States cp ddi 2012
Federalism key to Iraqi stability
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- Failing Federalism causes Iraqi civil war
- Iraqi civil war destabilizes the Middle East.
Federalism key to Iraqi stabilityDawn Brancati, visiting scholar at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University, Spring 2004, The Washington Quarterly, “Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq?” Ethnically diverse countries such as Belgium, Canada, India, Spain, and¶ Switzerland have all constructed stable democracies through federalism.¶ Tensions among Iraq’s different ethnic and religious groups are no stronger¶ or more volatile than tensions have been at one time or another in many of¶ those countries. These tensions have even erupted into violence at various¶ times in India, Spain, and Switzerland. Moreover, within the correct political¶ framework, Iraq’s crosscutting cleavages may conspire to make people¶ behave more moderately. They may provide the basis for parties to mobilize¶ groups across ethnic and religious lines, focusing politics on issues that are¶ not ethnic or religious in nature, and may thereby defuse tensions. They¶ may also promote more moderate policies on ethnic and religious issues.¶ Whether Iraq is able to establish a stable democracy ultimately depends on¶ the design of its system of federalism. Impact – Iraq Failing Federalism causes Iraqi civil warDawn Brancati, visiting scholar at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University, Spring 2004, The Washington Quarterly, “Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq?” By definition, democracy aims to provide representation and protection for¶ the rights of everyone in society. Creating and sustaining such a system in¶ Iraq, without opening the door to ethnic conflict, is no easy task. According¶ to the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and chief negotiator of¶ the 1995 Dayton accords, Richard Holbrooke, “To govern this country as a¶ democracy would be very hard, since a true democracy would almost certainly¶ lead to Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders who hold extreme positions.¶ This would be worse than Bosnia, because the passions are much¶ deeper, and the Bosnian war will not resume, whereas fighting between¶ Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds could easily begin any day if we aren’t there.”1
at Princeton University, Spring 2004, The Washington Quarterly, “Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq?” The potential consequences of failing to design federalism properly and to¶ establish a stable democracy in Iraq extend far beyond Iraqi borders. Civil¶ war in Iraq may draw in neighboring countries such as Turkey and Iran, further¶ destabilizing the Middle East in the process. It may also discourage foreign¶ investment in the region, bolster Islamic extremists, and exacerbate¶ tensions between Palestinians and Israelis. A civil war in Iraq may even undermine¶ support for the concept of federalism more generally, which is significant¶ given the number of countries also considering federalism, such as¶ Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, to name just two. Finally, the failure to design¶ and implement the kind of federalism that can establish a stable democracy¶ in Iraq might undermine international support for other U.S. initiatives in¶ the region, including negotiations for Arab-Israeli peace. Iraq’s federal government¶ must therefore be designed carefully so as to give regional governments extensive political and financial autonomy, to include Kirkuk in the¶ Kurdish region that is created, and to limit the influence of identity-based¶ political parties. The short- and long-term stability of Iraq and the greater¶ Middle East depend on it. Impact – solvency Federalist balance good—allows for state influence in policy decisions Foy 96 [Joseph J. Foy, Ph.D. at the University of Notre Dame, Manatt Fellow for Democracy Studies at the International Foundation for Election Systems in Washington, D.C., 1996, “Applying the New Federalism of 1996: Governors and Welfare Reform”, Notre Dame, p.2-3, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/8/3/5/0/pages83501/p83501-2.php] aw With the passage of The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, America experienced an emergence of the “new federalist” policies that began during the presidency of Richard Nixon and blossomed under Ronald Regan. Defined primarily by its emphasis on “devolving” federal influence over social policies to the states, the new federalism of the mid-1990s gave state governments more freedom to decide how to manage and implement social programs while simultaneously increasing pressure on state officials to make those programs work. An obvious effect of this move in power was the pushing of states to the forefront of the debates surrounding social policies. Rather than continuing to sing backup to the federal government’s lead, the states now had a greater role in determining the course of some of the most long- standing controversies in modern-American political history. 1 The devolution of authority from the federal government to the states not only opened a door for state governments to have a greater say in policy choices, it also offered “students of politics a unique opportunity to pinpoint the determinants of state- level policy choices – a case in which the fifty states responded virtually simultaneously to a single policy mandate.” 2 This rare occurrence in which the American states were opened up as a laboratory for policy analysis on the same set of policy choices within the same time period offers a chance to see not only the impact federal policy has across the states, but it enables a look into the specific political activities of state governments in determining policy outcomes. Federalism key to effective transportation policy—ISTEA proves Dilger 92 [Robert Jay Dilger, Former Director, WVU Institute for Public Affairs, 1992, “ISTEA: A New Direction for Transportation Policy”, p. 67, http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/content/22/3/67.full.pdf+html] aw When President George Bush signed the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) on 18 December 1991, he emphasized its importance as a source of "jobs, jobs, jobs." However, its significance for American federalism and for transportation policy is much broader. Although Bush strongly objected to several of the act's