Saddam Army and Republican Guard From Globalsecurity
II Corps (3rd Armd, 15th and 34th Inf Divs)
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II Corps (3rd Armd, 15th and 34th Inf Divs)At the outset of the Gulf War, the Baghdad  area nominally fell under II Corps, but by 24 February 1991 most of its units were deployed to Kuwait and Basra. At least one source suggests that II Corps was responsible for the Iran front [where it reportedly remained during the Gulf War], and that the units reportedl assigned to II Corps were in fact assigned to VIII Corps, but all other sources agree that II Corps rather than VIII Corps was one of the four Corps deployed for the Mother of All Battles. The Iraqi commanders estimated that there would be an amphibious landing from the Gulf. By a process of elimination, they concluded that the landing would probably be north of Kuwait City. From there it would be possible to cut the north-south highway to Basra and cut off the forces to the south. To guard this approach, two infantry divisions were dug-in and supported by anti-aircraft guns for use against the U.S. marine helicopters. Hundreds of anti-ship mines were laid in the sea to prevent coalition ships and landing craft from approaching the coast. Behind these infantry divisions were Army mechanized and armored divisions. In the early 1990s the Iraqi National Congress began to build an army, and the CIA trained the INC to coordinate a March 1995 attack. On the eve of the planned attack, the US withdrew support and the March 1995 attack failed. In March 1995, according to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK] three army corps (the First, the Second and the Fifth) massed against the Kurdish region. These three corps reportedly included a total of 17 divisions comprising nine infantry divisions, one armored division, two mechanized infantry divisions, four Republican Guard divisions including an armored division, and one Border Guard division. In addition to these, a further 25 tank units (katiba), eight armored regiments (fawj), seven mechanized regiments, four armored units and 27 infantry brigades were deployed. On 02 March 1995 Iraqi armed forces attacked Kurdish positions near Chemchamal, on the road between Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya. Iraqi reinforcements have been observed to take position in the no-man-land in formations indicating imminent offensive action. The Iraqi forces unleashed a barrage of artillery and heavy machine-gun fire on Kurdish positions and the nearby district town of Shorish. In February 1997 there was a wide campaign of arrests within the ranks of the officers of the Iraqi Army's Second Corps (commanded by Staff General Yaseen Al-Ma'eeni). The corps' divisions were deployed along an axis extending from the oil city of Kirkuk to the city of Khanaqeen on the Iran-Iraq border east of Baghdad. The campaign, under the personal supervision of Saddam Hussain, reportedly came as a result of the regime's discovery that two of the corps' divisions intended to carry out a coup attempt with the cooperation of other officers. On 15 January 1999, Izzet Al Douri, the commander of the Northern Region, headquartered at the Civil Defense Directorate in the city of Kirkuk (Operations Room), issued orders to the First Corps (headquartered in Kirkuk) and the Second Corps (headquartered in Al-Mansouriyah mountain in Diayala) to raise the emergency level to 100% for their units. Furthermore, they were supplied with first and second line ammunition and gas masks. Execution brigades were formed under the command of Military Intelligence to stem any drive towards desertion among the rank and file. In December 2000 it was reported that Iraqi forces had deployed along the border with Kurdistan, with some speculating that these forces may exploit the intra-Kurdish feuding to invade Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK] controlled territory. PUK sources pointed to the deployment of Iraqi forces in areas controlled by the 1st Corps, on the Kirkuk border, and the 2nd Corps, on the Diyala border. Additionally, there reportedly are Republican Guard artillery units, infantry divisions, and an armored division deployed in that region.
