Tampa Prep 2009-2010 Impact Defense File
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- No risk of chemical or biological terrorism – tech is difficult to produce and it wouldn’t lead to extinction
- Ext 2 – No Extinction
Ext #1 – No RiskNo risk of bio terror – almost every other form of terrorism is more feasible and there is not risk of extinction from itAnthony Lake, G-Town Diplomacy Prof, 2001[The Georgetown Public Policy Review, "Bioterrorism: Interview with Anthony Lake," Spring, LN] It's much harder to develop a biological weapon than a chemical weapon and much, much harder than using computers for terrorist action. So, if you're calculating probabilities, then bioterrorism, probably even more than some forms of nuclear terrorism, is relatively unlikely. I do not walk around everyday worrying that people are dumping microbes in the ventilation ducts of the building I'm in. If we allow ourselves to become scared of this, then in a way, the terrorists have won. If we alter our behavior too much beyond prudent or preventative and preparatory efforts, then the terrorists have won. I don't think the chances are at all high that this will happen; in fact, I think they're very very low. However, the fact is that the Aum Shirinkyo was trying to develop biological weapons and probably used sarin because the Japanese police were closing in on them. (I believe they lost a scientist in the process of trying to develop biological weapons.) We should lament any death, anywhere, but that would be low on the list of lamentations. So while it's very unlikely, it is possible, and in fact we have entered the age in which there have been active efforts to try to develop biological weapons. No risk of chemical or biological terrorism – tech is difficult to produce and it wouldn’t lead to extinctionSteve Bowman, CRS Researcher, 1999["Weapons of Mass Destruction- the Terrorist Threat," 12/18, w/ Helit Barel, http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/crs/wpnsmssdst120899.pdf] Chemical. Toxic industrial chemicals such as chlorine or phosgene are easily available and do not require great expertise to be adapted into chemical weapons. Nerve agents are more difficult to produce, and require a synthesis of multiple precursor chemicals.15 They also require high-temperature processes and create dangerous byproducts, which makes their production unlikely outside of an advanced laboratory. Blister agents such as mustard can be manufactured with relative ease, but also require large quantities of precursor chemicals. The production and transfer of CW precursor chemicals is internationally monitored under the Chemical Weapons Convention, providing some degree of control over their distribution16 Aerosol or vapor forms are the most effective for dissemination, which can be carried out by sprayers or an explosive device. However, agents are vulnerable to temperature, moisture and wind, and would therefore be most effectively used on an indoor population. The Aum Shinrikyo again provides an example of the unpredictable effectiveness of chemical weapons. Although the cult was able to produce the nerve agent Sarin and release it in a closed environment — the Tokyo subway — the attack resulted only in 12 fatalities and injury to hundreds of others, whereas there were 301 fatalities and 5,000 injured in the conventional bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Too many obstacles—technical difficulties Audrey Kurth Cronin, Specialist in Terrorism Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. March 28, 2003 “Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context” CRS There are at least four reasons why terrorist groups like Al Qaeda might avoid using chem-bio agents in attacks against the United States and its interests. First and most important, the technical difficulties in carrying out such attacks continue to be significant. Aum Shinrikyo is a good example of a group that had unusually favorable circumstances for producing chemical and biological weapons, including money, facilities, time and expertise, yet they were unable to do so effectively. Some experts argue that Aum Shinrikyo’s experience, which included problems ranging from obtaining biological seed cultures to effectively disseminating them to chemical leaks and accidents, is as easily a warning of the technical challenges involved as it is an example for future groups.20 For most nonstate actors, difficulties with acquiring materials, maintaining them, transforming them into weapons, and disseminating them effectively are numerous. While many technical advances have occurred in recent years, arguably reducing the barriers somewhat, there are still considerable obstacles to terrorist development of chemical and biological weapons.21 Ext #2 – No ExtinctionBiological warfare wouldn’t cause extinction – diseases can be contained Gregg Easterbrook, The New Republic Editor, 2003[Wired, "We're All Gonna Die!" 11/7, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html] 3. Germ warfare! Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it didn't kill off humanity. Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug introduced into today's Western world would encounter top-notch public health, excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill bioagents. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent (two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future. Bio-Chem weapons not effective Audrey Kurth Cronin, Specialist in Terrorism Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. March 28, 2003 “Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context” CRS Second, as mentioned above, there are far easier and potentially more “effective” (at least in terms of casualty numbers) alternatives to chemical and biological weapons. On the rare occasions when they have been used, CBW have not resulted in large death tolls, especially compared to conventional weapons such as truck bombs and individual explosive devices.22 It is worth bearing in mind that the attacks of September 11th accomplished mass destruction without any unconventional weaponry. If measured strictly in terms of their proven capacity to kill people or the frequency of terrorist use in the past, CBW weapons are not the most worrisome.
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