Tampa Prep 2009-2010 Impact Defense File
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- AT: LNG Terror
AT: LNG Explosion 2/24. All of your LNG Impacts have low probability . ASPEN ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP, 2005 (INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE SAFETY AND SECURITY RISKS OF IMPORTING LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS: A COMPENDIUM , January, p 41) The committee determined that earthquakes are the most likely events to initiate an LNG hazard rather than man-made causes, but the likelihood that an earthquake could lead to a large release of LNG (e.g., caused by sufficient damage to a carrier or an onshore storage tank) was unlikely to very unlikely. Other findings from the study were as follows: • The proposed terminal and the carriers serving it are potential targets for acts of terror, but an actual attack is unlikely. • The chance of a maritime accident in San Pablo Bay and in the vicinity of the Carquinez Strait of a severity sufficient to release LNG is unlikely. • The authority of the USCG and the measures it applies to similar High Consequence Vessels (HCVs) in other United States LNG terminals reduces the threat from acts of terror or sabotage substantially. • A fireball presents the worst case for radiating heat. It is very unusual for LNG to form a fireball when released and ignited, because fireball formation requires the violent mixing of fuel and air prior to ignition. • LNG will not support a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE), because it is exceedingly cold and is stored at ambient pressure in very strong tanks. • A pool fire involving the entire contents of a storage tank, or the entire contents of a single LNG carrier cargo tank released onto San Pablo Bay at the terminal will not cause radiant heat levels dangerous to people and homes in Vallejo, because the circumstances leading to such a large LNG release are more likely to ignite the LNG before it reaches populated areas. AT: LNG TerrorNo impact—the worst case scenario kills 8,000 Kaplan, 6 – Associate Editor of the Council on Foreign Relations (Eben, “Liquefied Natural Gas: A Potential Terrorist Target?” February 27, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9810/) -CMM Are LNG ships and terminals potential terrorist targets? Yes, because of LNG's explosive potential, experts say. Al-Qaeda, for example, has specifically cited LNG as a desirable target, says Rob Knake, senior associate at Good Harbor Consulting, LLC, a homeland-security private consulting firm. Pipelines are not as attractive because the flow of gas can quickly be cut off and an explosion easily contained. Terminals make better targets because an attack could result in a massive fire that could potentially kill scores of people. They are also good targets because "if you take out those terminals, you could have a significant disruption [in the U.S. gas supply,]" Knake says. But an attack on an LNG terminal might not be so damaging. Terminals are equipped with emergency fire detection mechanisms designed to minimize the impact of fires resulting from terrorist attacks or accidents. The most attractive targets are the boats: 1,000-foot tankers with double hulls and specially constructed storage tanks that keep the LNG cold. A report, put out by Good Harbor Consulting assessing the risk of a proposed LNG terminal in Providence, Rhode Island, concluded that a successful terrorist attack on a tanker could result in as many as 8,000 deaths and upwards of 20,000 injuries. It is important to keep in mind that this is the worst case scenario. A report on LNG safety and security by the University of Texas' Center for Energy and Economics explains LNG "tanks require exceptionally large amounts of force to cause damage. Because the amount of energy required to breach containment is so large, in almost all cases the major hazard presented by terrorists is a fire, not an explosion." Tankers aren’t terrorist targets and the impact will be limited Melhem et al 06 – PHD Professor of Structural Engineering (Dr. G. A. Melhem, Dr. A. S. Kalelkar, Dr. S. Saraf “Managing LNG Risks: Separating the Facts from the Myths” updated 2006, http://archives1.iomosaic.com/whitepapers/Managing%20LNG%20Risks.pdf) Myth No. 2 LNG tankers and land based facilities are vulnerable to terrorism; An LNG potential disaster (explosion of an LNG tanker) is greater today because of the threat of terrorism. The gigantic quantity of energy stored in huge cryogenic tanks is what makes LNG a desirable terrorist target. Tankers may be physically attacked in a variety of ways to destroy their cargo or used as weapons against coastal targets. Fact As discussed earlier, LNG ships are not attractive “mass casualties” terrorist targets. Any explosive charge used on an LNG ship will cause immediate ignition of the LNG vapors. The subsequent LNG pool fire will have a potentially significant impact on the immediate release area only. This will significantly limit the extent of impact. There are also new Coast Guard security regulations (33 CFR Part 105) for LNG tanker movements and terminals. In addition, IMO and the USCG