Table of contents exchange of letters with the minister executive summary



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Report of the COI into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth 10 Jan 2019

COI Report – Part IV
Page 130 of 425

Benjamin had already identified and isolated the affected endpoints and was in the process of conducting forensics.
386. The TigerConnect chat logs show that on the morning of 13 June 2018 when the chat group was first created, Wee had in fact read the messages, and sent some queries, but did not give any instructions. Wee’s evidence is also that he took no steps to confirm with Benjamin if the situation had been isolated and contained.
22.4 Detecting failed logins to the SCM database from Citrix Server
2
First series of failed logins
387. At pm on 13 June 2018, a system-generated email alert was sent to Katherine, notifying her of a number of failed attempts at logging into the SCM database within a short period earlier that same day. All the attempts were made from an IP address which was different from the IP address from which the attempts on 11 and 12 June 2018 were made. At this point, Katherine was not aware that this IP address was that of Citrix Server 2.
388. All the attempts had failed because invalid user-IDs were used. From the email alert, Katherine noticed the following a) That one of the invalid user-IDs was also used in the earlier attempts on 11 June 2018; b) The server name for Citrix Server 3 was being used in an attempt to login to the SCM database, which was very unusual and c) Access was being attempted through a different Citrix server,
Citrix Server 2, after Citrix Server 1 was shutdown.



COI Report – Part IV
Page 131 of 425

389. Katherine surmised that the failed attempts at logging into the SCM database were evidence of someone attempting to gain unauthorised access to the
SCM database. At pm, Katherine forwarded it to Kelvin, Robin and Lum, with the subject of her email being “Login failed – new server.’, and with the IP address of Citrix Server 2 in the body text. Second series of failed logins
390. At pm on 13 July 2018, another system-generated email alert was sent to Katherine, informing her of a few more failed logins to the SCM database over a short period of time earlier that day. Once again, all the attempts were made from Citrix Server 2.
391. In one attempt, the server name for Citrix Server 3 was again used as a user-ID. The user-ID in another attempt was the name of a service account which would not ordinarily be used for the purposes of logging into the SCM database. In yet another attempt, the attacker used a user-ID that it had used in a prior attempt to connect to the SCM database from Citrix Server 1 on 12 June 2018.
392. Katherine was of the view that “these failed login attempts were even
more unusual as compared to the others”, and when she saw these errors, coupled with her knowledge of all the other failed login attempts, she realised that someone was repeatedly trying to gain unauthorised access to the SCM database. She forwarded these alerts to Lum as well.
Lum’s reply at pm
393. Upon receiving Katherine’s pm email, Lum identified the hostname of Citrix Server 3 to be that of a H-Cloud Citrix server. He also identified the IP address from which the attempted logins to the SCM database were made as being associated with Citrix Server 2. Lum checked the login logs for Citrix Server 2, and ascertained that (i) VM 1 was logged into Citrix Server 2 at the time of the failed logins to the SCM database, and (ii) the account used to login to Citrix Server 2 was the SA. account.



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