Table of contents exchange of letters with the minister executive summary



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Report of the COI into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth 10 Jan 2019

COI Report – Part VII
Page 292 of 425

39.3.4
Penetration tests should be conducted outside of the regular schedule
if a need to do so is indicated
847. Inline with taking a proactive strategy towards testing defences and detecting vulnerabilities, IHiS should also consider conducting penetration testing outside of any regular schedule if and when a need is indicated, e.g. when prompted by threat intelligence.
39.3.5
Penetration tests should be conducted by persons with the appropriate
levels of expertise
848. Dan testified that there are various levels of penetration testing that can be done, referring to penetration testing expertise ranging from in-house (e.g. in
IHiS’ case, by GIA or CSG) to independent accredited commercial penetration testers to CSA. He explained that a) There is nothing wrong with relying on in-house penetration testing as the “first-cut”. However, there maybe residual risks as this means there is no external view of system vulnerabilities. These risks maybe mitigated by engaging third-parties to conduct penetration testing. In respect of penetration tests which the CCoP requires CII owners to conduct on their CII, CSA’s requirement under the CCoP) is that if such penetration testing is done by third- party penetration testing service providers, the service providers and their penetration testers must have the requisite industry- recognised accreditation and certification. b)
CSA is building up advanced penetration testing teams, but the resources will be limited and CII owners cannot all rely on CSA to do penetration testing for them.



COI Report – Part VII
Page 293 of 425

849. In this regard, we therefore recommend that a) For CII systems, IHiS must engage independent third-party penetration testing service providers to conduct the penetration testing. These external penetration testers must fulfil CSA’s accreditation and certification requirements under the CCoP. For non-CII systems which are nevertheless critical, IHiS should also consider periodic penetration testing by accredited independent third-party service providers. b) In addition, there should be a strong in-house penetration testing capability, which would include having the in-house penetration testers regularly trained, accredited and certified. c) Such in-house penetration testing function should be independent of IHiS in nature, and could be parked in GIA or another department reporting directly to MOH. For clarity, there should not be any double-hatting in this process, and the person responsible for this function should not bean IHiS employee. d) There should also be clarity on what in-house penetration tests are being conducted and by whom and when, to avoid overlap, or the inadvertent omission of applications/systems/networks for testing. In this connection, the penetration testing department pursuant to c) above could consider drawing up schedules to track regular penetration testing and coverage of all relevant applications/systems/networks. e)
IHiS should consider whether there is any serious need (e.g. prompted by any particular threat intelligence, or alerts from its monitoring and detection systems) for any particular application/system/network to be subject to an advanced penetration test by CSA, and if so, to engage CSA.



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