have established stringent security requirements for vessels in international and United States waters. There are too many precautions for there to be a terrorist attack O’Malley- Chief, Ports and Facilities Activities United States Coast Guard- 8 (Mark, “SAFETY AND SECURITY OF LIQUID NATURAL GAS,” May 7, 2007, Lexis) –CMM In addition to undergoing a much more rigorous and frequent examination of key operating and safety systems, LNG vessels are subject to additional measures of security when compared to crude oil tankers, as an example. Many of the special safety and security precautions the Coast Guard has long established for LNG vessels derived from our analysis of "conventional" navigation safety risks such as groundings, collisions, propulsion or steering system failures. These precautions pre-dated the September 11, 2001 tragedy, and include such measures as special vessel traffic control measures that are implemented when an LNG vessel is transiting the port or its approaches, safety zones around the vessel to prevent other vessels from approaching nearby, escorts by patrol craft and, as local conditions warrant, coordination with other Federal, state and local transportation, law enforcement and/or emergency management agencies to reduce the risks to, or minimize the interference from other port area infrastructure or activities. These activities are conducted under the authority of existing port safety and security statutes, such as the Magnuson Act (50 U.S.C. 191 et. seq.) and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, as amended. Since September 11, 2001, additional security measures have been implemented, including the requirement that all vessels calling in the U.S. must provide the Coast Guard with a 96-hour advance notice of arrival (increased from 24 hours advance notice pre- 9/11). This notice includes information on the vessel's last ports of call, crew identities and cargo information. In addition, the Coast Guard now regularly boards LNG vessels at- sea, where Coast Guard personnel conduct special "security sweeps" of the vessel and ensure it is under the control of proper authorities during its port transit. In order to protect the vessel from external attack, LNG vessels are escorted through key port areas. These armed escorts afford protection to the nearby population centers by reducing the probability of a successful attack against an LNG vessel. These actions are in addition to the safety and security oriented boardings previously described. Of course, one of the most important post-9/11 maritime security improvements has been the passage of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA). Under the authority of MTSA, the Coast Guard developed a comprehensive new body of security measures applicable to vessels, marine facilities and maritime personnel. Our domestic maritime security regime is closely aligned with the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. The ISPS Code, a mandatory requirement of the SOLAS Convention, was adopted at the IMO in December 2002 and came into effect on July 1st 2004. Under the ISPS Code, vessels in international service, including LNG vessels, must have an International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC). To be issued an ISSC by its flag state, the vessel must develop and implement a threat-scalable security plan that, among other things, establishes access control measures, security measures for cargo handling and delivery of ships stores, surveillance and monitoring, security communications, security incident procedures, and training and drill requirements. The plan must also identify a Ship Security Officer who is responsible for ensuring compliance with the ship's security plan. The Coast Guard rigorously enforces this international requirement by evaluating security compliance as part of our ongoing port state control program. Any LNG vessel entering Long Island Sound would be subject to strict safety and security standards. There would be a moving security zone around the LNG carriers and a fixed safety zone around the proposed Floating, Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU). Coast Guard enforcement activities would be based on the most current threat assessment as well as standing Coast Guard policy and procedures which account for known and unknown threats. State and local law enforcement agencies could assist the Coast Guard with the enforcement of these safety zones. Another element of the extensive layered security system established by MTSA is Coast Guard approved facility security plans. Implementing the facility security plan for the FSRU would be Broadwater Energy's responsibility. An element of the facility security plan for the FSRU would include the employment of private security guards to conduct on-water security patrols in the vicinity of the FSRU. Private security guards would not have the authority to enforce the fixed or moving safety zones. Directory: files -> documents documents -> North Mankato Taylor Library documents -> In the Red and Brown Water documents -> - documents -> I. Disaster Summary Sheet II. 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