final provisions and almost vetoed it, ISTEA (pronounced "ice tea") will probably be remembered as one of his most significant contributions to the ideals of New Federalism. ISTEA is a landmark piece of legislation that makes wholesale revisions in the federal government's role in transportation, and provides state and, especially, local policymakers with an unprecedented opportunity to determine the future direction of the nation's transportation system. The act created a major new transportation block grant, established a new 155,000-mile national highway system, which includes the 44,000-mile interstate highway system and others to be designated largely from existing federally assisted highways, provides state and local government officials with added flexibility to transfer funds from one transportation program to another, significantly strengthens the role of metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) in project selection, greatly revises the relationships between MPOs and state departments of transportation, revises reimbursement rates to create a "level playing field" for all transportation modes, and requires completely new and potentially more effective styles of planning for such things as congestion management and pavement maintenance. Impact – solvency Balance between state and federal power is crucial to effective policies Revesz 96 [Richard L. Revesvz, Proffesor of Law at NYU, June 1996, “Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, p. 2395, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3312672?seq=2] aw In order to shield itself from the health-and-safety consequences of out-of-state products or wastes, or to preserve for its citizens a scarce natural resource, a state can constrain the importation of the product or waste, or the exportation of the natural resource. In such cases, the standards of the Dormant Commerce Clause define the extent to which the state can impose costs on out-of-state firms or citizens in order to fulfill the preferences of its own citizens.150 In contrast, a state cannot directly stop air or water pollution from coming across its border. It can, however, seek a federal injunction against excessive upwind pollution under provisions such as sections 110(a)(2)(D) and 126(b) of the Clean Air Act. The federal remedy allows it to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. The role of the federal decisionmaker under these provisions is to determine the extent to which the state's preferences for higher environmental quality or a larger margin for economic growth should be respected in light of the costs imposed on out-of-state interests. Both situations-one in which self-help is available and one in which it is not-raise the same tradeoffs between in-state and out-of- state interests. Where states can take direct action, giving an affected state too much leeway to constrain the importation of a product or waste or the exportation of a natural resource is undesirable because it permits the state to externalize the costs of its environmental preferences or to act in a protectionist manner. The state would therefore impose more stringent constraints than it would if it had to bear the costs of its actions. Where states can protect themselves only indirectly by invoking a federal remedy, an analogous situation arises if the standards under which affected states can obtain injunctions are too lax. Similarly, in cases in which direct action is available to affected states, giving the state too little leeway to constrain the importation of a product or the exportation of a natural resource will undervalue the preferences of the affected state for more stringent health-and- safety or environmental protection and, concomitantly, weigh too heavily the out-of-state interests at stake. Here, too, an analogous situation arises where affected states can protect themselves only indirectly by invoking a federal remedy. If the standards under which they can obtain injunctions are too stringent, out-of-state interests will be unduly privileged. Thus, the interests at stake in the control of interstate environmental externalities are parallel to those that arise in the context of problems addressed by the Dormant Commerce Clause. Federalism checks race to the bottom Revesz 96 [Richard L. Revesvz, Proffesor of Law at NYU, June 1996, “Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, p. 2343, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3312672?seq=2] aw A few years ago, I challenged the accepted wisdom on the "race to the bottom," arguing that, contrary to the prevailing consensus, competition among states for industry should not be expected to lead to a race that decreases social welfare.3 Moreover, I showed that even if there were such a race, federal environmental regulation would shift the competition among states to other regulatory arenas, or to the fiscal arena. Federal environmental regulation would then have undesirable effects on state interests in these arenas, and would not enhance social welfare. Race-to-the-bottom arguments in favor of federal environmental regulation are, in essence, a frontal challenge on federalism because the problems that they seek to correct can be addressed only by exclusive federal regulatory and fiscal powers.4 Impact – solvency Federalism has been growing – non-ux. Troy E. Smith, Associate Professor of Politics at Brigham Young University Hawaii, November 4, 2011, Review of Federalism, by John Kincaid, Publius, Oxford Journals, http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2011/11/04/publius.pjr045.full, TB Since 1989, interest in, and use of, federalism has been growing while centralized regimes and their legitimacy have been falling. The global recession, riots in Britain, and the evident problems of “too big to fail” foster growing interest in invigorating local institutions and federal structures. As more people turn to the federalism literature to understand federal structures and to seek means to address contemporary issues, they will be confronted by a literature that is vast, diverse, and growing, and a field in which there is no scholarly consensus on the conclusions, “theory, definition, methodology, operation, or study strategies” that should guide federal studies. John Kincaid's new four-volume anthology,Federalism, is a valuable resource for gaining some perspective over, and direction within, this tangled thicket.
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