Saudi Relations are key to regional power projection
Telhami and Hill 2002 (Shibley, Fiona Does Saudi Arabia Still Matter? Differing Perspectives on the Kingdom and Its Oil Foreign Affairs, November/December 2002 http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20021101faresponse10002/shibley-telhami-fiona-hill/does-saudi-arabia-still-matter-differing-perspectives-on-the-kingdom-and-its-oil.html)
Given America's ongoing security interest in the Persian Gulf, it is highly likely that the U.S. military will retain a large presence in the region. Washington must therefore continue to place high priority on sustaining favorable relations with Riyadh, since Saudi approval and cooperation will remain essential to any continued American military presence. It is certainly possible that the United States will reduce the number of troops it keeps in Saudi Arabia, or will at least have them assume a lower profile, but it is hard to imagine that, with the exception of Kuwait, any of the smaller members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (which comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) could afford to host large American bases without Saudi acquiescence. In addition, U.S. options would be significantly handicapped if Saudi Arabia were to deny overflight rights to U.S. military aircraft, or prohibit ground troops from launching operations from Saudi soil in the case of a war with Iraq.
Impact – Middle East Stability
Saudi Influence key to US middle east strategy
American Spectator 2011 ("Achieving the Impossible"; EBSCO, SRM)
The dispute has enormous strategic implications for the United States. Saudi Arabia, for all of its shortcomings, is an American ally that cooperates against groups like al-Qaida and has ensured the free flow of Middle Eastern oil to the West. Iran is a seemingly implacable American foe that supports such armed groups as Hezbollah and is widely believed to be pursuing a nuclear weapon. In the zero-sum game that is the modern Mideast, any political victory for Iran--bringing a Shiite government into power in Bahrain, for example--would represent a serious setback for both Riyadh and Washington. "The unpleasant reality is that our interests depend on the continued existence of a medieval monarchy in Saudi Arabia," said Robert Kaplan, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. "Our grand strategy for the Middle East comes down to doing what we can to ensure Riyadh's survival and what we can to bring about Tehran's demise."
Relations Key to regional stability
Russel 2002 (James A. “Deconstructing the US-Saudi Partnership?” Strategic Insights Insights v. 1 i7, September, http://www.ccc.npa.navy.mil/si/sept02/middleEast2.asp)
U.S. and Saudi air forces might in the future operate together using a coalition operations space within the combined air operations center at Prince Sultan Air Base. Perhaps officers from other Gulf Cooperation Council militaries could join together with Saudi and U.S. counterparts in this facility to coordinate joint and combined air defense efforts across the theater. If U.S.-Saudi operational cooperation can be established at PSAB, it could provide a model that could be replicated in other Gulf States, leading to activities that would promote mutual confidence and collective security. While regional military integration among friendly coalition partners may today seem a remote scenario, the scenario is at least plausible if Saudi Arabia and the United States lead the way. Regional security integration will surely never flourish without positive U.S.-Saudi bilateral relations. Conclusion Fundamentally altering the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship would have serious consequences for Saudi security and peace in the Middle East. It could potentially render the U.S.-trained and equipped Saudi military unable to defend the Kingdom and would deny the United States the opportunity to continue working with the dominant regional power to achieve collective defense and regional military integration. Any serious suggestions that the 50-year partnership needs to be fundamentally altered should carefully consider these costs.
And these regional conflicts escalate to a global nuclear war
Steinbach 2002 (John Steinbach in March 2002 (Source: Nuclear Age Peace Foundation http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00_steinbach_israeli-wmd.htm)
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)
Share with your friends: |