When the ground offensive started on 24 February 1991, Iraqi ground forces remained in defensive positions in the KTO. There were no indications of any Iraqi troop withdrawal. Iraqi front line units, including the 7th, 14th and 29th Infantry divisions in the I MEF zone and the 19th Infantry Division in the Joint Forces Command - East [JFC-E] zone, offered sporadic, but sometimes stiff, resistance. These forces were bypassed, withdrew or surrendered. Despite these initial setbacks, the Iraqi III Corps, opposite I MEF and Joint Forces Command - East [JFC-E] and the Iraqi IV Corps, generally opposite Joint Forces Command - North [JFC-N], still could counterattack with units from the 3rd Armored Division south of Kuwait International Airport. However, the large number of Iraqi III Corps soldiers surrendering suggested many had lost the will to fight. For the Iraqis to stop the Coalition ground offensive, mobile forces would have to leave their reverted positions, making them vulnerable to Coalition air attack. As the ground offensive progressed, by 25 February 1991 Iraqi units' ineffectiveness became more clear. The Iraqi III Corps units had suffered severe damage. CENTCOM assessed the Corps' 7th, 8th, 14th, 18th, and 29th Infantry divisions, in the I MEF and JFC-E zones, as combat ineffective and the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Infantry and the 3rd Armored divisions of III Corps as badly mauled. On the western side of III Corps, the 14th and 7th Infantry divisions in front of I MEF were combat ineffective. The 36th Infantry, 1st Mechanized Infantry, and the 56th Armored Brigade established hasty defensive positions south/southwest of Al-Jahra, northwest of Kuwait City. The Iraqi 3rd Armored Division was trying to hold blocking positions between Kuwait International Airfield and Al-Jahra. On the eastern side of III Corps, the 18th and 8th Infantry divisions, in front of JFC-E, were assessed as combat ineffective, although they offered stiff resistance against JFC-E forces near Mina As-Sa'ud. The 29th Infantry Division, withdrawing to the east, also was combat ineffective. The Iraqi 19th, 11th, and 15th Infantry divisions and three SF brigades in Kuwait City were assessed at full strength. These divisions continued to focus on an amphibious assault and prepare for military operations in Kuwait City. The deep penetration of Coalition forces in the western side of the Iraqi III Corps prompted several Iraqi battalion-size counterattacks from divisions along the flanks of the penetration. These units took heavy losses. On 26 February 1991, the massive exodus of Iraqi forces from the eastern part of the theater began. Elements of the Iraqi III Corps were pushed back into Kuwait City by I MEF and JFC-E. They were joined by Iraqi occupation troops from Kuwait City. Iraqi units became intermingled and disordered. During the early morning of 26 February, military and commandeered civilian vehicles of every description, loaded with Iraqi soldiers and goods looted from Kuwait, clogged the main four-lane highway north from Kuwait City. To deny Iraqi commanders the opportunity to reorganize their forces and establish a cohesive defense, these forces were struck repeatedly by air attacks. As of February 1997 Iraq had initiated a massive troop build-up of four Corps: two infantry, one armoured, and one of the Republican Guard, in the areas of Kut, Amara, Nassiriya, Basra, and the marshes facing the Iranian border in southern Iraq. This included the transfer of forces from the First and Fifth Corps from the North, to the South. The Third Corps is centered in the Al-Deer area in Basra, and had been joined by units of the Fifth Corps which is based at Salamiya, southeast of Mosul (equivalent to an infantry division), in addition to the Third Corps units which consist of the 11th Infantry Division, 51st Infantry Division, 6th Infantry Division, and 82nd Marine Infantry Battalion. In June 1998 Saddam Hussein replaced senior military commanders and recalled some officers out of retirement. This is a frequent practice by Saddam who is concerned about opposition to his regime within the ranks of the Iraqi armed forces. In Baghdad, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Maj. Gen. Youness Thunun Qashmoola, was replaced by Lt. Gen. Sabah Nouri Alwan Hamoud Al Ajili, who was commaander of the 3rd Corps in 1993. Reports of military operations against Shi'a civilians increased notably in the summer of 1998, after the killings of Ayatollahs Ali al Gharawi and Sheikh al Borojourdi. In July 1998, security services resumed arrest sweeps in the Thawra district of Baghdad, rounding up young men, assaulting residents, and looting money and personal property. In August 1998, the Third Army Corps, in conjunction with Ba'ath Party officials led by Abdul Baqi as-Sa'doon, conducted large-scale operations against settlements of the al Juwaisid, ar-Rahma, al-Bu Salim, and Asakira tribes in Nasiriyah province; most of the inhabitants, including women, children, and the elderly, were forced to flee after dozens were wounded in heavy artillery bombardments. In November 1998, security forces, the Third and Fourth Army Corps, and Ba'ath Party militia staged a 5-day assault, including heavy artillery bombardment, in the Bani Malik area and the al Suwaib district of Basra province, and widespread areas of Nasiriyah and Amara provinces, nearly to the Iranian border. Hundreds of persons reportedly were killed in late November 1998 in Amara as part of a security sweep personally directed by Qusay Hussein, Saddam's son and his Principal Deputy on the State Council. In December 1998, commandos arrested 39 persons in the aftermath of an alleged attempt in Karbala to kill Revolutionary Command Council Vice President Izzat ad-Douri. Some sources in the opposition claimed that the attempt on ad-Douri's life was staged in order to justify the crackdown. Others indicate that the 39 persons arrested were executed summarily. As of March 1999 it was noted that the number of Tikriti officers who occupied important positions had increased, which negatively affected other commanders and senior officers, because the situation minimized the chances of their promotion. At that time the commanders of the 1st and 3rd Corps were Al-Tikritis.
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