. The rest of the EU – including the largest members – are not especially interested, and if they are, they often favor the Russian position. The failure of the Eastern Partnership demonstrated just how little the smaller eastern neighbors matter to most EU members.

In the short term, Europe can do next to nothing about the Belarusian regime. Its best bet is to concentrate on longer-term leverage. Sanctions and isolation, however, are not always conducive to this process and have failed to bring about democratic change in the past in too many cases around the world. Surprisingly, the West keeps talking about punishing the dictatorship even though it is obvious that Belarus has an open border with Russia and no change will come unless Belarus' ties with an increasingly authoritarian Russia are undermined.

Weakening these ties is not impossible. Belarusians view Europe as the most attractive destination for travel and labor migration. The EU would loose little by removing visa and travel restrictions for Belarus's 9.5 million citizens, who have never posed a serious threat to the EU in terms of security or illegal migration. At present, well-educated Belarusians can only work without restrictions in Russia and Poland. Western countries could also launch more exchange and cooperation projects with the public and private sector in Belarus to provide them with alternatives outside Russia.

The EU should seriously consider engaging Belarusian government officials and regime insiders to provide the nomenclature with an exit option. Even many officials known for their hardline rhetoric are already accepting Western values in practice by sending their children to Western Europe and the United States. If given a choice, they could defect.

But to make them understand that choice the West has to interact with these people and convince them that there are other ways of doing things besides the Russian-style authoritarianism. After all, it is not just some abstract democratic ideal but also the best national interest of European countries to have on their eastern borders a free and stable nation and not a dictatorial outpost of the “Eurasian integration”.

SB